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This dissertation addresses four hypotheses in regards 
to future valuation by individuals. These include a 
hypothesis that the provision of public goods in the far 
future, a period in excess of an individual's lifetime and 
the lifetimes of his/her immediate descendants, is a likely 
component of utility functions. The second hypothesis is 
that the importance of distant future public goods provision 
is unaffected by contemporary consumption levels. The third 
hypothesis suggests that individuals discount the far future 
differently than th~y discount future events in the near 
future. The final hypothesis is that the extent of future 
valuation is determined by specific concern based upon 
religious or ethical considerations as well as concern for 
descendants. 
Evidence supporting all four hypotheses was derived 
from a survey instrument administered to a group of 147 
students at the University of Wyoming and a second group of 
60 office workers in Illinois. These responses were largely 
consistent with a zero discount rate on far future events. 
These results imply that far future impacts are 
undervalued in benefit-cost analysis. A cautious approach is 
recommended in policy analysis, especially when contemporary 
activity is characterized by irreversibilities. 
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Chapter I 
Valuation of the Future: an Introduction 
How do people value the distant future? Do they value 
events that will occur to future generations? How and why 
do they formulate these beliefs? What factors are important 
and what factors are unimportant? If an opportunity were 
afforded individuals to transfer wealth and/or mitigate 
negative impacts to future generations would it be utilized? 
A major reason for the contemporary importance of such 
questions is the fact that man, substantially more than at 
any other time in his past history, now possess the ability 
to irreversibly alter the resources, environmental quality, 
and total level of welfare available to future society. In 
fact, for the first time man has come to realize, in stark 
contrast to the mainstream of social and scientific thinking 
which has developed since the Renaissance, that the 
likelihood of endowing the future with a negative 
inheritance is large and increasing. The large scale 
resource and environmental problems facing the world are 
numerous. Climate may be affected by stratospheric 
pollution and increasing atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide; future environmental quality is jeopardized by 
exotic pollutants such as DDT, PCBs, and plutonium; and 
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future availability of nonrenewable resources is impacted by 
current consumption levels. 
Chapter II considers the concept of future valuation as 
developed by the mainstream of neoclassical economic 
theorists. In this chapter the rational for discounting is 
developed via consideration of the two justifications most 
often cited for placing a lessened weight on future events, 
opportunity cost and time preference. The implications of 
utilizing high and low discount rates in social decision 
making is discussed through the process of analogizing the 
discount rate to a "time window." 
The literature of mainstream economists is summarized 
in detail in this chapter. The literature survey begins 
with the works of Pigou (1920) and follows the development 
of the discounting literature to its pre:se11t level. 
Chapter III considers alternative concepts of future 
valuation as embodied in the works of non-mainstream 
economists and other disciplines. Religious and ethical 
basis for future valuations are also considered and the 
implications of the teachings of three religions on the 
valuation of far future activity are discussed. These 
religions include Christianity, Budhism, and Islam. In 
addition, four major ethical frameworks are analyzed; these 
include Rawlsian, Nietzschean, Utilitarian, and Paretian. 
In Chapter IV, a theoretical model of an individual's 
future valuation is developed. This model is used to 
~- -~ 
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analyze specific hypothesis regarding an individual's 
concern for the provision of public goods in the distant 
future. The model utilizes a three period utility function 
in which the periods are the present, the near future and 
the far future. Present and near future periods are assumed 
to encompass the period of an individuals lifetime and the 
lifetimes of immediate family members while the far future 
period is occupied by distant generations. From this model 
four hypothesis of future perception are developed. The 
first hypothesis is that the far future availability of 
public goods is important. The second hypothesis is that 
the importance of distant future public goods provision is 
unaffected by present and near future consumption levels. 
The third hypothesis is that individuals discount the far 
future differently than they discount future events in the 
relatively near future. The final hypothesis is that the 
"rate" which gove=ns the individuals valuation of public 
goods in the distant future is determined by specific 
factors in the utility function. These factors may include 
ethical and religious considerations as well as concern for 
descendents. 
Chapter V considers the possibility of empirical 
verification of future values exhibited in the hypothesis 
developed in Chapter IV. The potential for appiication of 
market and non-market techniques is explored. The 
applicability of market based techniques such as weak 






separability, hedonic specification, and others are largely 
dismissed due to the apparent nonexistence of a relationship 
between the distant future and contemporary market prices. 
Allocation of future public goods via a contemporary 
referendum is discussed. It is demonstrated that under most 
voting rules the allocation of future public goods is likely 
to be non-optimal. Finally, the feasibility of utilizing 
contingent valuation methodology is considered. Potential 
biases, which some have argued are inherent in the 
contingent valuation approach, are discussed along with some 
recent results of the willingness to pay literature. The 
chapter concludes that contingent valuation offers the only 
possible means of determining how individuals value the 
distant future availability of public goods. 
In chapter VI, an experiment is developed to determine 
the answers to the hypothesis presented in Chapter IV. This 
experiment utilizes the contingent valuation technique to 
determine how individuals value the far future provision of 
public goods. The design of a survey instrument utilized in 
the analysis is detailed. This instrument enables 
individuals, through the mechanism of a contingent market, 
to reveal preferences for future public goods. Furthermore, 
the impact of the individual's religious, ethical, and 
descendent-related leanings upon this valuation can be 
investigated. 
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Chapter VII presents the results of the contingent 
valuation analysis. These results substantiate the 
hypotheses contained in Chapter IV. In addition, the 
chapter contains suggestions for further research. The 
5 
impact of these results for ~olicy formulation is explored 
in Chapter VIII. The most important impact is the fact that 
far future effects should be included in cost-benefit 
analysis and these effects should be discounted at a 
reduced, or possibly zero, rate of discount. 
Appendix I contains the survey instrument utilized in 
this analysis. Appendix II contains a general equilibrium 
model of discounting behavior and the preservation versus 
development question • 




Valuation of the Future: 
The Neoclassical Economist's Viewpoint 
In this chapter the neoclassical economist view of the 
future is detailed. The chapter begins with a review of the 
two generally accepted reasons for discounting: time 
preference and opportunity cost. The importance of this 
rate in policy analysis is discussed along with an 
illustration of the impact of different rates in traditional 
discounting formula. Following this discussion, a review of 
the prominent neoclassical writers on the discount rate is 
conducted. This review begins with the work of Pigou (1920) 
and traces the history of the literature to its present 
level. 
Economics has been concerned with the future since the 
beginning of the discipline. However, with the advent of 
very long term federal water resource programs, which 
required the developmen~ of techniques to determine the 
financial feasibility of water projects, a need developed to 
put an explicit perspective on the value of future economic 
events. In this context, economists generally agree that 
the value of a future economic event, say for example the 
receipt of $10,000 dollars in benefits from a water project 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
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in the year 2010, is less than its face value when 
considered in todayts terms. That is, the "present value: 
of $10,000 to be received at some time in the future is 
something less than $10,000. 
There are two generally accepted reasons for this time 
dependent devaluing, or discounting of the magnitude of a 
future occurrence: time preference and opportunity cost. 
TL~e preference, economists, psychologists and others would 
certainly agree, arrives from the fact that individuals 
would readily prefer an equal amount of consumption today 
rather than at some future date. 1 That is, if given a 
choice between receiving two pounds of commodity X today, or 
the same amount of the commodity one year from now, the 
rational consumer would prefer the former alternative, 
assuming that X is a good, i.e. something that yields 
utility. Two general explanations of individual time 
preference behavior are often cited. The first of these is 
lwhile most economists agree that the consumer does 
discount future economic activity, many_~o~ld argue that 
such discounting is not appropriate. This principle was put 
forward as early as 1888 by Bohm-Bawerk who remarked that 
"to goods which are destined to meet the wants of the 
future, we ascribe a value which is really less than the 
true intensity of their future marginal utility." E.V. 
Bohm-Bawerk, The Positive Theorf of Capital, (1888), W. 
Smart Translation (New York: G.E. Stechert and Company, 
1891), p. 253. Other economists who believe that the 
discounting of future utility is in some sense irrational 
include Marshall (1920), Pigou (1920), and Strotz (1955-56) • 





the fact that, with growing incomes~ most i~dividuals expect 
to be earning a larger income in the future. When this 
factor is combined with the standard notion that the 
relative marginal evaluation of a dollar's worth of 
consumption decreases with income, an explanation for time 
preference behavior is provided. The second factor which 
provides an additional explanation of such action is that 
individuals can never be absolutely certain that a future 
event will occur in a prescribed manner - or even that they 
will be able to take advantage of it if it does occur. 
Opportunity cost, the second major reason for 
discounting the magnitude of future economic events, occurs 
due to the notion of the time value of money. This time 
value of money arises from the fact that, assuming an 
interest rate of i%, a dollar received today may be invested 
to yield a total of (l+i) dollars one year from now. 
Therefore, in order for two payments occurring 1 year apart 
to have equivalent present value, the latter payment must 
exceed the former one by i% in order to account for the lost 
opportunity of the foregone return. 2 
2combination of these two explanations for time 
preference behavior seems less than satisfactory. The 
reason I eat the ice-cream bar in my refrigerator today 
instead of next week has nothing to do with the fact that 
next week I may have higher income or that in the interim I 
may die, suffer a loss of electrical power, or be forced to 
(Footnote Co~tinued) 
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Explicitly, the weighting scheme devised to account for 
the effects of time preference and opportunity costs take 




where PV equals the present value of some future value (FV) 
to be received t time periods distant and r is the discount 
rate. 3 The discount rate represents the weight that is 
applied to the value of future income or consumption. 
Notice that the larger is r, the smaller is the present 
value of some future economic activity. If r = 0, the 
future values and present values are equivalent. 
Of course, most instances of computing present values 
from future values are much more complex than that described 
above. Often, the decision to undertake a project which 
spans several years will re~~ire the consideration of future 
returns and future costs in each year. In this context, and 
(Footnote Continued) 
stand-in for my boss at an out-of-town conference due to the 
untimely death of his sister. 
3The logical progression of this formula from the 
opportunity cost argument is readily apparent. If $1 is 
investe~ for one year at a rate of i% it will grow to 
$1(1+i) 1 This amount equals the FV. If r=i, then the FV/(l+r) = $1. Note however, that no logical link from 
this geometric formulation to the time preference argument 
c~~ be formulated. 
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NPV = I: 
t=l 
B.._ - C.._ 
I.. I.. 
(l+r)t 
= Net Present Value 
= Benefits occurring 
= Costs occurring in 
= the discount rate 
= a particular year 
in time t 
timet 
= the last year in which benefits and/or costs 
occur (i.e., years= 1~ 2, ••• , t, ••• , T). 
Note that the net present value of a project depends on 
three factors: the time horizon, the distribution of costs 
and benefits, and the discount rate. Both the time horizon 
and the distribution of costs and benefits depend only on 
the project being analyzed. However, the discount rate is a 
choice parameter; it is this choice which gives rise to much 
controversy. Different rates can force net preset value to 
be larger, smaller or even negative. 
To illustrate this, consider a project such as the 
construction of a dam, involving high initial costs for 
several years and moderate benefits for many years 
afterwards. A relatively low discount rate will make the 
project feasible because future benefits remain relatively 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
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unaffected. However, a high discount rate will drive the 
present value of distant, future benefits to near zero thus 
making the project infeasible from an economic standpoint. 
In this context the discount rate is a "time window". 
A high rate gives us a very myopic view of the future and a 
low rate preserves our futurescopic vision. A discount rate 
of zero would yield perfect futurescopic views and cause us 
to value future costs and benefits as if they occurred 
today. 
The choice of a low rate of discount implies that we 
place high values on future economic activity while choice 
of a high rate implies that future activity is valued much 
less in relation to the present. This gives rise to several 
ethical questions regarding the choice of a discount rate 
since often the utilities of different generations are being 
compared. These ethical ~~estions will be discussed in 
Chapter III. 
The choice of proper discount rate(s) for evaluating 
public investment decisions has occupied a large bulk of the 
presumably, productive time of economists for decades. The 
list of authors is this area is long and the list of myriad 
conclusions is perhaps longer. The proper conclusion of any 
paper on discounting is that there is no conclusion. Mayhem 
abounds. Authors have approached the discount rate decision 
by arguing that it should be the long run consumption rate 
of interest, the opportunity cost of capital -- either as an 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
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overall average or as a weighted average of the cost of 
capital in the various sectors of the economy from which the 
funds are derived, and even by a weighted average of the 
cons~~ption rate of interest and the opporttu~ity cost of 
capital approaches (the latter which could also be some 
weighted average of returns in different sectors!). Some 
authors have argued that none of the above so called 
attempts at measuring opportunity costs, either of 
consumption or of investment, are correct. This latter set 
of authors argue that the rate that should govern societal 
investment (and possibly private investment also) for the 
future has nothing to do with the opportunity cost measures 
discussed by most authors, but should reflect the autonomous 
worth society feels towards the future. These authors have 
developed the notion of discounting via the use of 
"socially" derived rates. A..'"ld of course there are those 
that argue that this "social" rate can be proxied with other 
rates in society -- perhaps by using the consumption rate of 
interest. Finally, some authors have, as one can guess, 
argued for combinations of social and opportunity cost 
criteria. This is perhaps the ultimate extension of the 
complexity of the discounting debate. Unfortunately, the 
profession is only perhaps slightly closer to resolution of 
the issue of what constitutes a proper rate of discount. 
Pigou (1920) argued that individual investment 
decisions are myopic. He believed that the government is 




the guardian of the interests of future generations as well 
as the interests of the present generation. Therefore, 
welfare in the Pigovian model is a function of the level of 
utility of all individuals whether they are born yet or not. 
Under this arrangement, it becomes the role of government to 
consider the interests of the future as well as the present 
generation when making decisions which affect these groups. 
Because discounting would force society to place less weight 
on impacts which occur to future members of society it woul~ 
lessen the representation of future individuals in the 
government process. Thus the effect of discounting is to 
force government to a reduced level of consideration of 
future impacts; discounting is then, a way to pass 
judgement on the merit of future generations' utility and is 
therefore inappropriate. 
F.P. Ra~sey {1928) is a historical opponent to the 
discounting of utility. In his paper he described the 
practice as being one "which is ethically indefensible and 
. 1 f th akn f th · · t" n 4 ar~ses mere y rom ewe ess o e ~ag~na ~on ••• 
Despite this statement, in Section II of this paper, Ramsey 
extended his basic model of national savings behavior to the 
case where future utility is discounted. Further, he was 
4F.P. Ramsey, "A Mathematical Theory of Saving," 
Economic Journal, 38 (1928), p. 543. 




careful in this extension to point out that the rate of 
discount which should apply to future monetary sums had 
nothing to do with the rate which should be utilized to 
discount future consumption. 
Ramsey's (1928) work would, if the single statement 
14 
mentioned above was ignored, seem to indicate acceptance of 
the idea of some form of discounting of societal decisions. 
Ramsey apparently resolved this conflict as in a later work 
(1931) he argued for the need to place a perspective on 
time. 
Krutilla and Eckstein (1958) argued that the discount 
rate should reflect the cost of removing resources from the 
private s·ector. This "social cost" approach looks at the 
various sources of funds and estimates the value attached to 
these funds in their alternative uses. Thus it is necessary 
to ascertain the interest rates faced by indivi~~als and 
firms. Further, one must also determine what proportion of 
these costs are "requisitioned" from the various sectors of 
the economy. This method abstracts from charges in 
distribution of incom~; who receives the benefits and who 
receives the costs is a matter of indifference. 
Eckstein (1958) pointed out that use of an opportunity 
cost-based discount rate as a selection criteria would wipe 
out the justification for most public works projects. He 
argued that this was ·inappropriate and maintained that: 
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Social policy as derived from the political 
process, may prefer rejection of present 
interta~poral preferences in favor of a 
redistribution of income towards future 
generations ••• It is not logically inconsistent 
for the same person to be willing to to borrow 
at a high interest rate to increase his present 
consumption while voting to spend tax money to 
build a project from which future generations 
will benefit, for in the case of a vote to tax, 
he can be sure that other i§dividuals can be 
compelled to act similarly. 
In light of this, Eckstein maintains that a low (social) 
interest rate should be used for project evaluation. 
15 
However, he did not believe that opportunity costs should be 
ignored, especially in light of the fact that such a low 
rate could be misused to enable "the justification of 
projects with little economic value."6 He suggested that 
opportunity costs should be determined via an analysis of 
where funds are requisitioned. These costs thus become 
indirectly reflected in the evaluation process. 7 
Eckstein:s method involves use of a sliding scale of 
benefit cost ratios and discount rates that correspond to a 
project's minimum economic criteria equalling the 
opportunity cost of funds withdrawn from the the private 
5otto Eckstein, Water-Resource Development: The 
Economics of Project Evaluation, (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1958), pp. 99-100. 
6Eckstein, p. 100. 
7see Krutilla and Eckstein (1958). 
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sector. Under Eckstein's proposal, projects with 
benefit-cost ratios of unity require evaluation using a 
16 
discount rate which is equal to full opportunity cost while 
projects with higher ratios may be discounted at lower 
. rates. 8 
Steiner (1959) believed that the discount rate should 
be a social time preference rate which is derived from the 
opportunity cost of deferring consumption. Others have 
referred to this rate as the consumption rate of interest. 
Steiner also argues that opportunity costs must be 
cc~sidered. His conclusion in this area was similar to 
Eckstein's (1958) in that only in the case where a project 
is evaluated via a time preference rate which equals the 
projects internal rate of return and the market return on 
investment are opportunity costs equal to zero. If the time 
preference rate used in project evaluation is greater th~~ 
the projects internal rate of ret.urn and the market's 
marginal return on investment, then opportunity costs of 
public investment are negative. Alternatively, if the 
market return and the project's return are both higher than 
8Eckstein's proposal also requires that project 
life-span and ratios of operating cost to fixed cost be 
considered. Ceteris paribus, longer lives require higher 
rates of discount while a higher ratio of operating cost to 
fixed expenditures necessitates evaluation at a lower 
discount rate. 
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the time preference rate, then opportunity costs of public 
investment are positive. 
In practice, Steiner identified three specific types of 
opporturJLty cost. The first of which represents the purely 
public opportunity cost of utilizing the public budget for 
one project over another. This cost is related to the 
internal rate of return of a particular public project and 
the social time preference rate (the consumption rate of 
interest). If federal budgets are fully flexible this cost 
is zero. The second type of opportunity cost captures the 
effect of displacing specific private projects with public 
investment. This cost depends on the net benefits of the 
private projects evaluated at the social time preference 
rate. Steiner noted that in an economy with a large 
percentage of under employed resources, this value is likely 
to be zero. The third type of opportunity cost is 
identically equal to that identified by Eckstein (1958) and 
Krutilla and Eckstein (1958). This is the opportunity cost 
of transferring funds from the private to the public sector. 
It is calculated by an analysis of the sectors of the 
private economy where public funds are originated. In the 
special case where only unutilized resources are transferred 
from the private to the public sector, this cost is also 
zero. 
Marglin (1963A) focused his arguments regarding the 
discount rate on the relationship between generations. He 
IE> ,dr-... -· Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
~~:-. 
18 
explicitly argued that the social rate of discount is less 
than the market rate because of the welfare aspects of 
present social investment on future generations. He 
rejected the ideas that 1.) "the rate of interest determined 
in an atomistic competitive market need have any normative 
significance in the planning of collective investments," and 
2.) that the market determined rate of growth of the economy 
is optimal in a welfare sense. 9 This suggests that 
gover~~ent might maximize the welfare function (which 
includes future generations) by encouraging investment (both 
private and public) via use of a lower rate. In practice, 
discounting is not used at all in the Marglin model; 
decisions are based on the rationale of the "collective, 
political capacity," as a final result of which, investments 
are undertaken which have future returns too low to justify 
private invest~ent. 
Marglin postulated the existence of a social discount 
rate by asking the rhetorical question, "Why do governments 
require citizens to sacrifice current consumption in order 
to undertake investments that will not yield their benefits 
until those called upon to make the sacrifice are all 
9s.A. Marglin, "The Social Rate of Discount and the 
Optimal Rate of Investment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
77 {1963A), p. 111. 





dead?"10 J.ltlarglin proposed three explanations for this 
behavior. He proceeded to reject the first two of these 
postulates and accepted the third. The first explanation, 
19 
Marglin termed the "authoritarian answer," was the same one 
suggested by Pigou (1932). This is the notion that 
government represents the interests of the unborn. 11 
Marglin rejected this postulate on the grounds that a 
government which is actively pursuing the interests of the 
unborn at the expense of the electorate can not fulfill the 
democratic principle the requires ~onsideration of the 
wishes of the body politic. 
The second postulate, which Marglin called the 
"schizophrenic answer," is a notion that individuals possess 
two sets of preference orderings. One set governing their 
behavior as individuals and the other governing behavior as 
citizens or members of society. Under this dual 
arrangement, we can explain behavior which is consistent 
with both the observation of individual self-interest and at 
the same time collective altruism. Marglin expresses great 
sympathy for this view but in the e~d he is forced to reject 
it -- mainly due to the difficulty of deciding which one of 
10Marglin, 1963A, p.95. 
11Pigou's work is discussed earlier in this section. 
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the dual preference arrangements should be used by society 
to determine investment levels.
Marglin’s third postulate, and the one which won his 
support, is the "interdependence answer." In developing 
this answer he assumed the following utility function;
u i   U ±  ( C ^ C ^ C p   C ± ) 
where is the utility of individual i which is a function 
of his own consumption, C^, the consumption of future 
generations, C^, and the consumption of his contemporaries 
in the present generation, Cp - C^. Total differentiation of 
this function yields:
dU± = SU± + ^ U ± dCf +^U. d(C - C±).
aci acf a(cp"ci}
Marglin made the following assumptions regarding the 
magnitude of the marginal values existing in a neighborhood 
around Ci, Cp, and Cp-C^:
= 1/ = a, = P
£cf
If we utilize these relationships and the fact that d(Cp-C^) 
= dCp-dC^, the total differential becomes: 
dui = dC± + adcf + ptdCp-dC^.
And if we assume that at the margin, the sacrifice of one 
dollar of present consumption yields k dollars to the 
consumption level of the next generation, i.e.,
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then this implies that an individual receives a satisfaction 
level of ak when he invests one dollar for future 
generations. Therefore, it becomes rational for the 
individual to unilaterally invest if dUi = -1 + ak is 
nonnegative. That is, the change in the utility of 
individual i is equal to the sum of utility loss to i due to 
a reduction in present consumption by $1.00 plus the gain in 
i's utility which arises out of the fact that the 
consumption of future generations is increased by ak 
dollars. This unilateral investment criteria reduces to ak 
= 1. 
In the same manner the investment criteria that governs 
he desire of the individual to see one of his contemporaries 
invest a dollar for future generations is determined by the 
following relationship: 
dU. = -13 + rrk. 
~ 
That is, the incremental change in individual i's utility is 
equal to the sum of i's utility loss due to the reduction of 
one of his contemporary's consumption by $1.00 plus i's gain 
due to the increase in the consumption of future 
generations. This contemporary investment criteria reduces 
to ak ~ 13. If a society is made up of homogeneous members, 
then it is conceivable for some 13 < ak < 1 1 that all members 
of the society would like to see each other invest but none 
would do so individually. 




The argument for investment is strengthened 
considerably if all individuals in the society invest $1.00. 
Assuming n individuals, the change in utility for individual 
i becomes: 
dUi = -1 + akn- ~(n-1) 
Where of course, -1 is individual i's utility loss due to 
the reduction in consumption by $1.00, akn is the gain in 
utility to individual i arising out of the investment of n 
dollars, and ~(n-1) is the utility loss to individual i 
which comes about because his/her n-1 contemporaries have 
sacrificed current consumption by $1.00 each. This 
collective investment criteria implies that all individuals 
are better off if: 
akn ~1+~(n-1). 
Note that as n becomes large, the utility change for 
individual i approaches n tL~es the utility change arising 
from a dollar investment by one of i's contemporaries. That 
is, as ~oo 
dUi :::: n[ -~ +ak]. 
This implies that for large societies the condition required 
for each individual to favor collective investment reduces 
approximately to condition required for individual to favor 
investment by others. 
Marglin supported the conclusion of his interdependence 
answer and argued that this is the source of motivation for 
long-term societal investment. Note that the operational 
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discount rate implied by this procedure is a purely social 
rate which has absolutely nothing to do with any other rate 
23 
prevalent in society -- including the consumption rate of 
interest. Facilitating confusion on this issue is the fact 
that the consumption rate of interest has been termed a 
"social" rate by other writers. 12 
In a follow up paper the same year, Marglin (1963B) 
reiterated the conclusions of his earlier work (1963A) and 
expressed the view that the opportunity costs of displaced 
private investment must be considered when resources are 
transferred from the public to the private sector. 
According to Marglin, this displacement must be accounted 
for because of two reasons. The first of these occurs 
because of the discrepancy between the rate Marglin feels 
should govern public decisions and the rate which governs 
private decisions (this discrepancy formed the thesis of his 
earlier paper). That is, since the optimal public rate is 
lower than the appropriate rate in the private sector, the 
marginal productivity of private capital will, of course, be 
greater. Obviously, when private capital is transferred to 
lower valued uses in the public sector, society incurs some 
loss because of the different marginal productivities of 
12see Eckstein (1958), Steiner {1959), and Lind {1982). 
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capital in the two sectors and as a result less private 
investment is undertaken than would otherwise be the case. 
A second reason for displaced private investment is, 
according to Marglin, the fact that government performs many 
duties which may be performed by the private sector. He 
argued that this displacement occurs due to the fact that 
the "boundary between the public and private investment 
sectors is not absolute in modern capitalistic economics."13 
Opportunity costs must be accounted for in the project 
evaluation phase to reflect this displacement of resources. 
In order to account for displaced priva~e investment, 
he supported the notion, pioneered by Eckstein (1958) and 
expanded by Steiner (1959), that the evaluation of public 
investments be directly altered. 
Since the marginal social rate of discount 
reflects the community's marginal weight on 
conswuption at different tLues, the appropriate 
basis for comparison of alternative public and 
private investment is the present value of their 
net benefits to society evaluated at the 
marginal social rate of discount. Thus, in the 
planning of public inves~uent, the present value 
of the social benefits of private investment 
that public investment displaces, evaluated at 
the marginal social rate of discount, supersedes 
the money cost of public investment as the 
measure of its true social cost ••• but, in 
evaluating the social cost of public investment, 
an opportunity cost reflecting the social value 
of utilizing resources in private investment 
replaces the money cost of the portion of the 
13Marglin, 1963B, p. 275. 




resourci~ that comes from the private investment 
sector. 
25 
In this context Marglin also supported a symmetric approach 
that the value of public investment also be beefed up to 
account for the benefits which accrue to the private sector 
as a result of public undertakings. 
Tullock (1964) commented on the Marglin (1963A) paper. 
Tullock conceded that the idea of collective investment to 
support some group is a sound one. Indeed, he cited the 
work of Vickrey (1962) who argues that individuals would 
often be encouraged to make transfers to other members of 
society if they knew that others would also make such 
transfers. Despite this, however, Tullock disagreed with 
the Marglin conclusion. He argued that it is ridiculous to 
collectively reduce consumption today in order to increase 
the income of the future generation. This is due to 
Tullock's belief (and of course that of others also) that 
the future generation is going to be wealthier. Therefore, 
in Tullock's view, Marglin's scheme "taxes the poor to help 
the rich." 
Lind (1964) also commented on the Marglin (1963A) work. 
He showed that in a homogeneous society, "if each 
individual, given the market equilibrium, feels that the 
14Marglin, 1963B, pp. 277-78 • 
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marginal rate at which he is willing to trade present for 
future consumption is correct for every other individual, 
then his private and social rates of discount are 
equal ••• "15 The implication of this is that in societies 
characterized by similar tastes and incomes, the market rate 
of interest should be used to determine the relative merit 
of public investment decisions which benefit future 
generation. 
In addition, Lind suggested that when tastes and 
incomes are not nearly homogeneous, the operative discount 
rate for investment decisions may be greater or smaller than 
the market rate of interest. The magnitude of this rate 
depends upon the relative marginal valuation that an 
individual places upon consumption by himself, by his 
contemporaries, and by future generations. Lind stated that 
in this situation it is L~possible to achieve some optL~~~ 
amount of investment and that no social discount rate 
exists. 
Feldstein (1964) advocated the use of a shadow price to 
reflects social time preference considerations on funds 
withdrawn from the private sector to fund public projects. 
In addition, Feldstein argued that this shadow price should 
15Robert c. Lind, "The Rate of Discount and the Optimal 
Rate of Investment: Further Comment," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 78 (1964), p. 345 • 
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also reflect the productivity of funds in private 
investment. 16 This latter requirement is necessary in the 
Feldstein analysis due to the fact that "the interest rate 
of even a perfect capital market would be unsuitable for 
27 
1 · ubl. · · 11 17 eva uat~ng p ~c ~nvestment proJects. This holds partly 
due to notions of social time preference, but it also arises 
for due to the fact that an autonomously determined rate of 
interest in the private sector, which reflects private 
opportunity costs, can not possibly reflect social 
opportunity cost: 
Investment enhances the productivity of labour 
and other factors of production, and, as a 
result, increases their income. This is a cost 
to a private investor, who calculates his rate 
of return net of payments to other factors. But 
to society as a whole, those increased factor 
incomes should be treated as a gain. The social 
rate of return on investment, i.e., the marginal 
output-capital ratio, may therefore be much 
gre~ter !§an the private marginal efficiency of 
cap~ tal. 
This point was also raised by Sen (1961). 
Furthermore, Feldstein rejected, at least partially, 
the notion that the prevailing rate of interest is 
determined via the equating of the marginal productivity of 
16see Eckstein (1958), Steiner (1959), and Marglin 
(1963B). 
17M.S. Feldstein, "The Social Time Preference Discount 
Rate," The Economic Journal, (June 1964), p. 379. 
18Feldstein, p. 364. 
!£<" ..i..:_ 
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investment and the marginal time preference of consumers.19 
He argued that given the prevalence of "liquidity preference 
theories which emphasize the 'non-real' monetary nature of 
interest rate determination" and the L-npossibility of 
producers and consumers knowing optimal investment and 
consumption paths through time, the market rate of interest 
can have little consequence as a societal decision 
criteria. 20 
Feldstein agreed with Marglin that the social rate of 
time preference must reflect the notion that public 
investment is a public good and concludes, as did Marglin 
(1963A) that social time preference determination can only 
be accomplished by explicit government action. However, he 
disagreed with Marglin's belief that government must only 
undertake activity consistent with the wishes of the present 
populace, as opposed to the notion raised by Pigou (1920), 
Ramsey (1928), and Sen (1960) that the government must also 
represent the interests of the unborn and/or has a 
obligation to hand out prescription glasses to correct for 
myopic time vision. In essence his position is that the 
social rate may reflect all of these factors. Feldstein 
argues that the magnitude of this government-determined rate 
19see Lind (1964). 
2°Feldstein, p. 363. 
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should vary over time to reflect growth in consumption 
levels and population and changes in society time 
preference. 
29 
Diamond (1968) commented on Marglin's (1963B) work on 
the opportunity costs of public investment. He argued that 
the assumptions necessary to justify Marglin's advocacy of 
shadow pricing capital to indicate opportunity costs while 
discounting projects at the social rate of discount are too 
restrictive to make the technique of any practical value in 
policy analysis. 
Baumel (1968, 1970) argued that if some consumers are 
willing to purchase long term government bonds at an 
interest rate of r percent, this constitutes an acceptable 
estimate of their time preference. However, Baumel pointed 
out that even if r is a passable measure of marginal time 
preference it is not even remotely an ade~~ate indicator of 
the social opportunity costs of public investment, i.e. the 
marginal return to private investment. This divergence . 
between the private rate of time preference and the 
opportunity cost of social capital is unavoidable and is 
also responsible for much confusion in the literature. The 
divergence occurs for two major reasons: the distorting 
effect of corporate and other taxes and varying 
accommodation of risk between the public and the private 
sectors. 
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To illustrate the first cause of divergence between 
private rates of time preference and the marginal return on 
private investment, the wedge-driving effects of taxes, 
assume: 
(1) full employment, 
(2) no risk, 
(3) corporations are the sole provider of goods and 
services, 
(4) corporations are financed solely by equity (no debt 
financing) , 
(5) a uniform corporate tax of SO%, 
(6) a single rate of interest say r, and 
(7) taxes are only paid by the corporate sector. 
Since under these assumptions, all inputs to government come 
from the corporate sector, the opportunity cost of using 
resources is the return that they would have earned in the 
that sector, i.e. the marginal efficiency of private 
investment in the corporate arena. Under these assumptions, 
the marginal investor would be indifferent between 
investments in the public and the private sector only if 
realized returns are the same. However, since one-half of 
all corporate earnings are taxed away, private sector 
investments must yield twice those of public investments in 
order to compensate investors by the same amount after taxes 
are paid. Therefore, the marginal pre-tax rate of return in 
the private sector must be 2r in order to satisfy investors' 
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expectations. This implies that if the rate of return on 
government securities (one measure of private time 
preference) is 5%, then the rate of return in the private 
sector, and the single social opportunity cost discount 
rate, must be 10%. 21 Generally, for these assumptions and 
any corporate tax rate t, the before-tax rate of return in 
the private sector equals the after-tax rate of return 
divided by (1-t). 22 r 23 
31 
21rt should be noted that this figure represents a 
minimum in that it is based on those investors participating 
in the market for government securities (or other long term 
"safe11 securities or bonds). It is probable that the time 
preference of other individuals is higher than r, and the 
corresponding measure of social opportunity cost would, on 
average, be higher. 
22This follows directly from the fact that the 
after-tax rate of return is equal to the before-tax rate of 
return multiplied by (1-t). 
23rn a later paper, Baumel (1970) extended his analysis 
to the situation where government investment displaces 
several sectors, each of which has a different tax rate, t;. 





= Before tax income in sector i 
After tax income in sector i 
Therefore, Ba~~ol argues that the appropriate rate of 
government investment is a weighted average of the 
before-tax rates of return. The appropriate "weight" is the 
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The second cause of divergence between private rates of 
time preference and social opportunity cost is the existence 
of risk in private sector undertakings. Risk requires that 
private firms pay investors a premium in order to encourage 
them to choose this investment as opposed to the other safe 
alternatives. According to Baumol this premium should also 
be included as a social opportunity cost due to the fact 
that the transfer of resources from the private to the 
public sector prevents this premium from being earned. In 
this sense, the risk of private investment functions in an 
equivalent manner as the taxes discussed above. Risk 
requires that resources be emplo~·ed in ·u.ses which yield a 
greater return than the same resources would be required to 
yield without the risk premium. Furt.hermore it is these 
investments, and their corresponding returns, that are 
forgone when resources are transferred from the private to 
(Footnote Continued) 
where: 
r = the government rate, 
rg = the after-tax rate of return in the 
w~ = the relative proportion of government funds coming 
from s~ctor 
i, and 
ti = the tax rate for sector i. 
In this paper, Baumel also extended this analysis to 
consider multi-sector risk as premiums for risk are 
analogous to the taxes discussed earlier. Thus, in a system 
with the displaced investment subject to different tax rates 
and different premiums for risk, the appropriate rate of 
discount for the government is a weighted average of the 
observed before-tax rates of return. 
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the public sector, and therefore the appropriate measure of 
opportunity costs is the return that those resources are 
required to generate in their private uses - inclusive of 
risk premiums for investors. This is the essence of 
33 
Baumel's theory regarding the affect of risk. Baumel 
further asserted that since premiums are required to induce 
investment in risky projects, this higher required rate of 
return is the relevant opportunity cost (after taxes), and 
that the elimination of private risk that occurs if the 
government undertakes an investment is not to be regarded as 
a social gain. In other words, the change in the amount of 
risk is not to be considered as producing a change in the 
level of anyone's utility. Baumel notes that the only way to 
eliminate the need to consider this risk premium is for 
government to subsidize private investment to offset it. 
Ba~~ol's proposed trea~uent of risk places hLu s~~arely 
at odds with Samuelson (1964), Arrow (1966), Hirshleifer and 
Shapiro (1970), Arrow and Lind (1970), and Arrow and Kurtz 
(1970). The basis for conclusions of these authors is that 
risk is reduced in the public sector because of the large 
number of public projects and therefore risk premiums should 
be excluded from the discounting process. Throughout 
Baumel's argument, he maintained that the opportunity costs 
are what must be measured in the discount rate analysis and 
these opportunity costs include the risk premiums that would 
have been paid to investors in private projects. 
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Thus unless the corporate tax is eliminated and the 
government undertakes a program to subsidize private 
investment by the amount of the risk premiums, the 
divergence between private time preference and social 
opportunity cost is inevitable. Baumel acknowledges that 
the divergence between time preference and social 
opportunity costs leads one to the necessity of choosing 
which rate is appropriate for project evaluation. On this 
issue he favors opportunity costs. 
The basic premise on which this analysis will 
proceed is that the appropriate rate of discount 
for public projects is one which measures 
correctly the social opportunity cost. The 
decision to devote resources to investment in a 
public project means, given the overall level of 
employment in the economy, that these resources 
will become unavailable for use by the private 
sector. And this transfer should be undertaken 
whenever a potential project available to the 
government offers social benefits greater than 
the loss sustained by removing these resources 
from the private sector. The social rate of 
discount, then, must be chosen in such a way 
that it leads to a positive number for the 
evaluated net benefits of a public project if 
and only if its gross benefits exceed it~4 opportunity costs in the private sector. 
While Baumel is a firm advocate of an opportunity cost 
measure of the appropriate rate of discount he does not 
share with other opportunity cost writers embracement of 
popular methodologies for measuring this opportunity cost. 
24Baumol (1968), 789-90. 




Baumel strongly dislL~es techniques, proposed by Eckstein 
(1958), Krutilla and Eckstein (1958), Steiner (1959), 
Marglin (1963B), which attempt to reflect opportunity costs 
by tracing the sources of public funds. Besides rejecting 
these methods on the basis cf their complexity and ignorance 
of the then prevalent notions of functional finance, Baumel 
argued that such a process is unnecessary. 25 
If it is true that, in real terms, what the 
government takes from the private sector is 
input resources, then to determine the relevant 
rate of discount one need not inquire beyond the 
rate of return currently being earned by users 
of such inputs. One can ignore in this 
calculation the subjective tL~e preferences of 
consumers, the difference between the disutility 
of paying taxes and of lending and a host of 
other issues which clutter unnecessarily some of 
the of the public project discount rate 
calculations. That the government's use of 
resources does deprive consumers of some goods 
is true but beside the point because consumers 
implicitly but very definitely indicate how they 
feel about this foregone consumption through the 
rat7 of re~urn ~tey are currently providing to 
bus~ness f~rms. · 
25under the functional finance notion, government 
activity is removed from dependency upon sources of funding. 
Furthermore, such activity is largely conducted for the 
purposes of accomplishing macroeconomic goals. Baumel also 
mentions the balanced budget multiplier through which an 
expansion in the economy can be achieved with an equal 
increase in government spending and taxation. Thus the 
existence of this expansion implies that real resource cost 
of the government spending must be somewhat less that the 
equivalent dollar amount in taxes. Baumel (1968), p. 792. 
26Baumol (1968), p. 792. 
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One more factor that must be considered and the one 
that economists know the least about practically, is 
Baumel' s argument regarding externalities. Baumel argued 
that: 
The firm whose output pollutes the atmosphere 
obviously provides a net social return · 
significantly lower than the figure given by its 
yield on capital. Similarly, the company that 
produces external benefits ••• yields social 
product greater th~ is indicated by its 
financial returns. 
Such externalities are not limited only to the private 
36 
sector and therefore are not a source of divergence between 
public and private discount rates. Rather the existence of 
such externalities represents a justification for altering 
the level of both rates. Baumel admits that implementation 
of this principle is likely to be extremely difficult. 
Part of the Baumel externality argument arises because 
investT.ent in the future is a public good. Ba~~ol is 
sympathetic to this Marglin-type (1963A) view but he 
believes that in general, the more appropriate view belongs 
to those, like Tullock (1964), who believe that it is 
foolish to burden members of the present society by 
transferring wealth to the already promising future. Baumel 
does provide for exceptions to this policy, however. These 
27Baumol (1968), p. 282. 




exceptions include assets - such as the Grand Canyon -
characterized by irreversibilities. 
In swmnary, Baumel argued that the percentage rate of 
return in the private sector is greater than the individual 
marginal private rate of return, and that the latter equals 
the market rate of interest. Under this approach Baumel 
believed that the true opportunity cost of public investment 
is the before-tax return on capital. And as to the choice 
of an appropriate rate of discount, Baumel concluded that: 
It is my inclination at the moment to look with 
some favor at a figure toward the higher end of 
the range - at a discount rate closer to what 
may be considered the cost of capital to private 
firms. My grounds for this preference are 
hardly convincing even to me - they rest largely 
on the feeling there is a very tangible loss in 
the transfer of resources from a high rate of 
return use to an employment in which their yield 
is very low. On the other hand I can attribute 
much less significance to a time preference rate 
which is constantly shifted about and made t~8 adjust to ~~e dictates of a monetary policy. 
Steiner (1968) presented a very different view of the 
discounting process. He argued that private and public 
investment have no close, substitutable relationship. In 
the Steiner model, congress (or some other authority) 
analyzes proposed projects to decide their merit. If a 
project is chosen, money is appropriated. The basic point 
of the Steiner model is that determination of the budget is 
28Ba~~ol (1968), p. 801. 




partially or totally independent of the economic evaluation 
of the project. Therefore, substitution between public and 
private projects does not enter the discounting decision. 
He argued that the major concern is to optimally fix the 
level of the budget and that this process may require quite 
different evaluations of future costs and returns between 
different programs and projects. (Note the similarity to 
the Marglin theory.) 
Usher (1969) accepted Baumel's position as to the 
causes of divergence between the consumption rate of 
interest an the opportunity cost of private investment, but 
he differed as to the proper opportunity cost of public 
investment. In comments on Baumel's (1968) paper he 
suggested that the correct ~pportunity cost is somewhere 
between the pre-tax rate of return in the private sector and 
the individual private rate of return. Usher's analysis is 
based upon explicit modeling of second best considerations. 
He demonstrated that under certain assumptions, including a 
homogeneous distribution of preferences and assets, the 
optimal rate of discount on government projects is between 
the time preference rate and the opportunity cost rate. 
Ramsey (1969) also accepted the Baumel position that 
risk and taxes prevent the equalization of the marginal rate 
of return in the private sector and the market rate of 
interest. However, Ramsey noted that individual savings are 
also taxed, and that these taxes will cause a divergence 




between the individual marginal rate of return and the 
market rate of interest. Therefore, Ramsey argued that the 
proper social rate of discount is a linear combination of 
the individual rate and the private sector rate (both 
pre-tax) which are properly weighted by the source of funds. 
Haveman (1969) was a strong advocate of the opportunity 
cost approach to determining the appropriate rate to employ 
in the evaluation of public investment projects. Be 
rejected any notion of a socially determined rate for two 
reasons. First, he rejected any idea that society should 
explicitly transfer wealth to the future through the 
application of a social rate which is lower than the rate 
prevailing in the private sector: 
That the people would collectively agree to 
provide a standard of life to unborn generations 
greater than that implied by our current rate of 
economic growth is highly doubtful. It seems 
especially so when people sea~ unable to meet 
adequately the needs of the hungry, the 
uneduca~ed, 2~n~0the sick in their own 
generat~on. ' 
29Robert E. Haveman, "The opportunity Cost of Displaced 
Private Spending and the Social Discount Rate," Water 
Resources Research, 3, 5 (October 1969), p. 948. 
30obviously Haveman's argument that future generations 
are going to be wealthier as a matter of the normal course 
of economic growth follows the mainstream of economic 
thinking. Certainly, this has been the observed outcome of 
economic progress for centuries. It does not consider the 
possibility that, perhaps through side effects arising from 
present economic activity, the current generation may be 
endowing the future with a smaller -- and perhaps negative 
(Footnote Continued) 




Secondly, he argued that the use of a social rate would also 
either require the shadow-pricing of project costs or the 
application of decision criteria based on a benefit cost 
ratio greater than unity in order to prevent the transfer of 
resources from higher return private projects to lower 
return public projects. He rejected both of these 
approaches because of fear that the elected body of 
representatives is incapable of coming to grips with this 
decision and would be easily swayed by a small organized 
group who would benefit by public investment. 
Haveman analyzed four opportunity cost approaches. 
These include use of the opportunity cost of before tax 
business invesr~ent alone, the use of a rate reflecting the 
reduction in both consumption goods and investment goods 
both of which are reflected in profits of business firms, 
the use of a rate reflecting the private credit restriction 
and additional savings that occurs in an economy which loans 
money to the government for investment, and finally a 
weighted rate of return on private sector consumption and 
investment spending which is displaced by public investment. 
Haveman concluded that the latter method is the preferred 
approach. He estimated this rate to be 7.3% for 1966. 
(Footnote Continued) 
-- endowment of wealth. One possible method that this may 
occur is through stratospheric ozone depletion. 
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Arrow and Lind (1970) and Hirshleifer and Shapiro 
(1970) approached choosing the approximate discount rate by 
use of state-preference theory. However, they came to 
opposite conclusions. The basic point of divergence between 
these writers occurred because of imperfections in the 
existence of markets. Let us begin with the latter paper. 
Hirshleifer and Shapiro argued.that risky investment 
opportunities prevent private investment to the point where 
the percentage rate of return on the marginal unit of 
capital in the private sector equals the market rate of 
interest. Therefore, they further argued that the 
government should use the "riskyn private rate of return as 
a measure of social opportunity cost. 
Their analysis began by assuming a nbasic claimn • A 
basic claim is a claim to one dollar to be rec~ived at a 
future date. This cla~u is contingent on the existence of a 
certain state of the world, and represents prices in the 
future. Under this arrangement let: 
Vo = -Po~io + PlaAsla + PlDAslb + ••• 
represent certainty equivalent value, where: 
~io = an increment of investment 
~sla = net returns in period one given that state 
"a" exists in this period 
Pla = Basic Claim to receiving $1.00 in period one 
under state nan where this is the discounted 
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value of $1.00 or $1.00 1 
1+r 
However, the world is not characterized be certainty, and we 
would need to account for this by allowing r to deviate from 
the riskless rate and by adding a probabilistic analysis. 
Therefore the model becomes: (For two periods) 
where: ~Vo = 
Ttla = 
AVo = PoAio + n1a~s1a + n1~slb 
1 + r 
again represents certainty equivalent value 
the probability that state "a" occurs in period 
one, and 
r* = the risky rate of interest. 
Using this analysis, Hirshleifer and Shapiro concluded 
that the optimal rate of discount should reflect the risk 
premium, i.e., that the social rate of discount should 
equal r*. This rate reflects the opportunity cost of 
private investment. 
Arrow and Lind (1970) used a similar approach and 
derived an opposite conclusion. They stress that there are 
imperfections in the market for future claims. These 
imperfections prevent the determination of r*. 
Imperfections arise from two sources in the Arrow-Lind 
analysis: 1. ) the moral hazard problem and 2·. ) the 
imperfections caused by transaction costs for future 
markets. Basically, the Arrow-Lind argument boils down to 
the fact that the adverse effect of private risk is reduced 
when funds are transferred to government because the risk is 
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shared by all. Moral hazard fits into their argument if we 
assume that a government bureaucrat makes very conservative 
decisions in order to avoid losses which may raise questions 
regarding his competence. Whatever the cause, moving funds 
from the private sector to the government brings about a 
different and more advantageous distribution of 
risk-assuming risk-aversion. The policy implication is that 
government should ignore risk premiums of private investors 
and use a "risk-free" rate of private return as the measure 
of the social opportunity cost of displaced capital. 
This same policy conclusion was derived by Arrow and 
Kurz (1970). However, Arrow-Kurz added the fact that there 
is a fixed savings behavior which prevents the equalization 
of the marginal private rate of time preference and the 
market rate of interest. Therefore, the social rate of 
.. 
discount lies below the percentage rate of return on the 
marginal unit of capital in the private sector because of 
risk, but they were unable to conclude anything about the 
relationship of the discount rate to private savings 
activity because of uncertainty. 
Bradford (1975} provided a theoretical framework to 
determine the shadow price of resources withdrawn from the 
private sector of the economy and utilized to finance public 
investment. One of the basic principles of the Bradford 
model was that, in the broad sense, government is restricted 
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from investing in the same types of activities as the 
private sector. Therefore: 
••• apparently attractive returns in the private 
sector may not represent opportunity costs for 
the government at all, or at least not directly. 
When the private investment opportunities are 
not also government investment opportunities, 
private rates ?f relyrn become irrelevant to 
government cho~ces. 
Bradford developed a model to indicate when public 
investment is justified. His methodology focused on a 
comparison of the marginal reduction in private capital 
formation caused by a shift of one dollar to the public 
44 
sector and the marginal increase in private capital 
formation induced by an increase in one dollar of government 
services. The value of this capital is expressed in terms 
of its ability to increase the discounted present value of a 
subsequent consumption stream. This is the shadow price of 
capital. The discount rate used to derive this shadow price 
is the social time preference rate. Investment is induced 
by government spending due to the fact that this money is 
returned to the economy and utilized for capital formation. 
The proportion utilized for capital formation depends on the 
magnitude of the aggregate marginal propensity to save. 
31David F. Bradford, "Constraints on Government 
Investment Opportunities and the Choice of Discount Rate," 
American Economic Review, (December 1975), p. 888. 
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Since government spending is financed from investme~t 
and consumption the shadow price of funds withdrawn from the 
private sector is something less than it would be if all 
financing were at the expense of private investment. 
FUrthermore, since government expenditure is also 
responsible, through the marginal propensity to save, for 
generating a future consumption stream, government projects 
with a specific internal rate of return may be justified 
even if this rate is substantially below the private rate of 
return on investment. 32 
Lind (1982) established a framework for the discount 
rate issue which combines elements of social time preference 
and the opportunity cost approach. In general, Lind's 
approach followed closely on the work of Eckstein (1958), 
Krutilla and Eckstein (1958), Marglin (1963B), Feldstein 
(1964), Diamond (1968), Feldstein (1970), and Bradford 
(1975). This method, termed the "shadow price of capital 
approach," unburdens the discount rate from trying to 
simultaneously fulfill the dictates of social time 
preference and the requirements of signalling the 
32rndeed one of Bradford's examoles illustrates the 
possibility that a government project may be justified even 
if its internal rate of return is lower than the social rate 
of time preference. This is the case where all 
government-utilized resources are derived from private 
consumption and all government expenditure is ultimately 
converted to private capital. Bradford, pp. 891-2. 
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opportunity cost of capital. Lind advocated the removal of 
opportunity cost considerations from the discount rate being 
utilized. He argued that opportunity costs are better 
considered by adjusting monetary costs of public 
expenditures (or private expenditures required by public 
action) to reflect opportunity costs that arise due to the 
displacement of resources from the private sector. Under 
this arrangement, the discount rate is therefore only 
required to reflect social time preference, and this Lind 
argues, is best approximated by the real rate of return on 
essentially riskless long-term government securities. Thus 
the social discount rate utilized in Lind's analysis is the 
consumption rate of interest. 33 
Thus it is fairly obvious that the mainstream of the 
economics profession is severely divided on the issue of 
what constitutes a proper method of evaluating the 
consequences of societal decisions which have future 
impacts. However, one does note some developing agreement 
in a few areas, most notably of which is that the 
33It seems a bit peculiar that when applying the shadow 
price of capital approach, costs of capital -- which should 
adhere rigorously to the geometric discount formulation 
derived from capital growth rates -- are shadow priced and 
that social time preference -- which has no a priori 
justification to be handled in any particular weighting 
scheme -- is handled in the standard logarithmically linear 
discounting fashion. 




opportunity costs of public investment must be accounted 
for. Unfortunately, there would still appear to be much 
disagreement as to the operational method of accounting for 
these costs. The majority of writers would prefer to 
account for opportunity costs via explicit alteration 
(shadow pricing) of monetary streams, while some economists 
require that they be accounted for through the use of an 
opportunity cost discount rate. 
For those willing to accept the use of discount rates 
which reflect something other than opportunity cost of funds 
withdrawn from the private sector, the preferred method 
appears to be to utilize the consumption rate of interest as 
the rate of discount. Disagreement exists as to why this is 
appropriate. Arguments for utilizing the consumption rate 
of interest either espouse the notion that it directly 
represents social tL&.e preference considerations, or that it 
is only an acceptable proxy of social time preference. 
In either event, the conclusion of the bulk of economic 
writers is that the consumption rate of interest, as 
determined by, say the real rate of interest on long-term 
government securities, passbook accounts, or home mortgages, 
represents the minimum rate by which future impacts should 
be evaluated. 




Accounting for the Future: An Alternative Framework 
In the previous chapter, the views of many traditional 
neoclassical economists regarding the future were discussed. 
Recall that most of these views have as their basis notions 
of certainty, smoothly functioning futures and capital 
markets, and a lack of taxes. And even when methods take on 
much more practical forms, i.e., the shadow price of capital 
approach and others, the fact remains that these methods 
rely on capital markets which allocate resources over 
relatively short periods of time -- hardly a blink of an eye 
in the history of modern man. 
Now it is appropriate to discuss how other disciplines 
and individuals evaluate the future. One factor that should 
strike the reader in particular is that, to a much greater 
extent than the body of neoclassical economists, the works 
of Pigou (1932), Ramsey (1931), and Marglin (1963A) would 
seem to be held in high regard by many of these others. 
Consider the impact of any real discount rate derived 
via some of the models proposed by the authors discussed in 
the previous chapter. As a practical matter, the 
consumption rate of interest may be the smallest rate to 
come out of any of traditional works. Let us say for 
purposes of example, that the rate is 3%. If we discount 
!!::-~< - _.,;,.,:._f 
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one billion dollars at only 3% it has a present value of 
$52,032,856.00 if the payment is made after 100 years. If 
payment is delayed for two hundred years then the present 
value drops to $2,707,418.10. And if payment does not occur 
for 500 years, then the present value of a billion dollars 
falls to only $381.41. For all practical purposes, the 3% 
rate of discount has nearly wiped out the magnitude of all 
impacts accruing after a relatively few years. 
We can see that the application of discount rates 
derived from relatively certain short term capital markets 
would indicate little concern for future generations. This 
result is the only answer most economists can give to a 
society that is suddenly finding itself having to deal with 
som~ very profound long-term issues. 
With the advent of the nuclea= age, large scale fossil 
fuel conversion, fluorocarbons and m~~Y other factors, the 
present society has become acutely aware of its potential to 
impact the health, wealth, and even the very existence of 
future society. Along with the technological capability to 
irreversibly alter man 1 s environment, people have been 
increasingly motivated to develop expressions to account for 
these impacts on future generations while weighing the 
wisdom of undertaking development projects with irreversible 
effects. 
This line of thinking is drastically different than 
those of the economists (and others) who have looked at the 
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increasing wealth of passing generations and decided that 
the future will take care of itself. This has been the 
operational argument of many for centuries and indeed 
correctly so. Since the advent of the renaissance, man has 
endowed future generations with more wealth, knowledge and a 
better way of life. Now however, man possess to a greater 
extent than before, the capability to provide the future 
with a negative endowment. 
It is true that the future has faced the problem of a 
greatly reduced endowment before -- but this has only 
occurred in a few specific commodities. Timber, wildlife, 
and natural lands have all been the focus of conservation 
movements dating from the late 19th century to the early 
20th century. It is notable that even under these threats 
-- it was ass~~ed that there would be someone around in the 
future to enjoy them if these ita~s were saved. And 
presumably they would be wealthier in all aspects -- except 
the ones mentioned above. 
It must be noted that some individuals outside of 
neoclassical economics would indeed subscribe to its 
principle regarding the valuation of future society. 
However, the fact remains that a large number would not. 
This chapter considers a subset of the individuals who 
have written about future valuations from a non-neoclassical 
perspective. Three distinct classifications are considered: 
•:-=-~~- --~ 
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the works of social and physical sciences, theology, and 
ethics. Within these classifications subsets are analyzed. 
Under the Social and Physical Science classification 
four divisions are considered. These include neoclassical 
economics, which was the focus of Chapter One; 
multi-disciplinal steady-state theorists who argue that 
mankind must immediately initiate a policy of zero growth; 
entropy theorists who argue that zero growth is not enough; 
and other physical scientists who argue for a scientific 
solution which can allow for continued growth. Under the 
theology classification, specific religions are considered. 
These include Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam. 
Finally, under the ethical classification, four 
specific divisions are considered using an intertemporal 
analysis. These include Rawlsian, Nietzschean, Utilitarian, 
and Paretian. 
One group with strong convictions regarding the proper 
course of society is somewhat loosely gathered under the 
banner of the steady-state theorist. This group possesses 
an extensive history which has as its beginnings, the 
writings of Thomas Malthus. The theories embodied by this 
group were further developed by classical economic thought 
and were perhaps best conveyed by John Stuart Mill. Modern 
day steady-staters are highly critical of neoclassical 
economics' notions regarding the intertemporal allocation of 
the world's resources. Contemporary economists who make 
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Herman Daly, and Talbot Page, have fou..'l.d themselves 
criticized by their neoclassical brothers. 
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To a very great extent, major support for steady-state 
theories has come from members of the hard sciences. 
Ecologists, biologists, and physicists seem to be more 
explicitly preoccupied with the problems of a finite earth 
than are other disciplines -- most notably economics. 
Note that all steady-staters would seem to be arguing 
that the future is undervalued by present society. Thusly, 
the applicable discount rate, according to these 
individuals, should be less than the rate attributable to 
neoclassical evaluations of far future events. 
Thomas Malthus (1798, 1830, Flew 1970), whose writings 
on the potential for geometric populatic•n increase in a 
world of finite resources earned eccno~~cs the title of the 
dismal science, was perhaps the first of the steady-state 
theorists. Malthus maintained that the tendency for 
unchecked population to double itself approximately every 
twenty-five years, when weighed against the likelihood of a 
food supply that at best increases arithmetically, 
necessitated the intervention of events to check population 
growth. According to Malthus: 
The great question then, that remains to be 
considered, is the manner in which this constant 
and necessary check upon population practically 
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operates. 34 
In his writings, Malthus suggested that this check may take 
many forms, among them: starvation, disease, and moral 
restraint. 
John Stuart Mill (1857) synthesized earlier work on 
classical economics. Mill advocated the "stationary state" 
as being not just necessary by the earth's physical limits, 
but desirable as well: 
I cannot, therefore, regard the stationary state 
of capitol and wealth with the unaffected 
aversion so generally manifested towards it by 
political economists of the old school. I am 
inclined to believe that it would be, on the 
whole, a very considerable improvement on our 
present condition. I confess I am not charmed 
with the idea of life held cut by those who 
think that the normal state of human beings is 
that of struggling to get on; that the 
trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on 
each other's heels, which form the existing type 
of social life, are the most desirable lot of 
humankind, or anything but the disagreeable 
symptoms ~~ one of the phases of industrial 
progress. 
This notion that the steady-state is a desirable 
outcome has survived in the works of present writers on the 
34Thomas A. Malthus, A Sununary View as quoted in A. 
Flew, Malthus. An Essay on the Principle of Pooulation, 
(London: Pelican Classics, 1970), p. 242. 
35John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy 
With Some of Their Applications to social Philosophy (New 
York: D. Apleton and Company, 1909), II, p. 336. 
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steady state. This result is in direct conflict with the 
views of neoclassical economics. 
Kenneth Boulding, perhaps the premier economist of the 
steady-state theorists, explicitly recognizes a difference 
between the discount rate applicable to the near future and 
the far future (Boulding, 1966). The fact that he regards 
the spaceship economy to be in the far future is evident: 
It may be said, of course, why worry about all 
this when the spaceman economy is still a good 
way off (at least beyond the lifetimes of any 
now living) ••• It is always a little hard to find 
a convincing answer to the man w~g says, 'What 
has posterity ever done for me?' 
Boulding does advocate the discounting of near time events: 
It is a well known phenomenon that individuals 
discount the future, even in their own lives. 
The very existence of a positive rate of 
interest may be taken on at least strong 
supporting evidence of this hypothesis. If we 
discount our own future, it is certainly not 
unreasonable to discount posterity's futur37even more, even if we do give posterity a vote. 
Indeed, Boulding would argue that the application of 
neoclassical principles would improve the relatively 
short-run state of the world and that some other, more 
36Kenneth Boulding, "The Economics of the Coming 
Spaceship Earth," in Henery Jarret ed., Environmental 
Quality in a Growing Economy, (Boston: Johns Hopkins Press, 
Inc., 1966), p. 11. 
37Boulding, p. 12 • 
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explicit intervention scenario is necessary to handle 
fundamental long run impacts. 
It may be complained that the considerations I 
have been putting forth relate only to the very 
long run, and they do not much concern our 
immediate problems. There may be some justice 
in this criticism and my main excuse is that 
other writers have dealt adequately with the 
more immediate problems of ~3terioration in the 
quality of the environment. 
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This it can be readily seen that Boulding would prefer some 
form of intertemporal weighting that would enhance the 
outcome of the far future. 
Herman E. Daly (1973, 1975, 1977, 1980) is a very 
strong critic of mainstream economics. Daly's proposals to 
achieve the steady state call for drastic intervention in 
the economy and the lives of individuals. His policies to 
achieve steady-state goals impact all segments of the market 
economy. The distribution of wealth is corrected through 
the imposition of minL~um and maximum levels of individual 
wealth and income and the limiting of the size of 
corporations. 39 Resource utilization is curbed through the 
explicit modification of the market for natural resources 
into a two-tiered process. Buyers, who wish to participate 
38Boulding, p. 13. 
39 See Herman E. Daly, "Seventh Essay," Towards a 
Steady-State Economv, (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and 
Company, 1973), 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
af-:-.· 
56 
in the resource market would first be required to purchase a 
depletion quota which is established by the government at 
some optimum level which is independent of considerations of 
supply and demand. 40 Birth rates are controlled in the 
Daly proposal through the use of transferable licenses for 
child bearing. 41 
Talbot Page also is an economist who finds himself 
camped with the steady state theorists. Like Boulding, Page 
would seem to a great extent to accept the broad principles 
of neoclassical_economics. However, unlike Boulding, Page 
would not only argue for a far future discount rate less 
than the rate applicable to the near future, he would argue 
* * for the existence of an r as well. This r would indeed be 
a socially derived rate that is less than r, and presumably 
equal to 5 which would encourage the preservation of 
resources for the future. 
Page (1977) advocates, as a means to effect these 
transfers to the future, a severance tax on the extraction 
of non-renewable resources. This tax is a necessary policy 
instrument to improve the distribution of resources to 
40Herman E. Daly, Steady-state Economics: The Economics 
of Biophysical Equilibrium cu~d Moral Growth, (San Francisco: 
W.H. Freeman and Company, 1980), pp. 159-61. 
41naly, 1973, pp. 158-60. This idea is adapted from 
Kenneth E. Boulding, The Meaning of the Twentieth Century, 
New York: Harper and Row, 1964, p. 136. 
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individuals in the future. In practice, however, this tax 
is necessary because of the fact that market determined 
interest rates (combined with the existence of a depletion 
allowance) encourage the present exploitation of endowments 
reserved for the future. 
One group, the Club of Rome, has been extensively 
involved in producing research orientated towards the notion 
of a world doomed to extinction. This international group 
was largely responsible for the development of a large 
system dynamics model at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. The simulation, known as the Club of Rome Model 
or World3, was part of the Club's Project on the Predicament 
of Mankind. Development of the model was directed by Dennis 
Meadows, an engineer; other project members were physicists 
and biophysicists. The results of the Club of Rome Model 
have been dccwuented in nwuerous publications. 42 
Using the Club of Rome Model, researchers simulated 
time paths through the year 2100 for several interrelated 
factors important to man's continued existence on the earth. 
These factors included: population, resource stocks, 
industrial output, food production, and pollution. Numerous 
scenarios were derived by varying assumptions regarding 
42see for example Donnella H. Meadows et al. (1974), 
Dennis L. Meadows and Donnella H. Meadows (1973), and Dennis 
L. Meadows et al. (1974). 




consumption, pollution control, agricultural and energy 
production, and population growth. Under the "standard run" 
of the Club of Rome Model, all variables are developed using 
historical growth paths (since 1900). The standard run 
predicts the resource-driven collapse of industrial society 
around the year 2000 and the decimation of the population 
through a lack of food and medical services within a few 
years after industrial output falters. Under a variant of 
the standard run the discovery of more nonrenewable 
resources is of little consequence; a doubling of resource 
reserves buys society only slightly more time, i.e. less 
than 30 years, and the resultant residuals directly impact 
population levels. These residuals end up destroying 
mankind in the mid part of the 21st century under a third 
scenario which assumes that unlimited nuclear power and 
recycling largely eliminate man~s need to utilize 
exhaustible resources. With the addition of ~ffective 
pollution control to the unlimited energy scenario, 
population begins to decline only after all irrigable land 
has been utilized for food production. 
More scenarios include other developments, a doubling 
of agriculture productivity, perfect birth control, and mix 
and matches of all of the above.· In each case the outcome 
is more or less the same, man's position and number on the 
earth eventually declines due to the devastating effects of 
his production and consumption activities. In the most 
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optimistic of these scenarios, the inevitable is forestalled 
until the later mid-21st century. 
In only one series of scenarios is man's existence able 
to continue, in significant form, into the far future. 
These scenarios all have as their root an absolute 
stabilization of world population as of 1975. This 
stabilization was obviously unattainable when the model was 
developed (and obviously far removed from what actually has 
occurred) and thus the Club of Rome model is without 
question, a doomsday prediction. 
Kenneth E.F. Watt (1974), a zoologist, also shares the 
viewpoint of the rest of the steady-staters. Watt conveys 
at least the urgency of the Club of Rome in his pleas. Watt 
is very critical of nearly all outcomes and developments of 
our present economic system, and equally critical of that 
system's economists. Of overwheL~ing importance to Watt is 
the fundamental notion of irreversibility as it applies to 
contemporary activity. He argues that while the downfall of 
all past societies has been accompanied by a rebirth of a 
new civilization this can no longer be true because the 
causes of the collapse of our present society will be a 
squandering of irreplaceable resources. This misallocation 
E£<c... _...:_"! 
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will have permanent effects on the world and thus thwart any 
attempt of civilization to reorganize itself. 43 
Apparently, Watt has little faith in the law of demand 
and the ability of L~e price system to allocate natural 
resources. He says: 
In economics, an article of conventional wisdom 
is that as a resource becomes scarce, the price 
rises accordingly and there is a decline in the 
use of that resource. Unfortunately, the 
historical record does not bear out this 
assertion. The exceptions range all the way 
from seafood to electricity. They include, on 
the one hand, those cases where price increases 
have not been sufficient to discourage use, for 
the reasons that incomes were rising at about 
the same rate; on the other, and still worse, 
are those cases where use has gone up but prices 
have not. In 1960, 234 million pounds of tuna 
were imported into the u.s. at a price of 12.6 
cents a pound; by 1971, with the price at 23.5 
cents a pound, the ~~t~~ imported had risen to 
473 million pounds. r 
43Kenneth E. F. Watt, The Titanic Effect, (New York: 
Kenneth E. F. Watt, 1974), p. 11. 
44 Watt, p. 20. 
45Besides not acknowledging the economic safety net of 
ceterus paribus, Watt neglected to account for inflation in 
his analysis. During this period the real price increase in 
tuna was only 36% while the real increase in income was 39%. 
Furthermore, population over the same period increased 15%. 
Finally, in that Watt only considered the demand for fresh 
or frozen tuna, we are probably witnessing a change in 
demand for a superior good. This hardly represents an 
example of an allocation mis-function. 
u.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States: 1972 (92nd edition.) Washington, D.C., 1971, 
Tables 557, 1077. 
u.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States: 1975 (95th edition.) Washington, D.C., 1975, 
(Footnote Continued) 




The combination of these factors with pollution, 
inflation, overpopulation, market saturation, etc. led Watt 
to the conclusion that "the titanic effect" -- the point at 
which mankind has blown his inheritance to the earth -- is 
just around the corner. The avoi~ance of the Titanic effect 
lies in the abandoning of our present policies which 
encourage positive growth and the imposition of government 
control in those markets where the price system appears to 
be failing. 46 
Nicholas Georgescue-Roegen (1971A, 1971B) argued that 
even the steady-state economy is not sustainable, not to 
mention the present growth in the consumption of the world's 
resources. Georgescue-Roegen pointed out that man's 
economic system is bound by the inescapable laws of 
thermodynamics. These laws include the fact that order in 
matter and energy tends to disintegrate into disorder. It 
is order, perhaps in the form of a concentrated mineral 
deposit, which fuels our economic system. Concentrated 
(Footnote Continued) 
Table 631. 
u.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States: 1984 (104th edition.) Washington, D.C., 1983, 
Table 2. 
46The above discussions concentrated on a relatively 
small portion of the authors who have written on the merits 
of the steady state. For more the reader is referred to 
Donnella H. Meadows et al. (1982), Bruce Hannon (1975), Jay 
Forrester (1977), and Amory Lovins (1979). 
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sources of energy or minerals are said to have low entropy. 
Disorder, on the other hand, in the form of widely dispersed 
mineral and caloric waste, is the inevitable outcome of life 
processes. Tne substance of this outcome is said to have 
high entropy. 
This fundamental progression from a low to a high 
entropy state is an inevitable function of the universe. 
Man can only effect to a limited extent, the rapidity with 
which it comes about. In this vein, Georgescue-Roegen(1975) 
argues the steady-state is a "topical mirage" and that the 
"crucial error" in this line of thinking "consists in not 
seeing that not only grovlth, but also a zero-growth state, 
nay, even a declining state which does not converge toward 
annihilation, cannot exist forever in a finite 
environment." 47 Thus there is no sustainable stationary 
state and constant conswupticn of low entropy reserves is a 
necessity. Man's present actions are major determiners of 
the welfare of future society where this welfare is measured 
by its endowment of low entropy resources, "this is why in 
bioeconomics we must emphasize that every Cadillac or every 
Zim -- let alone any instrument of war -- means fewer 
plowshares for some future generations, and implicitly, 
47Nicholas Georgescue-Roegen, "Energy and Economic 
Myths," Southern Economic Journal, 41, 3 (January 1975), p. 
367. 




fewer human beings too."48 Georgescue-Roegen insists that 
the best way to deal with the inevitability of our high 
entropy fate is to stave it off as long as possible. This 
requires that the earth's population decrease through the 
production of less than two children for every two adults, 
the conversion of our economy, in as much as possible, to 
the utilization of solar energy, etc. 
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It is evident from Georgescue-Roegen's work that he is 
largely concerned with the yery long run. He does not deny 
the fact that present consumption levels can be maintained 
and even increased for decades to come. However, he argues 
that with each and every step we endow tomorrow and 500 
years from tomorrow with a reduced endowment of low entropy 
resources. 
Perhaps the best example of those who believe in a 
scientific solution is provided by Richard L. Meier (1966). 
Meier, a natural scientist, envisioned a world where cheap 
nuclear and other energy abounds, algae is a staple 
foodstuff, and " ••• that 50 billions can live moderately well 
on the planet ••• n 49 While one can be quick to criticize 
Meier for his optimism, it is far more useful to consider 
48Nicholas Georgescue-Roegen, 1975, p. 370. 
49Richard L. Meier, Science and Economic Development: 
New Patterns of Living, 2nd ed., (Cambridge Ma.: the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology), p. 147. 
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the era in which it was written. The 1950's and early 60's 
were generally characterized by overwhe~ng scientific 
achievement. Indeed the promise of medical advances and 
experience with the "green revolution" were legion; perhaps 
these advances only paled in the presence of an ever greater 
promise -- that of nuclear generated electricity that would 
be "too cheap to meter." Meier believed that nuclear 
energy, combined with energy from solar and other sources 
would provide such incredible energy abundance that we will 
face a quandary in determining how to use it: 
Now that it seems possible, even probable, that 
the world can be assured of a continuing supply 
of the familiar forms of energy at not 
unreasonable costs for tens of thousands, 
or even millions, of years into the future, an 
e~~arrassing question must be asked. Energy for 
what purpo§5s? How much energy is really 
necessary? 
Certainly, with out current 20 more years of experience with 
nuclear energy such a rosy prediction can be no longer 
sustained. The graphic accident at Three-mile Island, 
nuclear costs overruns of over 500%, delays in nuclear 
generating plant construction of nearly half a decade, and a 
failure to solve the waste disposal problem have all dealt 
the promise of nuclear power a serious, perhaps fatal, blow. 
However, the other proposals advanced by Meier seem more 
50Meier, p. 101. 




reasonable, and one must be amazed by the completeness of 
his vision. 
Meier describes solutions for the broad bulk of 
mankind's problem with increasing demands on the earth. The 
problems range from extending our 100 year supply of coke in 
order that steel production can be maintained for the 
indefinite future to offering a portable solar powered 
cooker to India's poor in order that vegetation need not be 
utilized fer fuel in food preparation. 
This vision has as its key the Barnett and Morse (1963) 
concept of resource scarcity -- in that the problem is not a 
lack of material abundance, the problem is one of 
insufficient concentration. Therefore, the solution 
requires the application of energy and technical skill to 
effectively utilize grades of ore with lower and lower 
concentrations of recoverable material. Indeed, 
to this process, according to Meier is not reached until 
after common igneous rocks (granite, basalt, etc.), and one 
third of the earth's land mass have been processed. Meier 
even believes that such a process could be self-sustaining. 
"The uranium and thorium in such rock are sufficient to 
energize the whole operation and probably would leave a 
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considerable surplus of power for transmission to nearby 
cities."51 
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Meier envisions these reforms being accomplished with 
strong government participation. Little if any hope is. 
extended for a decentralized economic solution. 52 
Furthermore, throughout its entirety, Meier's book only 
occasionally considered waste disposal and these references 
indicates that he believes the problem of waste disposal to 
be relatively minor. Certainly, Meier completely missed the 
notion that arrived later in the 1960's -- that of a 
civilization which was about to die by its own pollution. 
In that Meier advocates tremendous contemporary 
expenditures in order to advance the cause of far future 
inhabitants of the earth, it seems fundamental that this 
behavior would be associated with an negative rate of 
discount. Meier's belief in ·the capabilities of science and 
optimistic outcome for mankind arising from the application 
of advanced technology to the fundamental problems of our 
contemporary existence is a study in direct contrast to the 
future vision espoused by those who believe that society is 
51Meier, p. 125. 
52rn spite of this, Meier's work was heavily endorsed 
by the American Economic Review. 
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doomed in the relatively near future unless radical measures 
are undertaken. 
Theology also forms the bases for valuations of future 
events. The future vision of three specific branches of 
theology are considered in this section. These branches 
include Christianity, Buddhism and Islam. In addition, 
three subclasses of Christian thinking are also considered. 
These categories are loosely titled the "the conqueror," 
"the husbander," and "the eminent destructionist." 
Let us consider the conqueror first. John Cobb (1980) 
considered the fact that Christian beliefs have provided 
man's rationale for subduing the planet. This point of view 
features man as being separate from all other biological 
activity on the earth and of course, superior to them. 
Under this belief, western culture has been driven to 
mastery ever its envircnT.ent. The justification for this 
drive has divine origin and through the vehicle of modern 
science has achieved its most powerful level. 
The idea that The New Testament provides a 
justification for rapid domination of our present world 
without regard to impacts on future society was also 
considered by Boulding (1966). Boulding argues that The New 
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Testament "advocates that we should take no thought for 
tomorrow and let the dead bury the dead."53 
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The above depiction of Christian beliefs as providing 
rationalization and motivation for the conqueror is a study 
in sharp contrast to the notion, fostered by the same 
religion, of man as a caretaker or husbander of his 
environment. This point was also considered by Cobb (1980): 
If we Christians take seriously the idea that 
the Word, which is Christ and which fully became 
flesh in Jesus, is also found in the life of all 
living things, we will cease to be part of the 
problem and will be freed to participate in the 
healing of a suffering biosphere. OUr service 
to God as Christ will be the commitment to God 
as the urge and call to life and its enhancement 
and not an orientation away from the natural 
world toward a purely human and transcendent 
sphere. We will love and serve the God who 
cares about the grasses of the field and the 
death of a sparrow and not one who treats nature 
as a mer54stage on which the human drama is enacted. 
Cobb ar~~es that source of mcu,•s con~~ering tendencies 
cannot be the Bible as the Bible itself: 
••• is not antropocentric but theocentric, and 
the God who is the center of all things is the 
creator of all nature, not only of human 
beings ••• God knows and cares for plants 
53Kenneth Boulding, "The Economics of the Coming 
Spaceship Earth," in Henry Jarrett ed., Environmental 
Quality in a Growing Economy, (Boston: Resources for the 
Future, Inc., 1966), p. 12. 
54John Cobb, "Ecology, Ethics, and Theology," in Herman 
E. Daly, ed., Economics. Ecology. and Ethics: Essays Toward 
a Steady-state Economy, (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and 
Company, 1980), p. 175. 
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Under this framework, Cobb argues for a much more long-run 
view of the impacts of man's present actions. This would 
thus lend support for explicit modification of present 
actions as a result of consideration of the future's 
welfare. 
The final branch of Christian ideology considered in 
this work is one which can be termed the eminent 
destructionist. Holders of this viewpoint believe that the 
time is rapidly approaching where upon the Lord will be 
making his return to earth. According to this belief, the 
destruction of the world is already at hand and most 
importantly, this destruction cannot be dissuaded by 
individual or collective actions of man. To holders of this 
belief, speculation on any event in the distant future is 
ridiculous and thus any future valuation is irrelevant. 
It is important to note than this viewpoint has 
gathered significant support in recent years, although not 
all practi·tioners emphasize its consequences with equivalent 
zeal or conclusions as to when destruction will occur. 
Perhaps one of the most influential of all these 
55 Cobb, p. 175. 
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practitioners is James Watt, the former United States 
Secretary of the Interior. 
E.F. Schumacker (1968) considered the economic 
implications of Buddhism. According to Schumacker, one 
aspect of the teachings of Buddha is strict husbandry for 
renewable and conservation of non-renewable resources. This 
is in strict adherence to the Buddha's teachings with regard 
to consumption: a strong emphasis on simplicity and on 
making do with less. Under the Buddhist's doctrine, choices 
between renewable and non-renewable are fundamentally 
different: 
From a Buddhist point of view ••• the essential 
difference between nonrenewable fuels like coal 
and oil on the one hand and renewable fuels like 
wood and water power on the other can not be 
simply overlooked. Nonrenewable goods must be 
used only if they are indispensable, and then 
only with the greates~ ca55 and most meticulous 
concern for conservat~on. · 
This can be contrasted with more traditional western 
economic approaches, which according to Schumacker, "does 
not distin~~sh between renewable and nonrenewable 
56E.F. Shumacher, "Buddhist Economics," in Herman E. 
Daly, ed., Economics. Ecology, Ethics: Essays Toward a 
Steady-State Economv, (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and 
company, 1980), p. 143. 





materials, as its very method is to equalize and quantify 
everything by means of a money price."57 r 58 
Ir. fact the Buddhist would consider the misuse of 
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resources to be an act of violence. This especially applies 
to nonrenewable resources. The population which relies 
heavily on nonrenewable materials for continued existence 
is: 
••• living parasitically, on capital instead of 
income ••• As the world's resources 
(nonrenewable) ••• are exceedingly unevenly 
distributed over the globe ••• their exploitation 
is an act of violence against nature which must 
almo~; inevitably lead to violence between 
men. 
Buddhist economic philosophy tends to be held in high 
esteem by those who are proponents of the steady-state 
approach. This behavior is consistent with a valuation of 
future events as if these events were occurring today. Thus 
the appropriate discount rate applicable to far future 
events would be zero. 
57schmacker, p. 143. 
58obviously, Schumacker missed the point of Hotelling's 
article which proved a difference between nonrenwable and 
renewable price paths over time. Specifically, by applying 
calculus of variations methods, Hotelling showed that in a 
competitive equilibrium, the price of nonrenwable resources 
will tend to increase at at least the rate of interest and 
produce an optimal depletion path, ceterus paribus. See 
Hotelling, H. "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources," 
Journal of Political Economy, 39 (1931) pp. 137-75. 
59shumacker, pp. 143-4. 
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Islam also provides a prospective on individual and 
societal valuations of future events. Fundamental to Moslem 
constructs is the notion that individuals (who are able) are 
required to pay a part of profits or wealth to others - even 
if these others are future generations. This concept is 
known as z a k a h . F o r  those eligible to pay it, zaklh may 
may be any amount at or above the minimum amount of 2|% up 
to an upper limit which is defined by what is left over 
after meeting ones needs. Thus a Muslim has three options 
with respect to his wealth, he may: 1) hoard it and pay a
penalty of 2|% (at a minimum) each year, 2) employ it as a 
Qard-i-Hasan (a non-interest bearing loan), or 3) if he 
chooses to keep his wealth intact, invest it to earn an 
amount at least equal to the minimum zakih.^
d'Arge (1985) analyzed the implications of zakah on the 
pattern of non-renewable resource extraction. In this 
context, the concept of zakah has two reinforcing impacts on 
the intertemprol extraction path of an exhaustible resource. 
The first impact arises directly from the fact that zakah 
requires that a society preserve a portion of its wealth, in
60 The implication of zakah on the aggregate savings
rate of an Islamic economy was considered by M. Fahim Kahn.
"Macro Consumption Function in an Islamic Framework."
Journal of Research in Islamic Economics, 1, 2 (Winter
1984), pp. 1-24.
61Kahn, p. 7.
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the form of non-renewable resources, to provide a direct, 
zak~-related, transfer to future generations. The second 
effect arises due to the intertemporal implications of zakab. 
on the prevailing level of interest rates in a society • 
. This latter impact occurs because the existence of zakab. 
causes interest rates in a society to be lower than they 
othen~ise would be and thus through interaction of the 
Hotelling (1931) model, extraction rates will be lowered. 62 
d' Arge also points out that the fact that resources are 
societally owned and state mined in Moslem countries will 
eliminates the problem of common property resources, i.e. 
the "if I don't get it fast, I won't get it at all" problem 
of western countries were resources are extracted by private 
firms. d'Arge concludes that Islamic culture embraces a 
type of Rawlsian ethic (Rawls, 1971) of resource extraction. 
~~rther discussion on Rawlsian ethical tenants follows 
below. 
In addition to theology and the other patterns b:r which 
the future can be viewed, ethical and moral constructs 
provide guidelines for future valuation. As in the case of 
religion, different ethical philosophies yield sharply 
differing outcomes. Furthermore, as will be seell, the same 
62For a discussion of the implications of zak~ on the 
prevailing rate of interest in a society, see Kahn (1984). 
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ethical construct can yield differing future valuation under 
different. assumptions. 
Subscription to Rawlsian principles (Rawls, 1971) could 
presumably justify any relationship between present and 
future valuations. This principle, also known as the 
max-min principle, dictates that society is judged by the 
welfare of its most disadvantaged members. Therefore, 
social motivation along Rawlsian lines would necessitate the 
transfer of wealth from the more fortunate to the less 
fortunate. That is, social forces should be directed 
towards the maximization of the welfare of those individuals 
who currently experience the minimum level of welfare. 
Continuous application of Rawlsian principles would lead to 
a society with a homogenous level of welfare. 
Extension of Rawlsian principles to an intertemporal 
analysis was accomplished by Kneese ~~d Schultze (1983). To 
illustrate this application to the present model consider 
the following intergenerational utility function: 
where 
U represents the welfare function, and 
ui represents the level of welfare prevailing in three 
successive societies, i = 1, 2, and 3. 
For purposes of this work one may think of these 
societies as being the present generation, the future and 
the far future. Application of Rawlsian social principles 
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would dictate that forces be motivated to transfer resources 
to the time period which is most disadvantaged. Thus, if 
the a priori level of welfare prevailing in a period two is 
less than that prevailing in periods one and three, 
explicit social actions should be utilized to transfer 
"welfare" to period two from the other periods. 
In our present analysis, the direction of welfare 
transfer is reflected in the operational rates of discount. 
If the second period is disadvantaged with respect to the 
other two, then the appropriate social policy would be 
reflected in a decrease in the discount rate applied between 
periods one and two and in increase in rates of discount 
applicable to the events in the far future. Furthermore, 
there is no restriction on how far a discount must be 
decreased or increased -- the rate may even necessarily 
change sign. Obviously, a sL~~lar relationship holds if the 
most disadvantaged period is period one or period three. 
In order to apply Rawlsian principles in an 
intertemporal analysis, one must make predictions regarding 
the operational level of welfare for future society 
appropriate to any social policy. Depending on the nature 
of this prediction, any policy can be justified. For 
example, if one subscribes to traditional economic notions 
of an increasing endowment to the future, then explicit 
social policy along Rawlsian principles calls for a bit more 
"eat, drink, and be merry" as embodied in higher discount 
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rates. Alternatively, if one believes that man is on the 
verge of leaving a negative endowment to the future, then 
lower, perhaps negative, discount rates are consistent with 
Rawlsian principles. 
The determination of intergenerational transfers under 
a Nietzschean ethical framework would represent an opposite 
approach than that of a Rawlsian. This framework, also 
known as the max-max principle, dictates that a society is 
judged by its highest achievements. Thusly, welfare is 
improved when the welfare of a society's most elite members 
is improved in absolute terms. 
Applied to a static society, the Nietzschean framework 
would justify the transfer of resources from the less to the 
more fortunate. Presumably, the only limit to the extent of 
this transfer would be the point where any further reduction 
in the welfare of society's poorest individuals would also 
reduce the welfare of the most elite. Presumably, depending 
on the nature of a particular society, this point may or may 
not be below the subsistence level. 
Applied to an intertemporal society, this Nietzshean 
framework would justify intergenerational transfers. 
Consider the following three period utility function: 
u =max (u1 , u2 , u3). 
When the elements, u, and u1 , u2 , and u3 are identical to 
the corresponding elements utilized to illustrate 
intertemporal Rawlsian criteria. However, note the one 
•<c.- -~ 
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difference in the two models is the fact that the 
Nietzschean criteria calls for the measurement of 
intertemporal welfare based on the highest single level of 
welfare attainment of the most well-off generation. Thusly, 
if the utility of individuals in period two is considered to 
be the highest, then social investment policies would 
optimally require the transfer of resources from period one 
and period three to period two. Obviously, in the transfer 
from one to two would require a very low rate of discount, 
while the transfer from three to two would necessitate that 
a very high rate be applicable in the evaluation of period 
two's utility vis a vi that of period three. 
It seems difficult to imagine any application of 
Nietzschean philosophy to others. It would seem that the 
most fundamental reason for the application of such a 
philosophy is to improve the welfare of a conta~porary 
group. Presumably this group also possesses the power to 
effect the transfer; Nietzschean philosophy provides a 
pseudo justification. Furthermore, in a intertemporal 
application, only one body possess the power to effectively 
invoke a transfer from the other two periods. This body is 
of course being the present members of a society. It would 
seem therefore that the ethical foundation would most likely 
be used to justify the transfer of welfare from the future 
to the present. This would be reflected in the heavy 
discounting of future impacts. 
~~·<:-
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Under the dictates of a utilitarian framework a 
society's welfare is judged to be the cardinal sum of the 
welfare of its individual members. Interpersonal 
comparisons of utility levels are thus required, however the 
utility of all members is weighted equally with respect to 
the utility of all other members. In an intertemporal 
framework welfare in different periods must continue to be 
weighted equally in order to satisfy the utilitarian ethic. 
This means that the welfare of the unborn must be considered 
on an equal footing with that of the ·born and thus 
discounting is not appropriate. Thus the applicable 
intertemporal utility function is 
u = u1 + u2 + u3• 
And present evaluation of future impacts are made in an 
identical manner as contemporary impacts are evaluated. 
Thus, the applicable discount rate is zero. 
The Paretian framework forms the basis for neoclassical 
economics. Under this philosophy a society's position is 
judged to be improved if a least one member's position is 
improved and the welfare of all other members is not 
diminished. While this philosophy has formed the basis for 
neoclassical propositions, there does not seem to be any 
fundamental justification for discounting within its 
framework. 
The effective discount rates arising from these 
alternative viewpoints are sununarized in Table I. In order 
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to consider the possibility of a difference between 
near-future and distant-future time windows, a distinction 
is made between them for purposes of analysis. Near-term 
rates are specified by r while distant rates are specified 
by 5. Of course, this specification does not prevent the 
rates from being equal. 
In the following chapter a theoretical model of 
individual discounting behavior is developed. This model 
forms the basis for an empirical evaluation of individual 
time preference over the periods encompassed by r and 5. 
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Chapter IV 
A Theoretical Framework for Discount Rate Analysis 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical 
framework for use in ar.alyzing hypotheses concerning any 
individual's concern for the provision of public goods in 
the distant future. In this chapter four hypotheses are 
postulated. The first of these hypotheses is concerned with 
the existence of arguments in individuals' utility functions 
which include the availability of public goods in the far 
future. The second is concerned with the separability of 
future public good availability from other arguments in the 
utility function. The third hypothesis deals with the issue 
of whether or not individuals value the availability of 
public goods ~n ~~e dist~Lt future differently than the 
availability of other goods, both public and private, iri the 
near period of their lifetimes (or the lifetimes of their 
immediate heirs'). The final hypothesis relates to the 
factors that determine an individual's value for the far 
future provision of public goods. 
Prior to considering the nature of the utility function 
it is useful to briefly review the writings discussed in 
Chapter II and Chapter III. From Chapter II, one notes that 
Pigou, Marglin, Tulluck, Haveman and Baumol all discuss the 
future generation issue. So do many of the non-mainstream 
~-:-:.·· -~ _,.... . . 
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and non-economic viewpoints discussed in Chapter III. All 
of these writers point to whether or not it is appropriate 
to worry about the future. Tullock, Haveman and Baumol 
argue that transfers to the future are a "get rich on the 
backs of the poor" scheme. However, it seems fundamental 
that if people want to make transfers to the future these 
arguments regarding poor to rich transfers have little 
merit. Certainly imposition of a contrary outcome would be 
a violation of consumer sovereignty that economics could not 
tolerate. 63 
The essence of these questions then boils down to 
determining whether or not the future, or any aspect of it, 
is a component of the utility function of individuals. And 
if it is, how is the fact that it is in the future affect 
valuation? 
If ~~e far future provision of public goods is a 
component of peoples' utility functions then why can it not 
be observed? One may attempt to argue that nothing prevents 
people from unilaterally making transfers to the future. 
And the answer to that question would most likely be that 
they do, somewhat. Consider some examples: the existence of 
numerous foundations whose purpose is to save the whales; 
63Tbe implementation of an outcome contrary to the 
wishes of the majority of voters in a society would also be 
a violation the basic principle of democracy. 
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contributions to the Friends of the Earth organization; and 
financial support for lobbying efforts to establish more 
wilderness areas. However, use of these instruments is 
essentially limited. One cannot be quick to use these 
. examples to draw conclusions regarding the individual (or 
societal) valuation of the distant future because these 
goods once provided for the distant future are generally 
also provided for the near future. The latter point 
requires consideration of free rider impacts and thus the 
possibility that· individuals will not reveal their true 
preferences. Thus these mechanisms are likely to be 
inefficient mechanisms for individuals to make future 
transfers. The broad fact remains that there is no 
acceptable market mechanism to facilitate direct 
consideration of far future public goods provision; there is 
sL~ply no such thing as a market for contingent claLus on 
far future events. 
What about the allocation of far future public goods 
through the political system? Since a democratic system 
allows the wishes of the voter to be expressed at the polls, 
doesn't this mean that future values, if they occur, have 
already manifested in our present societal investment levels 
and procedures? The shortcomings of the democratic system 
as an allocation mechanism are discussed in Chapter v, 
however it is appropriate to note some of its shortcomings 
here. These include the prevalence of "single issue" 
a::·:__ -~-




elections that propel representatives into offices which 
require consideration of multilateral issues, large 
information costs for voters, incentives for politicians not 
to reveal true opinions, over emphasis on compromise and 
logrolling -- perhaps in an effort to reduce political 
transaction costs, and the nonexistence of an efficient 
voting rule from an allocation and a procedural standpoint. 
For these reasons, it must be concluded that the democratic 
process, perhaps to even less of an extent than the market 
system, is unlikely to yield efficient allocation of far 
future commodities. And therefore, it is likely that 
contemporary outcomes of the political system are not 
representative of individual or societal future valuation. 64 
Consider for a moment evidence of far future valuation 
of a more subtle nature. It has been suggested that the 
users of the Gr~~d Canyon, i.e. the floaters and hikers, 
exhibit a remarkable ethic regarding their recreation. The 
64Thus far the discussion of the political process has 
ignored the issue that the future constituency is not even 
directly represented. Recall that Pigou (1920) argued that 
it is the duty of the government to represent the unborn. 
Pigou's argument runs directly opposite to Marglin (1963A) 
who said that he considers it "axiomatic" that democratic 
government only represent the wishes of the body politic. 
However, it does seem possible that since one function of 
government is the protection of mi~;crity rights, i.e·. · 
speech, religious freedom, etc., the government may be 
justified in protecting the future majority from the present 
oligarchy - even if that oligarchy is a democracy in present 
terms. 
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Canyon is filled with Indian ruins and artifacts. Yet, 
despite the visits of literally thousands of 
recreationalists each month, the canyon remains largely 
pristine and, to the greatest of extents, the artifacts 
remain where they were examined by the last visitor. Of 
course, one can attribute this husbandry to the fact that 
there are substantial fines for littering and worse awaits 
the vandal or the thief; however, this theory does not seem 
altogether satisfactory when one considers that the canyon 
is a vast area, exceeding several hundred square miles, and 
thus is virtually unpatrollable. Furthermore, since it is 
not a common practice for authorities to search the gear of 
recreationalists upon exiting the canyon, the possibility of 
discovery and punishment is extremely remote. Thus one must 
conclude that there is something more behind this behavior. 
Perhaps tr~s ethic arises from ~~e self interest-related 
notions of user or option value, i.e. the recreationalists 
believes that there is a positive probability that they will 
return and thus these are the source of the "canyon ethic. " 
Some have suggested that option value can be 
intergenerational. Under this notion, justification of the 
canyon ethic does not require that the recreationalist have 
a positive possibility of returning, but that his/her 
descendant does. Others have suggested that the is a value 
to individuals just in knowing that the canyon exists and 
that this existence value is unrelated to the possibility 
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that the canyon will be utilized by the individual and/or 
his descendants. 
Certainly, one can argue that this special case is not 
illustrative of wide spread future valuation, and that it is 
not necessarily a case of far future valuation at all. It 
is sufficient however, to note that this example is likely 
to wet the appetite and invite a more thorough investigation 
of the existence and level of far future values. 
Assume for a moment that public goods in the far future 
are a component of the utility function of contemporary 
individuals. Now other interesting problems present 
· themselves. The first of these is whether or not these 
instances of future valuation are isolated exceptions, e.g. 
the Grand Canyon, or wide ranging, e.g. all future goods. 
The second question is why or how are they there, i.e. by 
what mar~er do they present themselves? Are they related 
solely to an interdependent utility function phenomenon 
surrounding the rather narrow notion of the utility of 
family and descendants (intergenerational option or user 
value}? Or are they a manifestation of altruism? Altruism, 
if it exists is likely to also have foundations in 
interdependent utility functions. However, most would agree 
that it encompass a much broader interdependency, such as 
one's fellow man, Americans, or Christians, etc. In this 
context altruism may also be related to the notion of user 
or option values. It does not however, seem necessary to 
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rely on the elusive notion of existence value for far future 
valuation to occur. 
Perhaps future valuation is related to other factors. 
What are these factors and how do they play a role? Are 
religious and ethical concepts, such as were considered in 
Chapter II, the (or a) basis for positive future values? 
wnat is the source of these concepts? Do religious and/or 
ethical values spring from interdependences of utility 
functions? Do fatalistic concepts such as karma play a 
role? Or is religiously motivated concern for ones fellow 
and future man a manifestation of fear regarding the final 
judgement of the almighty? 
To begin this investigation, let us start with the 
simple case whereby future public goods are important to 
individuals. Let us ignore for the time being why they are 
in the utility function. Consider the following 
intertemporal utility function: 
(1) U = U (C
0
,c1 ,P0 ,P1 ,P2) 
where ct and Pt are the consumption of private goods and 
public goods respectively. 
Note that this utility function is defined for three 
time periods. For purposes of analysis it is convenient to 
think of the periods 0, 1, and 2 as corresponding to the 
present, the near future, and the distant future, 
respectively. The near future period may best be thought of 
the period of one's own lifetime and the lifetime of his/her 
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immediate heirs. Ignoring for the time being the 
relationship of P2 to the utility function, it is reasonable 
to assume that utility increases as levels of C
0
, c1 , P0 , 





Further, it is also reasonable to assume that: 
(3) <0. 
Expression 3 indicates that subsequent increments of 
consumption of c1 , c2 , P1 , and P2 add less to total utility 
than previous increments; that is, there is diminishing 
marginal utility for these four arguments. In addition, 
under this expression it is normally considered reasonable 
to assume that V i,j = 0,1: 
(4) # 0 
Expression 4 indicates that the utility derived from the 
consumption of c1 , c2 , P1 , and P2 is influenced by the 
consumption levels of the other goods. That is, utiLi.ty 
derived from the consumption of any amount of either o.€ 
these four goods is not independent of the consw.nption 
levels of the other three. 
Equations 1, 2, and 3 describe the relationship of 
present and near future private and publi~ goods to the 
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utility function; the relationship between the availability 
of public goods in the distant future, P2, and the utility 
function forms the subject of the hypothesis considered in 
this chapter. 
In its essence, rhe ~~estion boils down to the 
following one: do people care about the availability of 
public goods in the distant future? That is, is dU ::fo 0 and 
~2 




The sign of this expression is positive because 
presumably the discussion is in regards to goods. However, 
if one considers the impact of public bads on the far 
futur~, then for most people the relevant expression is 
likely to be negative. Perceptions regarding the sign of 
this expression are largely based upon application of the 
principle that most people do not receive enjoyment from the 
fact that other people have an undesirable experience. The 
difficulties involved in a determination of whether or not 
an individual's utility is influenced by the existence or 
non existence of future public goods formed the basis for 
much of the discussion in the earlier portion of this 
chapter. 




While it is not necessary to hypothesize regarding the 
sign of the second derivative, it would seem reasonable that 
given H1 , d2 U <0. That is, the consumer has diminishing - aP 2 2 
marginal utility with respect to P2 • 
The second hypothesis is concerned with the issue of 
whether or not utility levels from the availability of P2 
are affected by any of the other arguments in the utility 
functions. That is, can we write the utility function as: 
(5) U = UA (C
0
, c1 , P0 , P1 ) + UB (P2 ) 
where the subscript A denotes the present and near future 
periods and B denotes the far future? 
Note carefully the separability imposed by this 
formulation. This type of separability is known in the 
literature as being weakly additive. 65 The formulation 
implies that the marginal rate of substitution between 
components of UA are unaffected by the component of UB and 
vice versa. This, of course, means that cross partials for 
pairs of commoditi~s in A and B are identically zero. Thus, 
we derive our second hypothesis: 
= 0 
where t = 0 and 1, respectively. 
65see James M. Henderson and Richard E. Quandt, 
Microeconomic Theory: a Mathematical Approach, 3rd ed., (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1980), p. 39-40. 
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Note the radical departure of the formulation in (5) 
from that of (1). In practical terms, this formulation 
argues that people separate the utility effects of P2 from 
the utility effects of everything else. The explicit result 
here is that the marginal utility derived from P2 are, for 
the individual, unaffected by other components in the 
utility function, particularly levels of consumption of the 
other goods, both public and private. Further note, that as 
specified in equation (5), the structure of the utility 
function has changed - not just the arguments. That is, the 
utility function UA is not structurally the same as that of 
UB. 
Alternatively, the structure of the utility function 
could be such that, while the elements in each subgroup 
change, the utility function is the same in each period. To 
illustrate this possibility further, ;~agine a three period 
lifetime utility function which is a function only of 
consumption in each of the three periods. That is, consider 
the function given by: 
(6) 
Imposition of separability that maintains the same structure 
of the utility function would imply that: 
(7) 
This can be contrasted to the formulation of (5) in which 
the utility functions for the different periods have 
different properties. A more general formulation of the 
-~ ·:-: ..h::.._ 
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structure inherent in ( 5) can be formed from ( 6) • That is, 
separate utility structures imply for this example, that: 
(8) u = u1 <c1 > + u2 cc2 > + u3 <c3 > 
The advantage of using a utility specification such as 
(8) as opposed to the one expressed in (7) is that we can 
explicitly introduce the notion that people weight utility 
in the future differently than present utility. The 
application of this concept allows for the introduction of 
time preference and permits development of the third 
hypothesis. For example, in its most simple formulation 
assume that people discount future consumption in a 
logarithmically linear fashion. Then the specific of (8) 
could have the following components: 
(9) (l+r) 
u3 (c3 ) = U(C3 ) 
(l+r) 2 
Thus we can see that the formulation embodied in ( 8) can 
allow us to make some assumptions regarding these weights. 
Our third major hypothesis foilows this line of 
reasoning by considering explicitly the weights that the 
consumer places en future consumption. That is, how does 
the consumer discount the near future and the distant 
future? In order to. adequately reflect the possibilities in 
this area let us first consider the consequences of imposing 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
I r.· 
an additional degree of separability upon the utility 
function of equation (4). Consider the following 
formulation: 
(10) U = UA(C
0
,P0 ) + UA(c1,P1 ) + UB(P2) 
{l+r) (1+5)2 
where r and o represent utility rates of discount. This 
93 
formulation of separability is still considered to be weakly 
additive although the reader will note the additional 
restrictions placed upon this function from equation (4). 
The implications of this arrangement are that the consumer's 




, and c1 .and 
P1 , are also unaffected by the availability of goods in the 
other group. 
The third hypothesis concerns the relative magnitudes 
of r and S. For example, if r=5 then this would indicate 
that the individual discounts events in the distant future 
using the same rate that he uses to discount the more 
i.T[l!!lediate future. 66 That is: 
H3 : r-J;o. 
The fourth hypothesis relates to the determinants of 5. 
In order to address this question it is appropriate to 
66of course, the compounding affect of time in the 
model will mean that the actual weight applied to the 
distant future would be different than the weight applied to 
the near future. 
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develop a model of respondent profiles to determine o. This 
model will be useful in the empirical portion of this 
dissertation. The model has as its foundation the 
assumption that a person's valuation of far future events 
depends on three factors: 
1) religious beliefs, 
2) ethical and moral beliefs, and 
3) concerns for descendant(s). 
The first two of these factors were discussed in Chapter III 
of this dissertation as they relate to future perspectives 
other than that offered by neoclassical economics. 
It is important to note that what is modeled in this 
section is not what particular religious, ethical/moral, and 
descendent-related concerns a person may hold, but what 
these beliefs imply about their concern for the availability 
of future public goods. In ~is sense, it is not the means 
by which a person develops their beliefs, but how these 
beliefs are reflected in valuation that is important. As an 
example consider religious beliefs, a Buddhist and a 
Christian may both hold the same degree of valuation for the 
future if the Christian falls within the class of husbanders 
discussed in Chapter III. 
Each of these factors may provide the basis for three 
levels of future valuation: a high level, a moderate level, 
and a zero level of valuation. Suppose, that a person's 
religious convictions are such that they can be 
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characterized as a Christian eminent destructionist. Then 
on the basis of this factor alone, a zero valuation of far 
future events would be implied. Similarly, certain ethical 
and/or moral beliefs will determine the degree of valuation 
for future events. Finally the same levels could be 
determined out of concern (or lack of concern) for an 
individual's descendents. 
There is no a priori reason to believe that these 
factors are independent, although for some individuals this 
.may be true. The addition of an assumption that these 
factors are independent would imply, for example, that and 
individual's morals-determined valuation of far future 
events is not a function of his/her religious convictions. 
Such a requirement seems unduly restrictive and does not add 
anything to the predictive power of this model. 
Finally assume that an individual's valuation of future 
events is determined by the maximum valuation of each 
category and the stage is set for the derivation of the 
fourth hypothesis. That is, if an individual's 
ethical/moral and religious leanings both imply a zero level 
of future valuation and a great level of concern for his/her 
descendents yields a high level of future value, then the 
operational level of valuation that this individual feels 
towards the future is high. Mathematically, we can express 
this hypothesis as: 
H4 : FV = max (R, E, D) 
~~- ~ 
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where 
FV = the level of an individual's valuation for 
the future; 
R = the level of an individual's valuation for 
the future determined by his/her religious 
beliefs; 
E = the level of an individual's valuation for 
the future determined by his/her 
ethical/moral convictions; and 
D = the level of an individual's valuation for 
the future determined by his/her level of 
concern for his/her descendents; 
and where 
FV, R, E, and D have values of high (H), medium 
(M) and zero (0). 
The fact that under this formulation, the determined l~vel 
of FV is the maximum of values existing under R, E, and D 
would seem to be reasonable. It is·certainly reasonable to 
assume that the FV of an individual whose pattern of 
religious and ethical convictions imply a very high level 
concern for the future would not be influenced by the fact 
that they do not plan to leave any descendents. Similarly, 
another individual's FV may be solely determined by the 
level of D if R and E both have a level of zero. 
At first glance, the assumption that FV is independent 
of all but the maximum of R, E, or D may appear to be in 
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conflict with the assumption that allows for interdependence 
of R, E, and D. This is not the case. The fact that, for 
some individuals a moderate value for R also implies a 
moderate value for E does not in any way affect the fact 
that the operational level of FV is high because of concern 
for descendents. Furthermore this fact does not change if 
the high level of D is determined in some way by the 
moderate levels of E and R. 
As a result of the above formulation, a 27 cell, 3x3x3 
matrix of outcomes is determined. The dimensions of the 
matrix are .the three possible determinants of FV, i.e. R, E, 
and D. Each dimension has three values: H, M, and 0. Let 
us consider the possible outcomes which are possible for a 
person who has a value of 0 for D. This can be thought of 
as a conditional arrangement where the level of FV is 
derived conditional on the fact that D=O. Under this 
arrangement, all possible values for FV must be detennined 
by the corresponding levels of R and E due to the fact that 
D is at a minimum. A graphical portrayal of these possible 
outcomes provides one, 9 cell, slice of the 3x3x3 matrix. 
This slice is depicted in Table IIa. 
Note that the values in the nine cell slice of the 
outcome matrix represented in Table IIa. range from 0 to H 
depending on whether or not R or E has the highest value. 
Furthermore, given the structure of the FV function, in that 
the level of FV is the maximum level applicable to R, E, and 
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Table II a.
Possible Values of FV if D  0
R
H M 0
H H H H
M H M M
0 H M 0
Table II b.
Possible Values of FV if D  M
R
H M 0
H H H H
H E M M
0 H M M
Table II c.
Possible Values of FV if D  H
R
H M 0
H E E E
M H E E
0 E E E






D (in this case D=O), then five cells have a value of H, 
three cells have a value of M and one cell has a value of 0. 
If the slice of the matrix pertaining to D=M is 
considered, the possible outcomes are as portrayed in Table 
IIb. Note that the difference between this slice and the 
slice depicted in Table IIa. is that the cell corresponding 
to values for R and E both equal to zero has a value of M. 
This is due to the fact that for this cell, the 
corresponding entry is determined by the level of future 
valuation indicated by D. That is the future value function 
for this cell is 
FV = max (R=O, E=O, D=M) = M. 
Finally, the slice pertaining to all possible values 
for FV if D = H is presented in Table IIc. This outcome is 
relatively trivial in that no matter what values pertain to 
R and E, ~~e applicable value for ~~ is H, the value 
corresponding to D. 
It is important to note that the likelihood of any 
particular value for FV is not in any way influenced by the 
fact that a majority of cells of the outcome matrix have a 
value of H. One should be careful to realize that what is 
depicted are all possible outcomes, not the outcome 
attributable to any one individual. Any particular 
individual occupies only one position in the 27 cell matrix. 
This position corresponds to his/her values for R, E, and D 
and the value for that particular cell is determined from 
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the FV function. While it is true that a level of H for 
either R, E, or D would predetermine the value of FV, 
without more information it is impossible to determine 
whether or not a level of H is actually prasent. 
100 
For a particular population., no a priori information 
exists in regards to the probability of each cell outcome. 
If a study of frequencies were conducted across a large 
number of individuals, then it would be possible to 
determine individual probabilities applicable to each cell 
and to make a priori predictions regarding the value 
attributable to FV. The sum of all probabilities in each of 
the 27 cells is one and the probability of achieving a value 
of H, or M would depend on the individual sum of the 
probabilities in each cell that corresponds to a particular 
value. Probabilities in 19 cells would be summed to 
deter.r..ine the probability of F".J eq-u.al to H, while 
probabilities in the seven cells would be summed to 
determine the probability of FV equal to M. The probability 
of a FV equal to 0 is the probability of the single cell 
that corresponds to FV = max { R=O, E=O, D=O) • 
This completes development of the hypothesis to be 
analyzed in the empirical portion of this dissertation. 
However, prior to moving to a discussion of potential 
a~pirical methods to test the hypothesis, it is useful to 
reflect on the relationship between the discount rates 




considered in this chapter and those rates which prevail in 
the capital market. 
The discount rates, discussed so far in this chapter 
are utility discount rates. These rates provide for the 
individual, an assignment of current values to future 
consumption. In a smoothly functioning economy 
characterized by a lack of taxes and perfect information, 
the utility discount rate for consumption in the near 
future, r, may also equal the consumption rate of interest 
and the opportunity cost of capital. Yet, the economy does 
not function smoothly, taxes predominate the corporate and 
personal arena and drive a wedge between the consumption 
rate of interest and the opportunity cost of capital. Even 
the concept that the utility discount rate equals the 
consumption rate of interest is hampered by the fact that 
not all individuals have e~~al access to the credit market. 
By this consequence and others, some face real interest 
rates of 3% for a home mortgage from their local savings and 
loan (obviously, this has not occurred recently) while 
others pay 50 - 100% or more to certain, perhaps 
unscrupulous, extensions of the normal credit market to 
finance their activities in other arenas - perhaps at the 
local race track. 
An example of the wide range of utility discounts 
occurring across individuals can be found in Hausman (1979). 
In his study, Hausman estimated the individual discount 
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rates of people purchasing energy using durables. He 
identified income dependent discount rates ranging from 
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about 5% for incomes of $50,000 to almost 90% for incomes of 
$6000. 
OVerwhelming the fact that prospects for a near future 
utility discount rate equal to the consumption rate of 
interest appear bleak, is the fact that the possibility of 
equating our utility discount applicable to the far future 
with some similar measure derived via credit markets is 
nonexistent. Intergenerational credit markets, where they 
exist, would seem to be characterized by at least an equal 
number of faults as the short term markets. In addition, 
existing long-term markets, i.e. the market for government 
bonds, home mortgages, and other high quality corporate and 
municipal instruments, seem to be accessible to a relatively 
small portion of society. Finally, the mere fact that the 
longest terms available in these vehicles are generally 
limited to 30 years - hardly a time period involving 
society's "far future" - limits any conclusion in this 
area. 67 
67Exceptions to the thirty year time limit do exist. 
However, they are few and far between and if anything, 
becoming rarer. It is interesting to note that the English 
government of the 19th century had outstanding a number of 
perpetual instruments which were callable by the issuer. 
The government exercised its option and exchanged these 
(Footnote Continued) 
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In the next chapter the possibility of empirically 
estimating the value that individuals place upon far future 
provision of public goods is explored. Potential methods to 
test the hypothesis derived in this chapter are evaluated. 
Techniques considered include exploration of the 
relationship between market goods and non market goods, 
analysis of voting behavior, contingent valuation, and 
market creation. 
(Footnote Continued) 
bonds for noncallable, fixed term instruments of 100 years 
duration. See Homer, Sidney and Martin L. Leiboweitz, Inside 
the Yield Book: New Tools for Bond Market Strategy, (London: 
Prentice Hall, 1972), pp. 33-34. 
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Chapter V 
Empirical Estimation of 
Individual's Values for the Distant Future 
In this chapter the possibility of empirically 
estimating the values that individuals have for the level 
and quality of future public goods is explored. The chapter 
discusses estimation techniques that may possibly be applied 
to the availability of public goods in the far future. One 
technique, contingent valuation, is shown to offer the 
possibility of resolving the hypothesis presented in the 
last chapter. Each potential valuation method is one of 
four basic classes of techniques that can be applied in an 
attempt to obtain valuations for public goods. 
The first method explores the relationship between 
market goods and public goods. It attempts to exploit this 
relationship to derive inferences regarding the value that 
individuals hold for the provision of public goods. Three 
valuation approaches which are components of this market 
based method are weak complementarity, hedonic pricing, and 
travel cost analysis. 
The second approach attempts to elicit public good 
values from their voting behavior. In this context, public 
good supply becomes a referendum issue. As currently 
utilized in the vast majority of public decision making, 





such referendums are usually bilateral in structure. That 
is they require a yes/no response to a specified level of 
public goods provision. 
The third technique is also a nonmarket procedure. 
This is the use of artificial markets to elicit nonmarket 
values via survey techniques. This approach is known in the 
literature as contingent valuation. Using this methodology, 
the researcher constructs a hypothetical market for a public 
good and queries individuals regarding their willingness to 
pay (or in some cases their willingness to accept) for 
changes in the level of the good. This technique can be 
affected through either a written or a verbal medium or 
both. 
A fourth approach to future valuation is to create a 
market for far future events. Presumably, this could occur 
if goverr~T.ent or some other ~~ar~itcr provided appropriate 
assurances to investors that their investments would be 
realized. Obviously direct application of this approach by 
any entity except government is extremely difficult. The 
final section of this chapter details the desirable 
characteristics and implications of this approach. 
·Furthermore, a "contingent" version of this approach will be 
discussed in the empirical analysis that is developed in 
Chapter VI. 




Approaches Which Exploit Relationships Between Public Goods 
and Private Goods 
In order to determine the potential for utilizing one 
or more of these techniques to determine individual's 
valuation of public goods in the far future, it is necessary 
to consider these techniques in much more detail. The first 
approach to be considered is the market based technique of 
weak complementarity. 
ak 1 "t 68 We Comp ementar~ y 
Consider the following demand function: 
Xi= Xi(P,Q,Y) 
where Xi is a private good, P is a vector of prices, Q is 
some public good and Y is income. If the conditions 
necessary for weak complementarity were to hold, then it 
would be possible to infer the daT.~,d price for Q from the 
demand function for X. Further, when weak complementarity 
is applicable, then it is not necessary to integrate the 
demand function to derive the underlying utility or 
expenditure function. Two be applicable to the problem of· 
determining a demand price for Q, two conditions must hold: 
1) there must be some price, p1 at which demand for X 
68This discussion follows closely on Freeman, 1979B, 
pp. 72-74. 
~···. .. 
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is zero, i.e., 
x1 (p1 ,P,Q,Y) = 0 





where u is a fixed level of utility, the partial 
derivative of the expenditure function with respect 
to Q must be zero, i.e. 
~E = 0 
~Q 
Practical application of weak complementarity can be 
illustrated with the following example. Imagine that the 
demand curve for x1, given a level of public good equal to 
Q, is defined by DQ in Figure 1. Assume further, that the 
price of X, increases from Pi to P1i and thereby consumption 
of x1 falls to zero. To maintain the consumer's level of 
utility he/she would have to be compensated by an amount 
equal to the area determined by ABC. If at this point the 
level of Q increases to Q then the demar.~d curve shifts to 
DQ. Presumably, at the price Pi1 the change in the level of 
Q holds no interest for the consumer as his consumption of 
x1 is zero. However, if the price of x1 returns to the 
original price of P1 then the consumer's welfare has 
increased by the area determined by BDEC if compensation 
payments equal to ABC are discounted. 
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Consider the possibility of applying the technique to 
the utility function defined by equation (5) in Chapter IV. 
Recall that (5) had the following formulation: 
(5) 
It should be obvious to the reader that weak complementarity 
can not be applied to derive the individual's valuation for 
P 2• Unforttinately, this is due to the fact that the demand 
curves for c
0 
and c1 are not functions of the level of P2 
because of the separable nature of the utility function. 




The implications of this separability were discussed in 
Chapter IV. And given the nature of P2, public goods in the 
far future, separability would sea~ to be appropriate. For 
this reason, the possibility of applying weak 
complementarity to this problem is zero and we must continue 
our search of other techniques. 
Hedonic Pricing 
The other alternative which can sometimes be used to 
value relationships between market goods and public goods is 
the use of hedonic pricing. This approach was pioneered 
through the efforts of Tiebout (1956), Lancaster (1966), and 
Rosen (1974) and surveyed by Freeman (1979A and B). The 
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hedonic technique exploits the relationship between a goods 
price and its characteristics to derive implicit prices for 
nonmarket attributes. For example, consider the factors 
which determine the price of a horne. such items as number 
and size of bedrooms, age, size of lot, existence of a 
swimming pool, etc. are all characteristics which determine 
the market price of a particular horne. In addition, this 
market price is also a function of non-structural 
characteristics such as neighborhood attributes and 
environmental quality. Mathematically, we can express this 
relationship as: 
where: 
Ph.= Ph.< 5i1' 5i2'··· 5in;Qi1'Qi2' ••• Qiml 
J.. J.. 
Ph. = the hedonic price function for the ith unit 
J.. 
of h, 
s. . = the quantity of the j th structural 
l..J 
characteristic in unit hi, and 
Qik = the quantity of the kth environmental 
characteristic in unit hi. 
With this formulation, the hedonic price of a characteristic 
can be determined by differentiating the hedonic price 
function with respect to a particular characteristic. Thus 
~Ph./~Qik = Pg.k< 5i1'5i2'··· 5in;Qi1'Qi2' ••• Qirn) 
J.. J.. 
is the hedonic price function for Qik which illustrates the 
marginal expenditure on h required to get one more unit of 
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The applicability of this technique to the problems 
discussed in Chapter Four is probably non existent due to 
the fact that the far future availability of public goods is 
not a determinant of current prices. Therefore 
oPh_!dQit = o, 
~ 
where 
Qit = some future quantity of a public good. 
Thus we must continue our search for valuation techniques. 
Travel Cost Analysis 
Travel cost analysis was developed by Hotelling (1949) 
and applied to recreation benefits by Clawson (1959). The 
methodology is based upon the notion that the benefits that 
one receives from a recreational activity must be at least 
as great as the expenditures incurred to travel to the 
recreation site. Application of the methodology requires 
that the researcher construct a series of travel zones, 
often concentric circles, from which travel costs and 
per-capita visitation rates are calculated. Summation of 
the travel costs from each zone yields an estimate of the 
total recreation value of the site. 
There are several severe problems with the travel cost 
methodology which restrict its application. Perhaps the 
most serious problem is the fact that the travel cost 
methodology presumes that recreation benefits can only be 
obtained from the site and that no enjoyment can be obtained 
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from any other source. Thus the travel cost methodology 
ignores the fact that individuals may receive benefits from 
other sources, such as socializing with family and friends 
or perhaps through the traveling to the site itself. In 
addition, there is no consistent evidence regarding 
appropriate level of valuing peoples' time. Another problem 
with the travel cost methodology is that it is largely 
useless for applications to multiple destinations. 
Further consideration of the travel cost method is 
unnecessary. There is obviously no possibility of applying 
this methodology to public goods in the far future. 
Thus none of the three market-based approaches have 
proved to offer hope to answer the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter IV. It is now appropriate to explore the 
possibility of utilizing non-market based valuation 
techniques which do not rely on exploitation of the 
relationship between market goods and nonmarket goods. The 
first of these to be considered is the referendum. 
Referendum 
The second category in our search for valuation 
techniques to apply to.the future availability of public 
goods is that of utilizing·a referendum. Numerous 
economists have written in regard to voting procedures. 
Under some circumstances the application of the referendum 
process can lead to efficiency of supply of public goods. 




Obviously, since pareto efficiency requires that no one be 
harmed by an action and the fact that citizens are taxed to 
provide public goods this circumstances is limited to the 
case of unanimity for public goods provision. This point 
was first made by Wicksell (1896) and was later made by 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962). For multidimensional public 
good provision questions, Lindahl (1919), Malinvaud 
(1970-71), and Dreze and de la Vallee Poussin (1971) argue 
that a tatonnement process between all alternatives may be 
used. Obviously, this approach can be criticized for the 
transaction costs required to conduct the number of polls 
required to reach consensus. 69 Transaction costs occur for 
an indirect reason also due to the fact that the unanimity 
rule encourages strategic behavior, i.e. incentives for 
individuals to not reveal their true preferences in order to 
extract su._-rpluses from others. That is, since una.."li.."nity 
requires the participation of all members of society, the 
marginal societal benefits of coercing the nth member of an 
n-number society to vote "yes" with the others is equal to 
the sum of the individual valuations, and presumably 
individual benefits are sufficient to make both individually 
sponsored and societal coercion probable. Thus each member 
of society will seek to extract surplus from the others; it 
69Buchanan and Tullock 1962 ch 2 Black 1958pp.146-7 
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is this for.m of additional bargaining that increases 
transactions costs. These transaction costs arising out of 
strategic behavior on the part of the voter are detailed by 
Black (1958), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Barr~ (1965), and 
Samuelson (1969); they represent the foremost obstacle to 
application of the unanimity rule. 
Note that the above discussion was concerned with 
strategic behavior vis a vis the extraction of surplus from 
others. Use of the unanimity rule eliminates strategic 
free-rider behavior when public goods are considered. This 
is the notion, pioneered by samuelson (1954), that 
individuals will not reveal their true preferences because 
the good once provide for one is provided for all members of 
a society. Under a market allocation scheme this encourages 
individuals to understate willingness to pay for the good. 
Such behavior is elLT~nated under the unanL~ity rule because 
the vote of each and every member is essential for 
provision. This proposition holds as long as quantity and 
tax share are decided prior to the goods provision. 
Other voting rules exist which offer decreased 
transactions cost (but more prevalent strategic behavior) 
while penalizing efficiency. The most common of these in 
actual use is the simple majority rule. In some cases, in 
order to increase efficiency, the rule is modified so that a 
significant majority is required for passage. The use of a 
majority rule will generally impose further distortions. 
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One major problem with the majority voting rule is that it 
can lead to cycling both within and across issues. Across 
issue cycling was discussed by Condorcet (1785), Dodgson 
(1876), Black (1948b), and Kenneth Arrow (1951). Cycling 
can be defined as intransitively of voting outcomes. It 
occurs when the outcome of pair-wise comparisons of more 
than two alternatives depends upon the order in which 
comparisons are voted. 70 The problem of cycling encourages 
voters to trade their votes on separate issues in order to 
form winning coalitions on issues that are more important to 
them. Cycling is not required for vote trading, or 
logrolling, to occur. Taylor ( 1971) and Ridker and Brams 
(1973) suggested that vote trading may force non-traders 
into a disadvantaged position and therefore lower overall 
gains. Tullock (1959) argued that logrolling increases the 
overall level of government spending. 
70Further explanation of cycling is warranted. Assume 
a society of three voters: one, two and three. Further 
assume that three alternatives are to be voted upon. 
Designate these alternatives as A, B, and c. Finally assume 
transitivity of preferences and that the following 
preferences hold: voter one prefers alternative A to B and 
B to C; voter two prefers alternative B to c and C to A; and 
voter three prefers alternative c to A and A to B. Under 
this arrangement, pair-wise comparisons can lead to any 
outcome. For example if alternative A is pitted against B 
in the first round alternative A will win only to lose to c 
in the second round. Finally, it should be noted that if an 
election between all three candidates is held and if all 
three voters vote for their first choice, the system is 
deadlocked. 




Other voting rules may also be utilized also. These 
include the plurality rule, the Condorcet criterion, the 
Borda count, exhaustive voting, and approval voting. All 
suffer from some type of distortion. Furthermore, none of 
these rules are generally used to determine an allocation of 
public goods; they are however, often utilized to select 
candidates and representatives for public offices. 71 
So far the discussion has been centered on the 
technique of direct voter participation in the allocation of 
public goods. However, the majority of public goods 
allocation occurs through the vehicle of the representative 
government. 72 Ignoring Federalistic reasons for this 
71nennis c. Mueller, Public Choice, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 59-60. 
72Apparently there is a belief in our society that a 
direct democracy is better than the representative 
government on certain sorts of allocation questions. We 
often require such treatment for some "taxation" issues like 
school bonding for the new gymnasium or increasing the mill 
levy for the general fund. These items are handled via a 
direct mechanism while other allocation decisions are 
processed through the vehicle of the representative 
government. Ignoring Constitutional and historical 
practice, apparently one reason for this is because the 
individual impacts of the decision on the individual are 
greater and the transaction costs relatively low. However 
this reason does not seem adequate; as the decision to 
construct new high school and a comparable federal proposal 
to launch a new defense initiative both require 
approximately the same level of payment from the individual. 
Furthermore, the biggest decisions, .i.e. to send men to the 
moon or - if your a ratepayer to an electric utility - to 
build a nuclear powerplant, do not require referendums 
(Footnote Continued) 
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arrangement, such a process provides for a further reduction 
in transactions cost at the expense of decisional 
efficiency. Obviously, representative forms of government 
suffer doubly from the problems described above -- strategic 
behavior, cycling, logrolling -- due to the fact that these 
problems are prevalent when the representative is elected 
and when the representative votes on an allocation question. 
Other, more real world, problems begin to surface also. 
These include the existence of single issue elections which 
tend to produce candidates who are unqualified to serve in 
offices requiring multiple decision dimensions, large 
information costs for voters, incentives for politicians not 
to reveal true opinions, overemphasis on compromise and 
logrolling -- perhaps in an effort to reduce political 
transaction costs, gerrymandering, and a franchising 
mechar~sm ~~at excludes parties from the voting process. 
The above discussion has demonstrated that, under any 
form of government or voting rule, the observed level of 
public goods allocation is likely to be different than the 
optimal one. That is, the prevailing level of public gcods 
(Footnote Continued) 
despite the fact that the impact on the individual is much 
greater. 
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The bottom line of this discussion is that it is not 
possible to make a determination regarding individual values 
for the far future provision of public goods from the 
existing observed allocation provided by the present 
government. However, this does not mean that improvements 
may not be made in the system. In fact, it is interesting 
to speculate as to how people would reveal there preferences 
if they were afforded the opportunity to directly vote on 
the level and quality of public goods provided for the far 
future. 74 
Contingent Valuation 
The third method of achieving valuations for non-market 
goods is the use of contingent valuation. Under this 
73one must be careful here to not confuse the issue of 
revealing preferences with the issue of providing an 
efficient allocation of public goods. Even if we suppose 
the existence of a perfect preference-revealing process, the 
outcome is likely to be inefficient due to the difficulties 
inherent in transcribing mandate into action. This later 
problem would also prevail in the contingent valuation 
process. 
74This possibility will be considered in Chapter VI. 
In that chapter, a survey is designed, based upon the 
contingent valuation approach, which affords people the 
opportunity to vote for a far future allocation of public 
goods through specific actions in a hypothetical market. 






approach, households or individuals are directly asked to 
state their valuation for non-market goods. Early attempts 
to value public goods using the survey approach were made by 
Davis (1963), Bohm (1972), Hammack and Brown (1974), and 
Randall et al. (1974). 
As applied in interview and survey forms, contingent 
valuation represents a two step procedure. First, the good 
under evaluation is described to the respondent along with 
any necessary background information. This first step may 
include any necessary visual aids or other material 
necessary to present the respondents with a consistent and 
accurate impression of the public good at various levels of 
provision. Secondly, the respondent is queried regarding 
his/her willingness to pay (or willingness to accept) for 
various levels of public good provision. Alternatively, if 
bids are not utilized, the respondent may be queried as to 
behavioral changes. 
Evidence continues to mount that indicates that where 
non-market goods are well defined, i.e. well known and 
identifiable by the respondent, contingent valuation is an 
acceptable methodology. Results obtained via willingness to 
pay approaches have been demonstrated to be free from bias, 
stable and have been replicated in repeated studies, and 
verifiable with other non-market valuation techniques. 
Many economists an others have speculated that the 
outcomes of a contingent valuation study are likely to be 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
.s;;-:'' --. 
120 
biased. Three basic types of bias have been proposed. 
These include strategic bias, information bias, and vehicle 
bias. Strategic bias is the incentive for a respondent to 
not reveal his/her true preferences in an attempt to 
influence outcomes of the study. Information bias relates 
to the notion that a respondent's answer is affected by the 
amount and type of information revealed in the interview (or 
survey). Vehicle bias causes valuations to not be 
independent of the collection medium. 
The possibility of strategic behavior on the part of 
individuals confronted with an opportunity to influence the 
provision level of a public good was first discussed by 
Samuelson (1954). This notion arises due to the fact that 
since a public good once provided is provided for all, 
individuals have an incentive to not reveal their 
preferences cu'"ld "free ride." For example, consider a fund 
drive to raise money to provide a community with mosquito 
control. Many individuals are likely to under pay, i.e. 
contribute amounts less than their marginal valuation of 
mosquito abatement, because they strategically plan to free 
ride on the abatement funded by others. Obviously, if a 
substantial number of people react in this manner, the 
amount of mosquito protection provided is likely to fall far 
short of the optimal level. 
Strategic bias can take other forms also. One type may 
occur if an individual would like to see a level of public 
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goods provision which is different than that which he/she 
believes will be justified by the average of his/her true 
marginal valuation and the valuations of other individuals. 
In this circumstance the respondent may report a different 
valuation in hopes of changing the average level of 
valuation. 
Research has demonstrated that the hypothetical nature 
of contingent markets tends to minimize this behavior. This 
is especially true if respondents are informed that their 
responses will have no impact on policy decisions. Randall 
et al. (1974), Brookshire et al. (1979), and Rowe et al. 
(1980) were all able to disprove the existence of strategic 
bias in survey responses. Such bias is minimized by careful 
survey design. 
Information bias arises_if respondents are presented 
with deficient levels of information or the information is 
provided inconsistently. The hypothetical and complex 
nature of public goods supply questions often make some 
element of information bias inevitable. However, such bias 
can be minimized by careful survey design which in as 
thorough a manner as possible, acquaints the respondent with 
all of the relevant ramifications of changes in supply of 
the public good. Another related form of information bias 
is known as starting-point bias. Starting-point bias exists 
when the observed level of maximum willingness to pay is 
influenced by the initial level of valuation suggested by 
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the interviewer. Rowe et al. (1980) found significant 
levels of information bias, including starting-point bias. 
In this study respondents increased their bids when informed 
that their original willingness to pay was insufficient to 
maintain pollution from power plants in the southwestern 
United States at their present levels. However, no 
information bias in either form was detected by Thayer 
(1981). Starting point bias was eliminated by Rahmatian 
(1982) and Brookshire et al. (1980) by simply allowing 
respondents to choose their own starting points. 
Vehicle bias also has been noted in the literature. 
This form of bias is also known as instrument or payment 
bias. Under this for of bias, responses are affected by the 
method by which payments are to be collected. For example, 
willingness to pay in a hypothetical survey of wildlife may 
be affected by the fact that the payment is to be collected 
in the form of increased fees for hunting licenses as 
opposed to a general tax increase. Respondents may bid 
higher when the payment vehicle is a general tax increase 
because they feel that hunting is a "right," or they may 
feel that the state game and fish department is inefficient 
and may waste the money. Rowe et al. (1980) found evidence 
of vehicle bias. Their study determined that willingness to 
pay was higher if the survey vehicle was a payroll tax as 
opposed to an increase in entrance fees. Sorg (1982) found 
that big game hunters' willingness to pay for wildlife was 
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statistically lower if the payment vehicle was a license fee 
payment as opposed to a total expenditure vehicle. 
The potential for bias indicates a need to ensure that 
surveys are well constructed. In addition, it is important 
that, in as much as possible, every attempt is made to 
develop the well defined nature of the public good. A 
review conducted by Shultze et al. (1980) suggests that bias 
is not a serious problem. 
Substantiation of the results of contingent valuation 
methods via methodological cross checks has been achieved in 
several different studies. These verifications have taken 
three basic forms: 1) comparison of non-market values 
obtained in different contingent valuation studies; 2) 
comparison of valuations obtained via travel cost studies 
and values derived in contingent valuation; and 3) 
comparison of non-market values from hedonic property value 
studies and contingent valuation. 
Evidence has mounted which indicates the ability to 
replicate of contingent valuation results. Shultze et al. 
(1981) compared six different contingent valuation studies 
and found that results from the studies were consistent as 
relatively free of bias. Sorg (1982) found that in home 
interviews yield the same results as interviews conducted in 
the field. 
Contingent valuation methods have also been found to be 
roughly comparable to some travel cost studies. Bishop and 
!!!V~·-:·. . ...:...::...: 
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Heberlein (1980) compared several variants of contingent 
valuation to the travel cost methodology for Canadian Goose 
hunting in Wisconsin's Horicon Marsh. As a precondition for 
their study, an actual market and a hypothetical market were 
established to compare values obtained by hunters who sold 
their huntlng license. From this first round, Bishop and 
Heberlein found that the contingent valuation methodology 
yielded results that were statistically larger than those 
derived from cash payments. This bias was utilized to 
evaluate results of later comparisons of contingent 
valuation and the travel cost methodology. The authors 
found that travel cost values were significantly lower than 
those obtained via contingent valuation. However, it should 
be noted that this result is expected as travel cost yields, 
in some sense, a lower bound. 75 The fact that willingness 
to accept values were significantly, but not outrageously, 
higher indicates that they conform to expectations. 
Desvousges et al. (1982) also compared the travel cost 
method and contingent valuation. This study analyzed water 
quality related recreation benefits for the Mongahela River 
in Pennsylvania. Desvousges et al.'s results indicated a 
75see the discussion of the travel cost methodology 
presented earlier in this chapter. 
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strong correlation between results obtained via contingent 
valuation and travel cost analysis. 
Brookshire et al. (1982) compared the hedonic property 
value method to contingent valuation for air pollution in 
the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Their study compared 
households willingness to pay for an improvement in air 
quality and pollution-induced differences in property values 
revealed in the sales prices of single family homes. 
Besides substantiating the results of contingent valuation 
methods, Brookshire et al. demonstrated that the magnitudes 
of air quality valuations were within ranges suggested by 
economic theory. Using a simple utility maximization model, 
they demonstrated that the annualized cost difference 
between homes in two different air quality areas will exceed 
annual willingness to pay for an equivalent improvement in 
air quality, ceteris paribus. Brookshire et al. are quick 
to point out that their extremely well-ordered results are 
largely due to the fact that air pollution in the Los 
Angeles basin is a particularly well-defined good. 
Similar results were obtained by Lechman et al. {1982). 
This study was a straight-forward extension of the 
Brookshire et al. results to air pollution in the San 
Francisco Bay area. Again, willingness to pay values 
obtained using contingent valuation yielded predicted 
relationships to values derived with the property value 
method • 
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Cummings et al. (1982') conducted a study of hedonic 
wage differentials and willingness to pay measures for an 
increase in community infrastructure. The study was 
conducted utilizing data from communities in New Mexico and 
Wyoming. Willingness to pay values in the study were 
obtained by asking people how much they would be willing to 
forgo, in the form of reduced money wages to obtain a higher 
level of infrastructure. In addition, the authors estimated 
a hedonic wage gradient for the different levels of wages 
and infrastructure occurring across the communities. No 
significant difference was found between the results derived 
from the hedonic analyze and those obtained utilizing 
contingent valuation. 
Other research has centered on the particular form of 
contingent valuation studies. This research has centered 
arcu.~d whether or net values derived represent maxL~~~ 
willingness to pay_and whether or not the explicit 
introduction of a budget constraint effected derived levels 
of payment. Sorg (1982) found that payment card bids, 
utilized in written surveys and occasionally in personal 
interviews, do not capture maximum willingness to pay for 
wildlife. This result collaborates results derived by 
Rahmatian (1982) for air quality. Sorg concluded that use 
of the payment card alone provides a willingness to pay 
measure which is biased downward and that the amount of this 
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bias depends on the elasticity of demand for the public 
good. 
Sorg also tested the effects of a budget constraint. 
She found that no statistical difference exists between mean 
bids with and without a budget constraint. According to 
Sorg, this was due to the fact that the good under 
consideration, big game hunting, was well defined. This 
result was also derived by Rahmatian (1982) and Brookshire 
et al. (1982). 
Thus it can be seen that the contingent valuation 
approach offers substantial promise to provide answers to 
the hypotheses developed in chapter IV. However, contingent 
markets must be carefully constructed. In order to better 
construct. such a markt;t it is important to consider how an 
actual market for far future public goods may operate. 
Market Creation 
One conceivable method to observe individual behavior 
with regards to future goods is to create a market for 
future events. In such a market direct consideration of 
future values is possible. Under such an arrangement 
individuals could purchase claims to far future activity. 
Presumably, this could occur if government or some other 
guarantor provided appropriate assurances to investors that 
their investments would be realized. Obviously direct 
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application of this approach by any entity except government 
is extremely difficult. 
Consider the implications of a contemporary sale of 
perpetual instruments, such as were issued in England in the 
nineteenth century. 76 These callable instruments were 
issued by the English government. If variations of such 
instruments were available today, future valuations could be 
directly observed in the market. Certainly it would be 
interesting to observe purchasing behavior. Consider, how 
much would you be willing to pay for a bond that pays one 
dollar per year for the rest of eternity? a lot? a little? 
Much could be learned about the way people value the 
future if a observations were made of an intergenerational 
bond market. The market could be structured in order that 
people could purchase bonds with perpetual payments, the 
first of which is distributed one-hundred years (500 years, 
1000 years) from now to the recipients, or causes of their 
choice. With extremely minimal possibility of strategic 
behavior, future values could easily be determined directly. 
Obviously an important consideration for the potential 
participant in such a market is the likelihood of the 
payments being distributed. This is the primary reason why 
76These instruments were mentioned in footnote 67 of 
Chapter IV. 
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such a market would require government backing to minimize 
uncertainty regarding payment streams. Uncertainty may 
still remain a problem with government backing, and an 
observation of non-participatory behavior does not, in and 
of itself imply a zero value for the future. 77 Uncertainty, 
may also cause individuals to discount the value of the 
bonds and therefore ~~e market value would likely be smaller 
than it would be in the absence of uncertainty. However, 
despite the problem of uncertainty in such a market, it 
seems fundamental that if the bonds illustrate some 
non-negative value, evidence of far future valuation is 
secured. 
Unfortunately, construction of such a real market for 
the far future provision of public goods is politically 
impossible and thus it is not realistic to utilize market 
creation to cu~swer the hypothesis of chapter IV. However, 
this exercise is most useful. Information gathered from a 
proposed actual market for future events can be combined 
with knowledge of the application of the contingent 
valuation technique described earlier to design a 
hypothetical market for future events. Such a contingent 
77Admittedly, it may be more difficult to satisfy 
peoples' belief in a perpetual government today than it was 
to satisfy the monied English in perpetuity of England in 
the nineteenth century. 
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market is designed in the next chapter. This market has as 
its foundation a bond auction similar to the market 
described above. 
-~---7_ -- .. ..... ~ 
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Chapter VI 
Experiment Design and Sample 
In this chapter a survey instrument is developed to 
answer the hypotheses developed in Chapter IV. The need for 
a survey approach was established in Chapter v. The survey 
instrumant designed in this chapter combines elements of the 
discussion of an actual market for far future public goods 
with contingent valuation methodology. These techniques for 
determining values were discussed in Chapter V. 
Prior to discussing the actual design of the survey 
utilized to answer the hypothesis developed in Chapter IV, 
it is useful to consider the components of an ideal survey 
instrument. such an instrument would be unbiased, of 
moderate length, and would contain clear and specific 
questions as well as easily comprehensible instructions. 
The chosen sample for the survey would be random and without 
bias; the sample size would be large enough to provide 
incontestable statistical significance to the results. 
By necessity, the survey utilized to answer the 
hypotheses of this dissertation must deviate from the norms 
of the perfect survey. This is due to the fact that the 
concept of future valuation is a difficult one and the 
inherent complexity of the hypotheses and underlying factors 
which determine a respondents view of the future. The 




survey utilized in this analysis is relatively lengthy, 
however it is hoped that the other goals will be achieved. 
Survey Design 
In this section the survey utilized in this study is 
discussed in detail. An copy of the survey utilized in this 
analysis is presented in Appendix I. Specific criticisms 
and shortcomings of the survey instrument will be discussed 
in Chapter 7. 
The respondent is introduced to the future valuation 
survey with the following statement: 
The purpose of this survey is to determine how you 
value the future and why you feel the way that you do. 
It represents part of a research project on future 
valuation conducted by the University of Wyoming 
Department of Economics. Would you pleases take a few 
minutes of your time to fill out the survey? Thank 
you. 
With the introduction complete the respondent is asked to 
consider his/her impression of what the future will be like 
through a series of questi.-::ms: 
1. Do you think today's society will leave the future 
better or worse off that we are today? 
generally better off 
---generally worse off 
don't know 
2. In what ways will future society be better off? (Check 
all that apply. ) 
___ more knowledge 
more resources 
==:less chance of war 
___ improved spiritual outlook 
___ improved values 
better health 
more goods and services 







_other 1 (specify) ___________ _ 
___ other 2 (specify) ________________________ __ 
In what ways will future 
all that apply. ) 
fewer resources 




society be worse off? (Check 
deterioration of values 
--overcrowded 
fewer goods and services 
__ spoiled environment 
_other 1 (specify) __________ _ 
___ other 2 (specify) __________ _ 
An individual's impressions regarding the level of welfare 
in the future when combined with information regarding the 
individual's ethical leanings. As discussed in Chapter III, 
ethical criteria can provide a means of explaining future 
valuation. For example a person who believes that the 
future will be worse off than the present but who does not 
wish to make transfers to the future and in fact wishes 
transfers to be made from the future to the present may be a 
Nietzschean. Alternatively, a desire for the same transfer 
could be in accordance with a Rawlsian framework if the 
respondent believes that the future will be better off than 
the present. Further clarification of past, present and 
future perceptions welfare are provided by the following 
series of questions: 
4. How long do you believe society will continue to be at 
least as well off as today? 
10 years 10,000 years 
--- 25 years ==:1,000,000 years· 
100 years forever 
==: 1,000 years other (specify) years 






5. How long do you believe mankind will continue to 
inhabit the earth? 
10 years 10,000 years 
25 years 1,000,000 years 
100 years forever 
1,000 years ---other (specify) years 
6. In what manner do you believe mankind's existence on 
the earth will cease or be sharply reduced? (Check all 
that apply. ) 
7. 
8. 
return of the Lord ___ environmental pollution 
---nuclear holocaust lack of resources 
---famine ---none, mankind will exist 
---disease ---forever 
-other (specify) 
Is the world a better 
100 years ago? 
50 years ago? 
10 years ago'? 
Is mankind better of 
100 years ago? 
50 years ago'? 
















The next two questions attempt to directly elicit the 
respondents time preference for amounts of money at two 
different points ~n tL~e. TrJLs provides an estLuate of time 
preference behavior over near future events and thus 
provides an estimate of "r" which was discussed in Chapters 
III and IV. The first question presents the respondent with 
a series of choices: 
9. Assuming no inflation, which of the following 
alternatives would you prefer to receive in each set'? 
Set 1: _$100 today or ___ $5,000 10 years from now 
Set 2: _$100 today or ___ $2,000 10 years from now 
Set 3: _$100 today or __ $1,000 10 years from now 
Set 4: _$100 today or __ $ 500 10 years from now 
Set 5: _$100 today or_$ 250 10 years from now 
Set 6: _$100 today or __ $ 150 10 years from now 




If the respondent's money discount rate is between 4 and 
48%, then a switch from the right hand choices to the left 
hand blanks should be observed. For example, a person whose 
discount rate is between 35% and 26% would check the right 
hand side of sets 1 and 2 and the left hand side of sets 3 
through 6. 78 Thus the individual is is indifferent between 
the choice of $100 dollars today and between $1000 to $2000 
ten years from now. Technically, in this case the 
respondent is indifferent between $100 and some amount X, 
such that $1000 ~ X ~ $2000. Inclusion of the endpoints of 
the interval is necessary because the question did not 
differentiate indifference. 
The second question in this series is included as a 
consistency check. This question utilizes a five year time 
horizon so that the respondent can not simply restate a 
portion of his/her an~der to ~~estion 9. 
10. Complete this statement: Assuming no inflation, I would 
be just as happy receiving $50 today as I would be if I 
received $ five years from now. 
78The derivation of these rates of discount is based on 
the notion that a present value (PV) is equal to a future 
value (FV) divided by one plus the rate of discount (r), 
where the denominator is raised to the number of years (i). 
That is, in this case the following formula is utilized: 
FV = 
(1 + r)i 
Since, PV, FV, and i are known in each set, the problem 
becomes one of solving for r. 




From this question it is possible to directly calculate the 
discount rate that is implied by the respondent's 
indifference between the two dollar amounts. Because the 
respondent supplies the dollar figure which makes him 
indifferent, there is no range of rates as there was in 
question number 9. 
The next portion of the survey allows the respondent to 
vote on the future provision of petroleum. This question 
allows the respondent to vote on the possibility of taxing 
contemporary petroleum supplies so that stocks can be 
preserved for future generations: 
11. The price of oil has fallen significantly in recent 
months. As a result, gasoline prices are lower and 
people are using more petroleum. Over the long term, 
low petroleum prices will stimulate demand and 
significantly decrease the amount of petroleum 
available for future generations. Would you be in 
favor of increasing the price of petroleum, perhaps 
through a tax, so as to preserve supplies for future 
generations? 
__ _.yes __ no 
This question is based upon the discussion of the referendum 
process which was considered in Chapter V. It provides a 
practical and concrete opportunity for the respondent to 
indicate preferences towards the future. Furthermore it 
should be noted that such a. tax has been recently considered 
in the u.s., although the purpose of the tax was not to 
"preserve supplies." The tax was proposed on foreign 
petroleum imports in order to increase the competitive 
relationship of domestic production. 




After the above question now more abstract questions 
regarding future valuation. The first of these (12A) gives 
respondents the opportunity to express their perceptions 
regarding the relevance of future impacts in cont~~porary 
decisions. 
12 A. Do you think that today's society should explicitly 
consider the impacts of its actions on future society 
when determining our present course of action? 
___yes ___ no 
The second and third questions in this series (12B and 12C) 
build upon the first question. These questions are only 
asked to those who feel that society should explicitly 
consider the impacts of its actions on future society. The 
second questions inquires in regards to motives for high 
future valuation. Three motives are suggested (the 
respondent may write in two others). These motives coincide 
with the religious, ethical, and.descendent-related 
motivations developed in hypotheses four of Chapter IV. 
B. If your answer to the last question was yes, why 
should we worry about future generations? (check all 
that apply. ) 
It is our ethical and/or moral duty. 
----It is our religious duty. 
----It is our duty to our descendants. 
Other 1 (specify) ______________________________ _ 
__ Other 2 (specify) ________________ _ 
The final question of this series asks the respondent to 
explain how future impacts should be valued in a 
contemporary decision process. 
c. If you answer to question 12A was yes, how should 
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impacts on future generations be considered in our 
present decisions? Suppose for example, that we are 
considering a course of action that will cause future 
society to spend an extra $1,000 in today's dollars. 
How should this impact be considered in our present 
decision? (Choose the~ that applies.) 
It should be considered at the same magnitude as 
if this impact were happening to ourselves today. 
It should be considered at a magnitude which is 
smaller than the magnitude which would apply 
today but at the magnitude as if this impact was 
happening to ourselves in the future. 
____ It should be considered at a magnitude which is 
smaller than the magnitude we would apply if this 
impact were to occur to ourselves in the future. 
It should be considered at a larger magnitude 
than if this impact was happening to ourselves 
today. 
Recall that the first hypothesis developed in Chapter 
IV was that the far future provision of public goods is 
important to the individual. This hypothesis is tested by 
asking individuals a series of questions regarding factors 
that are in their utility function. This is accomplished 
through nine questions in the survey (questions number 
13-21). The first of these questions is a simple ranking of 
seventeen present and future goods. In this question the 
respondent is asked to rank the six most important item on 
the list. 
13. Rank the six most important things to you in the 
following list. (1 being highest, 6 being the lowest) 
___ the availability of a clean environment for present 
society 
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___ the availability of a clean environment for future 
generations 
___peace for contemporary society 
___peace for future society 
___ education for contemporary society 
___ education for future society 
___ a high level of contemporary religious values 
139 
___ a high level of religious values for future society 
___ contemporary goods and services 
___ goods and services for future society 
___ the welfare of future society 
___ the availability of goods and services for your 
grandchildren 
___ the welfare of your grandchildren 
___ the availability of goods and services for your 
children 
___ the welfare of your children 
___ the availability of goods and services for your 
distant descendants 
___ the welfare of your distant descendants 
In questions 14 through 20 pair-wise comparisons of 
present and future goods are made. Under this scenario the 
respondent is asked to compare eight different states of the 
world. These states include: the chance of nuclear war is 
reduced 10%; the respondent receives a new car; fewer 
resources are used today so that more resources are 
preserved for future society; people become more religious; 
more goods and services are available for consumption today; 
more goods and services are available for future society; 




more emphasis is placed upon pollution control today; and 
lastly, the moral fiber of contemporary society is ~roved. 
The following is a series of questions in which you are 
asked to choose between two alternatives. There are seven 








Would ycu consider yourself to be better off under 
state A or state B? 
A. the chance of nuclear war is reduced 10%. 
B. you receive a new car. 
Would you be better off in state C or D? 
c. ___ fewer natural resources are used today so that 
more resources are preserved for future society. 
D.___people become more religious. 
Now consider your answers for the above questions; 
would you be better under: 
E.___your answer to question 14 (A or B). 
F.___your answer to question 15 (Cor D). 
Would you be better off in state G or H? 
G. more goods and services were available for 
---society's consumption today. 
H. more goods and services were available for future 
---society. 
would You be better of in state I or state J? 
I. more emphasis was placed on pollution control 
---today. 
J. the moral fiber of contemporary society was 
---improved. 
Now consider your answers for the above questions, 
would you be better off under: 
K. ___your answer to question 17 ( G or H) • 
L.___your answer to question 18 (I or J). 
Finally, consider your answers to question number 16 
and question number 19. Would you be better off under: 
M.___your answer to question 17 (state ABc or D). 
N.___your answer to question 18 (G H I or J) 
Finally, question 21 asks the respondent to name and to 
rank in order the four things that give them most utility: 
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21. Rank in order the four most important things to you. 
That is, what four things make you feel most well off 




Fourth. __________________________________ ___ 
141 
An important part of the survey is the contingent 
transfer of wealth to the future. This is accomplished in 
the survey through the use of a intergenerational bond 
market similar to the instruments discussed in Chapters IV 
and v. The development and focusing of this contingent 
market requires eleven questions (Q22 to Q32). Under this 
approach, the surveys alternate between a 200 year and a 500 
year market. 
The contingent market is first proposed to the 
respondent in question 22. The market is very flexible. 
The respondent is informed that he/she can have the 
distribution payments made in any manner of their choosing. 
22. Suppose that it is possible to purchase a $1 bond which 
pays $1 per year forever, the first payment is 
distributed in 500 years to the recipients or causes 
of your choice. ---
Would you be willing to purchase any of these bonds? 
yes no 
Again note that approximately 50% of the surveys involve a 
500 year game and the rest utilize a 200 year game. 
Respondent who answer affirmatively as to whether or not 
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they would be willing to purchase any of the bonds are then 
asked how many. 
23. If your answer to question number 22 was yes, how many 
bonds would you purchase? (You may choose any dollar 
amount) 
dollars worth 
The respondents proposed recipient is ascertained in the 
next question: 
24. If your answer to question number 22 was yes, who or 
what would you want to receive the interest payments? 
(Specify) 
A very important part of the survey process is to ascertain 
why individuals would choose not to participate in the 
contingent market proposed in question 22. As emphasized in 
Chapter V, the fact that a person does not wish to 
participate in such a market does not, in and of itself, 
constitute proof that the individual does not value far 
future public goods. One major reason that people may not 
wish to participate in the market discussed above is that 
they are unsure as to whether the contingent payment would 
be distributed. 
25. If your answer to question number 22 was no, that is 
you do not want to purchase any of the bonds, is it 
because 
----~you have no desire to transfer money to the future. 
money will not solve the future's problem. 
----you do not believe that such a program could work. 
____ other (specify) 
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2 6 • If you checked the third box above (i.e. , you do not 
think that the program could work) would you be likely 
to participate in the program if it was government 
guaranteed? 
__ yes no 
If the respondent was willing to participate in a 
government-guaranteed market, then he/she is re-asked how 
many bonds they would purchase and who the recipients would 
be under the guaranteed program. 
The final series of questions in this section allow the 
respondent to transfer other things besides money to the 
future. The rational for this form of the game is based the 
rather common notion outside of pragmatic economics, that 
aid or support should be given in the form of in kind 
transfers. Despite the economic shortcomings of such 
practice, this is the basis for the food stamp program in 
this country as well as numerous oth;r social programs that 
make transfers in the form of education, utility services, 
or food. Based on the prevalence of such practice in the 
US, it may be hypothesized that people would prefer to make 
use of in-kind transfers to make their payments to the far 
future provision of public goods. This opportunity is 
afforded the respondent in questions 29 through 32. These 
questions follow the basic format of the earlier questions, 
only now the transfers are in-kind. 
29. A. Suppose that instead of money payments, the interest 
was paid out (after 500) years in the form of 
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anything that you choose, (i.e. clean air, education, 
hot dogs, religion, etc.) would you be willing to 
participate? 
____ yes no 
B. Would you prefer this type of payment mechanism over 
one that utilized money payments? 
____ yes no 
30. If you would be willing to participate in a program 
which gave the future interest payments in the form of 
any good that you choose. What form, besides dollars, 
would you chooses to utilize to make the interest 
payments? (Specify) 
31. If you would be willing to participate in a program 
which gave the future interest payments in the form of 
any good that you choose, how many bonds would you 
purchase? 
dollars worth 
32. Who or what would you want to receive the interest 
payments (in the form of your chosen good)? 
The respondents level of religious conviction is ascertained 
in the following question regarding the intensity of his/her 
religious predilections: 






other, (specify) __________ __ 
B. If you are religious, what religion are you? 
34. What statement best describes your feelings about the 
future: 
the end of the world is near, so we do not have to 
worry about taking care of future generations. 





it is our destiny to utilize the planet as we need 
-- to; we should not worry about the future as the 
future will take care o£ itself. 
it is our duty to take care of the earth for 
future generations. 
Economic theory indicates that income may be an 
explanatory variable o£ far future valuation, as well as 
other socio-economic factors. Therefore the s~vey 
instrument includes questions regarding political leanings, 
past, present and expected economic status, age, education, 
and education of the respondent's parents or guardians. 
Political orientation is gathered via the following 
question: 





---- very conservative 
-- c~~e~ 1 s-ec;~Y' 
-- '-"'"' ... \ 1:' ........... ~----------
Educational achievement is recorded in the following 
question: 
36. What is the highest level of education that you have 
obtained? 
less than grade-school 
---- grade school 
---- high school 
--- more than one year of college 
---Bachelor's degree ==:: advanced degree 
In addition, a question is included to document any special 
experiences that influence the method by which the 
respondent views impacts to future generations: 
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37. A. Did any of your childhood or religious experiences 
give you a way to look at events occurring to future 
generations? 
____ yes no 
B. If yes, please explain (use back of sheet if 
necessary) : 
Income is addressed in the next three questions. Since, 
economic theory suggests that permanent income is an 
important determinant of consumption behavior, these 
inquires are in regards to past, present, and future income. 
38. How would you describe the economic status of your 
upbringing? 
____ very poor 
____ poor 
lower middle income 
middle income =::: upper middle income 
wealthy 
---- very wealthy 
39. What do you consider your present economic status to 
be? 
____ very poor 
poor 
---- lower middle income 
middle income 
---- upper middle income 
---- wealthy 
---- very wealthy 
40. What do you expect your future economic status will be? 
____ very poor 
'DOOr 
---- iower middle income 
middle in.come 
---- upper middle income 
---- weal thy · =::: very wealthy 
In order to determine some of the characteristics of the 
respondent's upbringing, he/she is asked to provide the 
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education level achieved by one or more parents or 
guardians. 
41. What was the highest education level obtained by one or 
more of your parents (guardians)? 
less than grade school 
---- grade school 
---- high school 
---- more than one year of college 
----Bachelor's degree :::= advanced degree 
As was discussed in Chapter IV, a persons concern or level 
of valuation for the future may be shaped by whether or not 
the individual has or plans to have children. The existence 
of such motivation is obtained in the following two 
questions: 
42. How many children do you have? __ __ 
43. If you do not have children now do you plan to have 
children? 
____ yes no 
The respondent's age is determined in question 44. 
44. What is your age? ____ years 
The last question provides the respondent with the 
opportunity to comment on the survey. 
45. If you have any comments about this survey, please feel 
free to indicate them in the space below and on the 
back of the sheet if necessary. Thank you for your 
help in this project. 
Sampling Technique 
Two separate samples were used to obtain survey data. 
The first group surveyed were undergraduate economic 
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principles students at the University of Wyoming. Data was 
collected from 147 economic students in April of 1986. Due 
to the obvious drawbacks of basing results on such an 
extreme sample, data was also collected from a non-student 
.group in Chicago Illinois. The later group consisted of 60 
office workers. This survey was conducted in October of 
1985. Differences in the results between the two groups are 
discussed in Chapter VII. 




Results of the Survey Analysis 
In this chapter the results derived from this analysis 
and the contingent valuation survey are presented. 
Estimates of near and far future discount rates are derived 
in order to address the hypotheses developed in Chapter IV. 
In addition, the chapter contains a critique of the 
experiment and some suggestions and guidelines for future 
work. 
Summary of Raw Survey Results 
Completed surveys were returned from a total of 207 
respondents. Of this number 60 surveys were completed by 
~~e Chicago s~uple and 147 were from the Wyoming s~uple. In 
Table IIIa, results are reported for each question. Results 
for the 500-year sample are reported for the contingent bond 
market section. Table IIIb contains the corresponding 
results for the 200-year market. For those questions with 
response distributions that are continuous, only the mean 
and number of responses are reported. 
Individual Sample Characteristics 
Obviously, considerable differences exit between the 
two samples utilized in this analysis. The larger sample of 




Swmnary of Results of Valuation Survey 
1. Do you think today's society will leave the future generally better 
or worse of£ than we are today? 
106 generally better of£ 
60 generally worse off 
36 don • t know 
2. In what ways will future society be better off? (Check all that 
apply.) 
193 more knowledge 39 improved spiritual out1ook 
40 more resources 50 improved values 
26 less Chance of war 155 better health 
25 ~ther 1 (specify) 18 ways 
1 other 2 (specify) 1 way 
119 more goods and services 
3. In what ways will future society be worse off? (Check all that 
apply.) 
132 fewer resources 86 deterioration of values 
102 greater chance of war 124 overcrowded 
63 deterioration of spiritual 26 fewer goods ~ 5~~c~s 
outlook 41 famine 
23 poorer health 137 spoiled environment 
11 other 1 (specify) 10 ways 
3 o'ther 2 (specify) 3 ways 
4. How long do you believe society will continue to be at least as 
well o££ as today? 
44 10 years 4 10,000 years 
61 25 years 2 1,000,000 years 
47 100 years 14 forever 
10 1,000 years 19 other (specify) ears 
5. Row long do you believe mankind will continue to inhabit the earth? 
2 10 years 38 10,000 years 
4 25 years 18 1,000,000 years 
13 100 years 44 forever 
37 500 years 3 other (specify) ears 
31 1,000 years 
6. :In what manner do you believe mankinds' s existence on the earth 
will cease or be sharply reduced? (Check all that apply.) 
75 return of the Lord 75 environmental pollution 
116 nuclear holicaust 70 lack of resources 
48 famine 17 none, mankind nll exist forever 
43 disease 
22 other (specify) 15 manners 
~···- ., 




7. Is the world a better place for mankind than it was 
100 years ago? 168 yes 36 no 
50 years ago? 165 yes 36 no 
10 years ago? 132 yes 68 no 
8. Is mankind better off now than 
100 years ago? 172 yes 
50 years ago? 165 yes 




9. Assuming no inflation, which of the following alterDatives would 
you pre£er to receive in~ set? 
Set 1: 30 $100 today or 167 $5,000 10 years from now 
Set 2: 43 $100 today or 149 $2,000 10 years from now 
Set 3: 72 $100 today or 118 $1,000 10 years from now 
Set 4: 126 $100 today or 64 $ 500 10 years from now 
Set 5: 162 $100 today or 30 $ 250 10 years from now 
Set 6: 179 $100 today or 12 $ 150 10 years from now 
10. Complete this statement: Assuming no inflation, I would be just as 
ha~py receiving $50 today as I would be if I received $ five 
years from now. $354.47 (mean, of 195 responses) 
11. The price of oU has fallen significantly in recent months. As a 
result, gasoline prices are lower and people are using more 
petroleum. Over the long te:z:m, low petroleum prices will 
stimulate demand and significantly decrease the amount of petroleum 
available for future generations. Would you be in favor of 
increasing the price of petroleum, perhaps through a tax, so as to 
preserve supplies for future generations? 
106 yes 100 no 
12. A. Do you think tbat today' s society should explicitly consider the 
impacts of its actions on future society when detemining our 
present course of action? 
185 yes 20 no 
B. If your answer to the last question was yes, why should we worry 
about future generations? (Check all that apply.) 
137 It is our ethical and/ or moral duty. 
63 It is our religious duty. 
135 It is our duty to our descendants 
38 Other 1 (specify) 27 reasons 
0 Other 2 (specify) _______________ _ 




C. If your answer to question 12A was yes, bow should impacts on 
future generations be considered in our present decisions? 
Suppose for example, that we are considering a course of action 
that will cause future society to spend an extra $1,000 in 
today' s dollars. How should this impact be considered in our 
present decision? (Choose the~ which applies.) 
80 It should be considered at the same magnitude as if this 
impact was happening to ourselves today. 
56 It should be considered at a magnitude which is smaller than 
the magnitude which would apply today but at the same 
magnitude as it this impact was happening to ourselves in the 
future. 
13 It should be considered at a magnitude which is smaller than 
the magnitude we would apply if this impact were to occur to 
ourselves in the future. 
32 It should be considered at a larger magnitude than if this 
impact was happening to ourselves today. 
13. Rank the six most important things to you in the followi.ng list. (1 
being highest, 6 being the lowest.) 
l 1 2. !. ~ i 
20 18 26 13 19 6 
7 23 11 29 15 20 
55 21 19 14 8 6 
22 39 23 21 18 15 
14 1 20 17 18 4 
0 16 18 20 12 34 
18 5 9 5 13 5 
7 14 8 5 6 10 
2 3 3 7 12 9 
1 3 4 9 7 10 
3 8 14 8 15 22 
0 1 2 8 3 3 
0 15 8 7 10 1 
3 7 5 9 7 13 
39 12 19 16 18 11 
0 0 0 1 6 7 
0 0 2 1 2 8 
the availability of a clean environment for present 
society 
the availability of a clean environment for future 
generations 
peace for contemporary society 
peace for future society 
education for contemporary society 
education for future society 
a high level of contemporary religious values 
a high level of religious -values for future society 
contemporary goods and services 
goods and services for future society 
the welfare of future society 
the availability of goods and services for your 
grandchildren 
the welfare of your grandchildren 
the availabili.ty of goods and services for your 
children 
the welfare of your children 
the availability of goods and services for your 
distant descendants 
the welfare of your distant descendants 




The following is a series of questions in which you are asked to choose 
between two alternatives. There are seven questions in all.
14. Would you consider yourself to be better off under state A or state
B?
A. 117 the chance of nuclear war is reduced 10X.
B. 89 you received a new car.
15. Would you be better off in state C or state D?
C. 131 fewer natural resources are used today so that more
resources are preserved for future society.
D. 75 people become more religious.
16. Now consider your answers for the above two questions; would you be 
better off under:
E. 96 your answer to question 14 (A or B).
F. 110 your answer to question 15 (C or D).
17. Would you be better off in state G or H?
G. 99 more goods and services were available for society’s
consumption today.
H. 106 more goods and services were available for future society.
18. Would you be better off in state I or state J?
I. 107 more emphasis was placed on pollution control today.
J. 99 the moral fiber of contemporary society was improved.
19. Now consider your answers to the last two questions, would you be 
better off under:
K. 47 your answer to question 17 (G or H).
L. 158 your answer to question 18 (I or J).
20. Finally consider your answers to question number 16 and question 
number 19. Would you be better off under:
K. 98 your answer to question 16 (state A B C  or 0).
N. 101 your answer to question 19 (GHI orJ).
21. Bank in order the four most important things to you. That is, what 
four things make you feel most well off or satisfied with life?
First: 195 respondents 41 answers
Second: 193 respondents 43 answers
Third: 188 respondents 55 answers
Fourth: 172 respondents 57 answers
(Questions 22  31 contain responses for the 500 year game only.
Answers to the 200 year game are presented in Table IHb.)
22. Suppose that it was possible to purchase a $1 bond which pays $1 
per year forever, the first payment of which is distributed in 500 
years to the recipients or causes of your choice.
mp . . . . .





Yould you be interested in purchasing any of these bonds? 
60 yes 46 no 
23. I£ your answer to question number 22 was yes, how many bonds would 
you purchase? (You may choose any dollar amount) 
$188.88 (mean of 57 repouses) 
154 
24. If your answer to question number 22 was yes, who or what would you 
want to rece:l.ve the interest payments? (Specify) 
57 respondents chose 14 different recipients 
25. If your answer to question number 22 was no, that is you do not 
want to purchase any of the bonds, is it because 
6 you have no desire to transfer money to the future. 
11 money will not solve the future's problem. 
29 you do not believe that such a program could work. 
11 other(speeify) 10 reasons. 
26. If you checked the third box above (i.e., you do not think that the 
program could work) would you be likely to participate in the 
program if it was government guarenteed? 
9 yes 27 no 
27. If you checked yes to the above question, how many bonds would you 
be w1.l.ling to purchase? (You may choose any dollar amount.) 
$ 44.63 (~rean. of 8 responses) 
28. If you checked yes to qUestion 26, who or what would you want to 
rece:l.ve the interest payments? (Specify) 
4 :respondeuts chose 1 :recipient 
29. A. Suppose that instead of money payments, the interest was paid out 
(after 200 years) in the form of anything you choose, (i.e., 
clean. air, education, hot dogs, religion, etc.) would you be 
w1lling to participate? 
76 yes 27 no 
B. Would you prefer this type of payment mechanism over one that 
utilized money payments? 
64 yes 35 no 
30. If you would be w1ll.ing to participate in a program which gave the 
future interest payments in the form of any good that you choose. 
What form, besides dollars, would you choose to utilize to make the 
interest payments? (Specify) 
78 respondents chose 26 methods 
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31. If you would be w1lllng to partici.pate in a program which gave the 
future interest payments in the form of any good that you choose, 
how many bonds would you purchase? 
$257.10 (mean of 69 responses) 
32. lnlo or what woulc! you want to receive the interes't payments (in the 
form of your chosen good)? 
72 respondents chose 17 causes 
33. A. Are you 
14 very religious 
94 religious 




B. If you are religious, what religion are you? 
164 respondents chose 21 different religions 
34. iWhat statement best describes your feelings about the future: 
3 the end of the world is near, so we do not have to vorry 
about taking care of the world for future generations. 
23 it is our destiny to utilize the planet as we need to; we 
should not worry about the future as the future w1l1 take care 
of itself. 
176 it is our duty to take care of the earth for future 
generations. 
35. Politically, do you consider yourself to be 




8 ve~ conservative 
8 other (specify) -------
36. iWhat is the highest level of education that you have obtained? 
0 less than grade school 
2 grade school 
43 high school 
113 more than one year of college 
28 Bachelor's degree 
17 advanced degree 
155 
37. A. Did any of your childhood or religious experiences give you a way 
to look at events occurring to future generations? 
81 yes 119 no 
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B. If yes, please expl.aill (use back of sheet if necessary): 
55 respondent:s gave 26 different experiences 
38. How would you descri.be the economic stat:us of your upbringing? 
1 very poor 
11 poor 
53 lower middle bcome 
68 middle income 
61 upper middle :income 
8 wealthy 
2 very wealthy 
39. What do you consider your present: economic sta1:US to be? 
11 very poor 
23 poor 
30 l~er middle income 
72 middle income 
61 upper middle income 
6 wealthy 
1 very wealthy 
40. What do you expect your future economic status will be? 
2 very poor 
2 poor 
4 lower middle income 
50 middle income 
102 upper middle income 
32 wealthy 
10 very wealthy 
41. What was the highest education level obtained by one or more of 
your parents (guardians)? 
S less than grade sChool 
63 grade sChool 
33 high school 
(·· 56 more than one year of college 
, : 43 Bachelor's degree 
4 advanced degree 
42. How many children do you have? .75 (mean of 202 responses) 
43. If you do not have chi.ldren now do you plan to have children? 
117 yes 25 . no 
44. What is your age? 28.1 years (mean) 
45. If you have any comments about this survey, please feel free to 
indicate them in the space below and on the back of the sheet if 
necessary. Thank you again for your help in this project. 
42 respondents had 17 different comments 
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Table IIIb 
Specific Answers to the 200 Year Game 
22. Suppose that it was possible to purchase a $1 bond which pays $1 
per year forever, the first payment of which is distributed in 200 
years to the recipients or causes of your choice. -
Would you be interested in purChasing any of these bonds? 
57 yes 44 no 
23. If your answer to question number 22 was yes, how many bonds would 
you purchase? (You may choose any dollar amount) 
$189.33 (mean of 49 responses) 
24. If your answer to question number 22 was yes, who or what would you 
want to receive the interest payments? (Specify) 
49 respondents chose 13 recipients 
25. If your answer to question number 22 was no, that is you do not 
want to purchase any of the bonds, is it because 
6 you have no desire to transfer money to the future. 
17 money will not solve the future's problem. 
22 you do not believe that such a program could work. 
13 other(specify) 10 reasons. 
26. If you checked the third box above (i.e., you do not think that the 
program could work) would you be likely to participate in the 
program if it was government guarenteed? 
7 yes 19 no 
27. If you .. &"clted yes to the above question, how many bonds would you 
be will.1Ilg; to: purchase? (You may choose any dollar amount.) 
$~ 4t .14· (mean of 7 responses) 
28. If you checked yes to question 26, who or what would you want to 
receive the interest payments? (Specify) 
5 people chose 2 recipients 
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29. A. Suppose that instead of money payments, the interest was paid out 
(after 200 years) in the form of anything you choose, (i.e., 
clean air, education, hot dogs, :religion, etc.) would you be 
willing to participate? 
69 yes 27 no 
B. Would you prefer this type of payment mechanism over one that 
utilized money paymen~s? 
55 yes 38 no 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
a;::;·:·· ..,. . 
158 
30. If you would be ~g to participate in a program which gave the 
future interest payments in the form of any good that you c:hoose. 
What form, besides dollars, would you choose to utilize to make the 
interest payments? (Spec:1£y) 
72 chose 22 methods of payment 
31. If you would be w1lllng to participate in a program which gave the 
future interest payments in the form of any good that you choose, 
how many bonds would you purchase? 
$266.34 (mean. of 61 responses) 
32. llho or what would you want to rec:eive the interest payments (in the 
form of your chosen good)? 
71 people chose 14 different rec:ipients 
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147 economics principles students at the University of 
Wyoming contains predictable differences from the Chicago 
sample of 60 office workers. Significant differences exist 
in age, income, number of Children, and education. The mean 
age of the Wyoming sample was 21.6 while the average age of 
the Chicago group was 43.7 years. An overwhelming majority 
of the Chicago sample (96.7%) described their present income 
status as middle income or higher, this was substantially 
greater than the perception of college students among whom 
43% described their present financial status as lower middle 
income or poorer. The student group had a predictable 
average number of children of only .2, far surpassed by the 
office workers average 2.1 children. Education levels 
differed substantially; 68.3 percent of the white collar 
workers had at least a Bachelor's degree while 97.2% of the 
economics principles students had the predictable one year 
or less of college. . .. , . 
·However, for~~any of the characteristics considered 
significant for purposes of this dissertation, remarkable 
similarities exist. The students were only slightly more 
pessimistic regarding the condition in which present society 
will leave the future. More than half (59.3%) of the 
Chicago group felt that the future would be left better off. 
This percentage was slightly smaller for the Wyoming sample 
where less than one half (49.7%) felt that the future would 
be left better off. Nearly identical percentages, 18.2 and 




16.9 in the Wyoming and Chicago groups respectively, replied 
that the future status was uncertain. 
Similarities between the two groups were prevalent 
across all of the questions which asked how the future would 
be better or worse off. Virtual agreement existed on the 
state of the world and the state of mankind for the past 
100, 50 and 10 years. In each and every case, the 
difference between the student and office worker sample 
varied by less than six percent. In fact, in three of these 
scenarios, the difference was less than 2%. Further 
evidence of future valuation among both sample groups is 
presented later in this chapter. 
Even expected future income levels were not that 
different. Chicago respondents predicted that their future 
financial status would be middle income or better in 93.1% 
of the cases while the corresponding fiy~e for the student 
sample is 97.1%. 
Utility Discount.Rates 
One of the estimates of an individual's utility 
discount rate developed in this analysis was derived by 
presenting respondents with a series of six alternative 
choices between contemporary and future sums of money. In 
each of these question the respondent was asked whether they 
preferred to have $100 now or an alternative amount in 10 
years. The latter amount was 5000, 2000, 1000, 500, 250 and 
!!!:::·. -~ 
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150 dollars in each question, respectively. By observing 
which amounts the respondent would and would not prefer, a 
discount rate was derived. For purposes of identification, 
this rate shall be called ratel. It should be noted that 
ratel is only a neighborhood estimate of the intrapersonal 
discount rate because of the discontinuity of the choices 
presented to the respondent. This rate is able to take on 
values of 47.9, 41.4, 30.4, 21.9 13.6, 6.9 and 4.1 percent, 
respectively, depending on which of above amounts that the 
respondent chooses in place of $100 today. 
In actuality, while 47.9 and 4.1 percent indicate the 
exact discount rate implied by comparison of 100 today 
versus $5000 and $150 in 10 years, respectively, the other 
rates represent the midpoints between the ranges. The 
midpoint is utilized because it is impossible to determine 
the exact rate from the discontinuous choices offered in the 
survey. For example, if a respondent replies that they 
prefer $5000 in 10 .years to $100 today and that they also 
prefer $100 today to $2000 in 10 years, then all that can be 
determined from this information is that his/her implicit 
discount rate is between the rates implied by these figures. 
That is, the actual rate must be between 47.9% and 34.9%. 
Thus for purpose of analysis the relevant rate is considered 
to be the midpoint of these two rates, i.e. 41.4%. For the 
same reason the rate for the endpoints of the survey choices 
must also be lower and upper bounds respectively. If a 
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respondent chooses a contemporary payment of $100 in all 
cases one can only say that his intrinsic discount rate is 
no less that 47.9%.; a consistent choice of the larger 
dollar figure ten years hence indicated time preference of 
less than 4.1%. 
Values for rate1 are presented in Table IV. In the 
first column, the ranges implied by the various choices are 
presented. While the question specifically asks respondents 
which choice is preferred between two monetary sums, one can 
not rule out the possibility of indifference and thus all 
ranges include the endpoints. In the second column various 
values for rate1, the pseudo mean, are presented. The 
third, fourth, and fifth columns contain the number of 
observations for each choice of rate1 in the total, Wyoming 
and Chicago groups, respectively. In general the 
distributions are bell shaped with slightly lower rates in 
the Chicago sample. Note that of the 180 respondents from 
whom information:·was determined, the mode was 21.9% while 
the median and mean were 22.2 and 25.7 percent, 
respectively. Rate1 for the Wyoming sample had a median of 
22.6 and a mean of 25.8. The Chicago sample ran somewhat 
predictably more conservative with a median of only 16.9% 
and a mean of 21.9. The mode for the Chicago sample was 
13.6% while the Wyoming mode was 21.9%. The mode for the 
total sample was also 21.9%. 




Determination of Ratel 
Number of Observations 
Total 
Range Rate1 Sample Wyoming Chicago 
(Percent) (Percent) 
r~ 47.9 r ~ 47.9 23 15 8 
47.9 ~ r~ 34.9 41.4 17 16 1 
34.9 ~ r ~ 25.9 30.4 28 22 6 
25.9 2 r ~ 17.5 21.9 54 43 11 
17.5 2 r 2 9.6 13.6 33 17 16 
9.6 ~ r ~ 4.1 6.9 16 6 10 
4.1 > r 4.1 ~r 9 9 0 
Total 180 128 52 
~---:· ~~!!!!!;> - ·• . ' . 
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A test between the means of the two samples was unable 
to reject the null hypothesis that the means are equal at 
the 5% level of significance. However, it should be noted 
that since ~~e distribution is not continuous, utilization 
of a test procedure via parameters derived for the normal 
distribution is not fully appropriate. 
A second estimate of the respondent's discount rate was 
derived to provide a means to gain insight into the 
consistency of individual discount estimation capabilities. 
This rate is termed rate2. Rate2 was obtained by asking 
people to directly propose the value that they would accept 
in five years to be indifferent to $50 today. Because of 
the continuous nature of this distribution, rate2 has wider 
variability than ratel and ranges from a low of 0% to a high 
of 188.5%. 79 This is also the range for the Wyoming sample. 
The Chicago group was predictably more conservative with an 
upper bound on the range of 120.3%. The median and mean 
values for rate2 ·Here 15.0 and 33.6 percent respectively. 
The corresponding median and mean values for the Wyoming 
were 17.8 and 37.3 percent and for Chicago were 14.9 and 
24.6 percent. A test of means revealed a marginal 
79one individual actually had a discount rate of 
negative 27.5%! This respondent, a resident of the Windy 
City, offered to exchange a guaranteed $10 in five years for 
$50 today. 
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difference between the two samples at the 1% level of 
significance. 
Interpersonal consistency between rate1 and rate2 was 
evaluated through the creation of an index. 80 This index 
was calculated as the ratio of rate2 to rate1. Sample 
values for this index ranged from 0 to 3.69 with the mode 
equal to 0 and the median and mean equal to 1. 09 and 1. 61 
respectively. Consistency was also evaluated via a simple 
test of means of the two distributions for rate1 and rate2. 
As expected, the two distributions differ significantly with 
with a mean difference of 11.7%. 81 The source of this 
difference is indeterminable from the survey structure. It 
may be due to the inherent discontinuity of rate1, or the 
existence of a non logrithmically-linear structure of 
discount mappings, or both. 
80It must be noted that idea of checking for 
consistently between the two logarithmically derived rates 
must be questioned. If one is not convinced that the level 
of general interest rates should not provide a boundary for 
intrapersonal discount "rates", then it is difficult to 
presume why the functional form of logarithmically linear 
rates should prevail as well. 
81rn fact the higher mean is for the shorter time 
horizon, contrary to the prevalent monotonically increasing 
yield curves for financial instruments. 
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In general, the rates derived from the survey do appear 
to be more than roughly consistent. Furthermore they appear 
to be consistent with results derived in other studies. 82 
Many economists would argue that the observed discount 
rates are too high, especially when one considers the fact 
the sample questions were designed to exclude an inflation 
premium. This argument holds that the individual utility 
discount rate should be nearer to market rates. Theory 
suggests that with a perfectly functioning capital market, 
individuals will enjoy unhampered access to the capital 
market at a single interest rate for borrowing and lending. 
This access provides a means for the individual to arbitrage 
differences between utility discount weights and market 
interest rates. With diminishing marginal utility, 
individuals participate in the intertemporal market until 
market and intrinsic time preference are equalized. 
However, this representation is far from reality. 
Capital markets, especially at the individual level are far 
from perfect. Transactions costs drive a substantial wedge 
between lending returns and borrowing costs. Many 
individuals with a poor or non-existent credit history have 
only one-way access to this market -- they can lend but not 
borrow. Other high-risk individuals are able to borrow only 
82see Hausman (1979). 





if they pay rates substantially above the rates paid by 
low-risk individuals and corporations.· 
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For these reasons, it should come as no surprise that 
the average discount rate observed in the samples utilized 
in this analysis substantially exceed market interest rates. 
Furthermore, based upon the lower incomes and absence of a 
credit history for most college students, the average rate 
in the Wyoming sample should exceed the mean rate prevailing 
for the Chicago group. 
Evidence of Support for Hypothesis 
Recall that the first hypothesis described in Chapter 
IV was that the provision of far future public goods is 
important to individuals. That is, the provision of public 
goods to future generations is a component of peoples' 
utility f~~ctions. 
Analysis of the survey data strongly indicates support 
for this hypothesis. Of the 206 respondents who replied to 
this question, 51.5% (106) felt that the price of oil should 
be artificially raised in order to preserve supplies for 
future generations. 83 The individual groups were somewhat 
divided on t~~s notion; only 41.7% (25) percent of the 
Chicago sample was in favor of the tax while 55.5% (81) of 
83one observation was missing from the Wyoming sample. 
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the students supported it. Still, this difference does not 
seem that great when one considers the disparity in the 
character of the two samples. In either event however, very 
strong support is indicated for the first hypothesis. 
The qu~stion of whether or not present society should 
explicitly consider the impacts of its actions on future 
generations was affirmatively answered by 90.2% (185) of the 
respondents. The apparent gap in group attitudes towards 
future valuation from the oil tax question gap disappeared 
as 91.0% (132) of the Wyoming group and 88.3% (53) of the 
Chicago sample agreed that impacts should be considered. 84 
Other evidence of future valuation can be gleaned from 
the rating questions as well. In the question where the 
respondent was asked to rank the six most important things 
from a list of seventeen choices of present and future 
goods, future public goods were very popular. The most 
popular future public good was peace which was selected by 
66.7% (136) respondents. The second and third most popular 
future public goods were a clean environment with 51% (105) 
and education with 47.5% (100) of the respondents selecting 
them. Future general welfare was the fourth most popular 
public good followed by future religion. These goods 
84Two observations were missing; both from the Wyoming 
sample. 




received 33.8% (70) and 24.2% (50) placements in the top six 
rankings, respectively. 
In the second set of rating questions, respondents were 
asked to make pair-wise comparisons of eight choices. In 
this group, the second most popular selection was t..lte 
·reduction in present consumption of natural resources so 
that supplies are preserved for future generations. 
Finally, evidence of far future valuation is yielded by 
the fact that a substantial number of respondents offered to 
make transfers to the far future in the contingent markets 
of the survey. The original game generated a positive bid 
from 52.2% (109) of the respondents while the government 
sponsored game and the in-kind game achieved positive 
participation from 7.2% (15) and 68.6% (142) of the 
respondents, respectively. 
From these an~ders it would appear that the 
availability of future public goods is a component of the 
utility function of most individuals. Thus support is 
rendered for the first hypothesis of this dissertation. 
The third major hypothesis developed in Chapter IV was 
that individuals have a different time preference for far 
future public goods than they do for consumption levels of 
goods in the near future. Evidence in support of this 
hypothesis was received from the 185 respondents who felt 
that future impacts of contemporary decisions should be 
explicitly considered. These respondents were then asked 
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how future impacts should be considered in present 
decisions. 
An astonishing 17.7% (32) advocated behavior consistent 
with a negative discount rate for far future impacts. These 
respondents stated that future impact should be considered 
at a larger magnitude than if this impact was happening to 
ourselves today. In the most common response, 44.2% (80) of 
the sample believed that any future impact "should be 
considered at the ~ magnitude as if this impact was 
happening to ourselves today." Thus these persons believe 
that a zero discount should apply to such impacts. That is, 
a future impact is valued as if the "time windo\-111 yielded 
perfect (undistorted) images. 
The second most common response, that the impact 
"should be considered at a magnitude which is smaller than 
the magnitude which would apply today but at the same 
magnitude as if this impact were happening to ourselves in 
the future" garnered 30.9% (56) of the responses. Such a 
response is consistent with a discount rate for far future 
public goods which is greater than zero but less than the 
rate applicable to the near future. In this case future 
impacts are discounted, but the time window provides better 
views of far future events than it does to near future 
events. 
Only 7.2% (13) of the sample believed that the impact 
"should be considered at a magnitude which is smaller than 
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the magnitude we would apply if this impact w~re to occur to 
ourselves in the future." This latter answer does not rule 
out the possibility that far future vision is less distorted 
than the views provided of the near future. However, it 
also would support behavior consistent with an equal 
capability for far future and near future vision as well as 
far future capabilities inferior to near future vision. 
These outcomes are summarized in Table v. Table V also 
includes a breakdown by sample. Consistent with the 
designation afforded the two discount rates in the earlier 
chapters, the rate over near future events is labeled r 
while the corresponding rate for far future occurrences is 
o. 
A second and perhaps more critical example of support 
for the third hypothesis lies in the fact that no 
signific~1t differences exist between the outcomes of the 
200-year ~ontingent game and the 500-year contingent game. 
This sample was characterized by a few outliers that skewed 
the comparison between the two games. 85 However if all bids 
above $1000 are removed from the sample, the mean bid of 
85For the original transfer question, these outliers 
both occurred in the 200 year game where two respondents bid 
in excess of $10,000 -- a full order of magnitude above the 
next closest bid. More outliers were observed in the 
in-kind scenario; the 200-year game was characterized by 5 
bids in excess of $10,000 while the 500-year game had 3 such 
bids. 









Summary of the Implication of Replies to 
"How should future impacts be considered?" 
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those who bid was $188.88 for the 500-year game and $189.33 
for the 200-year scenario. A two tailed test for 
differences in means revealed that the null hypothesis that 
the means are equal can not be rejected. 
Under the government sponsored program mean bid was 
$44.63 for the 500-year game and $42.14 for the 200-year 
game. A t-test for differences in the means of the two bids 
yielded acceptance of the null hypothesis that the two 
means are equal. It should be noted that the opportunity to 
participate in the government-sponsored program was only 
afforded to those individuals who declined to participate in 
the original program and who "do not believe that such a 
program could work." Recall that the purpose of asking this 
question was to attempt to alleviate the respondent's fear 
regarding the lack of a guarantor for the program. Since 
these individuals were already reluctant to participate in 
such a transfer mechanism it should be expected that the . ._ •. 
00 ~11111: .. ~.~ 
mean bid should'· be·· smaller than the mean bid of those who 
offered to participate without a government guarantee. 
In-kind payments were the most popular among the 
respondents. The mean in-kind bid under the 500-year game 
was $257.01 while the corresponding bid for the 200-year 
game was $266.34. A two-tailed test for differences in the 
sample means was unable to reject the null hypothesis that 
the sample means were equal. 
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The number of respondents choosing to participate was 
also consistent between the 500 and the 200-year games. Of 
the 106 persons who received the 500-year game, 53.8, 7.5 
and 65.1 percent bid a non-zero amount in the standard, 
government-sponsered and in-kind questions respectively.
The corresponding figures for the 101 persons who received 
the 200-year game was 48.5, 6.9 and 60.4 percent 
respectively.
A near identical distribution of reasons for not 
participating in the original game was given by the 
respondents in the 200 and the 500-year games. Exactly the 
same number of respondents, 12.2% (6),in each game stated 
that they had "no desire to transfer money to the future." 
Slightly more individuals in the 200 year game agreed with 
the statement that "money will not solve the future’s 
problem." This amount was 34.7% (17) as compared with 22.4% 
(11) in the 500 year game. Slightly more individuals
# . ‘ .• ,'Vbelieved that the pfo’gram can not work in the 500-year game, 
44.9% (22) versus 59.2% (29) in the 200-year game.
Since no significant difference exists between the bids 
for the 500-year and the 200-year game and given the fact 
that the number of respondents who choose to participate was 
nearly identical in each case, it would seem that the time 
frame is not a determining factor. Evidently, the fact that 
the perpetual interest payments do not begin for either 200 
or 500 years has little or no impact on respondents desire
mt̂ y  





to ensure a better future. Thus it can be concluded that 
the observed rate of discount occurring between the two 
observations, 200 years and 500 years, is zero. Since this 
rate is lower than the rate observed for near term 
interpersonal monetary tradeoffs, 6 < r as hypothesized in 
the third hypothesis developed in Chapter IV. 
Recall that the fourth hypothesis was that valuation of 
far future public goods could be determined by the maximum 
intensity of one of three factors. These factors were 
related to religious, ethical and descendant-related concern 
for the future. This hypothesis was examined-by first 
asking whether or not impacts arising to the future should 
be considered in society's present activities. Those 
respondents that answered affirmatively were then asked the 
subsequent question "Why should these impacts be 
considered?" Respondents were offered religious,ethical and 
descendant-related cho,tc~.s as well as the opportunity to ... "" :· .::: 
supply their own reasO'n.l~;:· The specified categories 
captured the bulk of the responses. The most popular 
response, ethical motivation, captured 66.2% (137) of the 
responses. This was followed closely by descendant-related 
motivation which garnished 65.2% (135) of the responses. 
Religious motivation was cited by 30.4% (63) of the 
respondents. Other reasons to value the far future were 
supplied by 20.4% (38) of the sample. Most of these reasons 
were given by people who also checked one or more of the 




ethical, religious and descendant-related reasons; only 5.9% 
(11) offered an alternative without also checking one or 
more of these reasons. In total, 27 alternative 
justifications for future valuation were supplied. In fact 
however, many of these other reasons could be interpreted to 
fall in the ethical, religious or descendant-related 
categories. 86 Table VI indicates the amount of overlap 
between the answers received to the question "why should we 
worry about future generations?" Note that this table 
provides a more sophisticated representation of the data 
than can be obtained from Table III. 
How many of these respondents offered to put their 
money where their mouth is? Table VII provides a 
cross-tabulation of the motivation for future concern by the 
level of bid in the in-kind game. This table contains the 
responses of 88.7% {126) of those who bid a positive ~~aunt 
. th . ki d 87 ~n e ~n- n game. Ethical, religious, and 
86For example, reasons such as "we have to be 
considerate," "society is better off to consider the long 
run," and "they deserve what we have" all of which were 
offered as alternatives by the respondents and would 
indicate strong moralistic and possibly religious or 
descendent-related concern. 
87Missing are 16 non-zero bids from individuals who did 
not answer the motivation question or who did not believe 
that future impacts should be considered. 
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Table VI 
Summary of Replies to 
"Why should we worry about the future?'
MOTIVATION
Ethical Religious Descendants Other
Column
Total 137 63 135 38
Row 
Total
26 Yes No No No
4 No Yes No No
27 No No Yes No
2 No Yes Yes No
41 Yes No Yes No
3 Yes Yes No No
0 No Yes Yes Yes
8 Yes No Yes Yes
2 Yes Yes No Yes
5 Yes No No Yes
0 No Yes No Yes
5 No No Yes Yes
11 No No Yes 45 Yesv:-";:- Yes Yes No
7 Yes " Yes Yes Yes
186*
*18 Not Applicable, 3 No Answer
Hp'.’
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Table VII 
Summary of Replies to 
"Why should ve worry about the future?" 
Cross tabulated by Bid level in the In kind Game.
Motivation______________   Bid Level







20 Tes No No No 4 11 53 Mo Yes No No 0 1 225 No No Yes No 5 15 52 No Yes Yes No 1 1 037 Yes No Yes No 5 20 122 Yes Yes No No 0 0 20 No Yes No No 0 0 08 Yes No Yes Yes 3 5 02 Yes Yes No Yes 0 2 04 Yes No No Yes 0 3 10 No Yes No Yes 0 0 03 No No Yes Yes 0 2 111 No No No Yes 2 5 442 Yes Yes Yes No 11 23 87 Yes Yes Yes Yes 0 / 0162* 31 95 40
*Includes only those who answered the motivation questions and who also played the in kind game.
KF-- . '  ;





descendent-related concern is correlated with 83.8% (119) of 
those bidding a positive amount. 
It is interesting to note that the most common 
recipient in each game was the respondent's descendants. 
The second most ~ommon response was society as a whole. 
Obviously, the fact that descendants are a popular recipient 
strongly indicated decendent-related motivation while 
transfers to all of society are more consistent with 
religious or moralistic concerns. 88 Thus 
Recall that the fourth hypothesis also predicted the 
magnitude of future-related concern. The outcomes provided 
a 27 cell matrix with individual cell values of high, 
median, and zero based on the degree of intensity of the 
underlying motivation. Unfortunately such a refined 
prediction of magnitude is not obtainable from the question 
which generated Tables VI and VII. In fact, because of 
difficulties in i~terpreting the degree of descendant 
related and e~~cal related concern, only a 0-1 rendition is 
possible based on the results of this s~;ey. Essentially, 
the problem in the descendant and ethical area is that no 
method was established to measure intensity. Similar 
88Presumably since many of the transferred goods are 
public, there is the possibility of intergenerational free 
rider activity; and thus an individual may make a transfer 
to "society as a.whole" out of motivation to help his/her 
descendants. 
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problems may characterize religious-related future concern, 
however .respondents were asked to state how religious they 
were. 
Respondents who either have children or plan to have 
children were found to exhibit no difference from those 
respondents who both do not have children and do not plan 
children as far as responses to the oil tax question are 
concerned. Of those voting for the oil tax 82.9% had or 
plan children the corresponding figure for the opponents to 
the tax was 82.5%. 
A slight correlation was found between a respondent's 
self described religiousness and the the degree of 
future-related concern. For those who describe themselves 
as slightly religious, 51.3% also supported the notion of 
raising contemporary oil prices. Of the subsample that 
described themselves as religious or very religious this 
figure was 54.2% Only 40% of the group of atheists or 
. \., .... 
agnostics were li~~ly to support increased oil prices to 
curb present consumption. Religious individuals were also 
more likely to make contingent transfers to the future. 
Critique and Suggestions for further work 
Many problems were encountered in this analysis due to 
the lengt_~ and complexity of the survey instrument. One 
must conclude that the ideal instrument should be shorter 
and perhaps not so ambitious. Better explanations of 
-· 
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reliability of the outcomes. 
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Better definition of terms would improve reliability. 
For example, one term, "future generations," which was 
extensively utilized in the survey to indicate the far 
future, may have different meanings to different people. 
Some individuals may associate this term with time periods 
in excess of 100 years distant while others may apply a more 
immediate interpretation. 
Reliance on two separate and possibly non 
representative groups should be questioned; in an ideal 
study the sample would be more random. This would provide 
more representative results. 
Further problems surround the bids obtained in this 
analyses. It is not possible, based on this single 
experiment to ascertain ~~eir relevance. Replicability of 
the results is unknown. Structurally the bids revealed for 
future values may be improved by introducing (or reminding 
respondents of) the notion of the budget constraint and 
requiring respondents to identify the contingent opportunity 
cost of their bids. 
Certainly the area of intrap~rsonal time preference 
should be explored furthe:=. An experiment to evaluate the 
consistency of intrapersonal discount rates should be better 
structured. An improvement would be to not presume the 
structure of discounting behavior as well as the level of 
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discount rates. Given the apparent disparity in the rates 
from market levels there appears to be reason to question 
the applicability of logarithmically linear structure as 
well. 
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Chapter VIII 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The results of this experiment have provided strong 
evidence that individuals value far future impacts. 
Individuals would seem to advocate contemporary behavioral 
changes in order to avoid negative impacts on future 
generations. This value would appear to be motivated by 
ethical, religious, and descendant-related concerns. 
The major conclusion of this experiment was in regards 
to the relative values of individual discount rates applied 
to the near future and the far future. Evidence from the 
experiment indicates that individuals exhibit a discount 
rate for far future public goods which is smaller than the 
discount rate by which they value intertQuporal conswuption 
over the relatively near future. 
Consequences of S < r 
The implications of an individual's near future 
discount rate (r) exceeding the discount rate applicable to 
far future impacts (S) are important. This implies that 
while people may be comfortable with reducing the effective 
magnitude of future impacts due to the passage of time, they 
are not willing to do so as much as if this impact was 
occurring over the passage of time in their own lifetime. 
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As is apparent from the analysis contained in this 
dissertation, a zero rate rate of discount would seem to be 
appropriate for assessing the impact of man's present 
actions upon the far future. This would indicate that 
individuals believe that future impacts should be considered 
as if these impacts were occurring in the present. In 
practice this means that the future is considered to be just 
as important as is the present. This type of behavior is 
consistent with a Utilitarian or a Paretian ethical 
construct. 
Given the fact that that many respondents exhibited 
behavior consistent with a negative discount rate for the 
far future, further interpretation is warranted. Such 
behavior implies that these individuals believe that the 
future is more important (or more highly valued) than the 
present. ~nis action may be consistent with a Rawlsian 
ethical framework if t~e respondent believes that the future 
will somehow be disadvantaged with respect to the present. 
An alternative explanation for such behavior lies in 
application of a Nietzschean framework if the future is 
expected to be better off than the present. The former 
explanation would appear to be most likely for two reasons: 
1) the existence of irreversibilities which cause the future 
to have a reduced endowment as a result of contemporary 
activity, and 2) the fact that projection of a Nietzschean 
framework would appear to be unlikely. This latter 
e:·::- -. -~ 




conclusion is based on the fact that Nietzchean frameworks 
are most likely utilized to justify transfers from those not 
holding the ethical structure to those who do. 
It is important to note that the results of this 
analysis do not hinge upon collective action. That is, any 
requirement for consideration of far future impacts by an 
individual does not require that others behave similarly. 
Recall that such collective action was the basis for the 
Marglin {1963a) model. 
These results are in opposition to the bulk of 
neoclassical theory of time valuation. Certainly they are 
inconsistent with both an opportunity cost or a time 
preference framework. 
Implications for Policy ~nalysis 
Several major policy implications are suggested by the 
results derived from the.contingent valuation experiment. . :·:; .. ··~··.· .: 
Perhaps first and foremo'~·t of these is the fact that 
individuals do care about far future impacts and thus the 
inclusion of these impacts in public policy decision 
criteria is mandated. Furthermore, since individuals do not 
appear to discount these impacts in the sa~e manner as they 
do for intertemporal allocations over the more immediate 
future, differential treatment of far future impacts in 
benefit-cost analysis is warranted. This implies that 
decision makers should explicitly account for impacts 




affecting far future public goods provision through the use 
of lower and possibly zero rates of discount for these 
impacts in cost-benefit analysis. Given the uncertainty 
surrounding present activity induced physical impacts on the 
far future as well as uncertainty regarding the subsequent 
valuation of these impacts, a conservative approach is 
appropriate. This conclusion would appear to especially 
hold in the case of irreversible impacts of contemporary 
activity. 
Finally, further research into future valuation is 
justified. Given the nature of the conclusions derived in 
this analysis and the extreme implications for benefit-cost 
analysis, it would appear that this research should research 
should be of high priority from a public policy standpoint. 
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Appendix I 
Survey of Future Valuation 
The purpose of this survey is to dete~e how you value the future and 
why you feel the way that you do. It represents part of a resear~ 
project on future valuation conducted by the University of Wyoming 
Department of Economics. Would you please take a few minutes of your 
time to fill out the surveyl' Thank You. 
1. Do you think today's society will leave the future generally better 
or worse off than we are today? 
__ generally better off 
__ generally worse off 
don't know 
2. In what ways will future society be better off? (Chec:k all that 
apply.) 
__ more knowledge improved spiritual outl.ook 
more resources -- improved values 
less chance of war -- better health 
::::: more goods and services 
other 1 (specify) -------------------------
other 2 (specify) __________________ _ 
3. In what ways will future society be worse off? ( Chec:k all that 
apply.) 
fewer resources deterioration of values 
-- g:eater c:hanc:e of war overcrowded 
-- deterioration of spiritual -- fewer goods and services 
-- outlook -- famine 
__ poorer health ::::: spoiled envirot1111ent 
other 1 (specify). ______________________ _ 
__ other .2 (specify) ___________________ _ 
4. How long .to.·· you believe society will continue to be at least as 
well off 'aa .. toda.y? 
10 years 10,000 years 
-- 2S years -- 1,000,000 years 
-- 100 years -- forever 
::::: 1,000 years =other (specify) ears 
5. How long do you believe mankind will continue to inhabit the earth? 
10 years 10,000 years 
-- 2S years -- 1,000,000 years 
--100 years --forever 
--SOC years -- other (specify) ears 
l,COC y~; --
6. In what manner i!o you believe ma.nkinds' s existence on the earth 
will cease or be sharply reduced? (Chec:k all that apply.) 
return of the Lord environmental pollution 
uuc:.lear hollcaust -- lack of resources 
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7. Is the world a better place for mankind rh*n it was 
100 years ago?  yes  no
50 years ago? _____ yes  no
10 years ago?  yes _____ no
8. Is mankind better off now than
100 years ago?  yes  no
50 years ago? ____ yes _____ no
10 years ago? ___ yes  no
9. Assuming no Inflation, which of the following alternatives would 
you prefer to receive in each set?
Set 1: ___  $100 today or $5 000 10 years from nowSet 2: _____ $100 today of ___ $2,000 10 years from nowSet 3: ___ $100 today or ___ $1,000 10 years from nowSet 4: _____ $100 today or ___ $ 500 10 years from nowSet 5: ___  $100 today or ___ $ 250 10 years from nowSet 6: ___  $100 today or ___ $ 150 10 years from now
10. Complete this statement; Assuming no inflation, I would be just as
happy receiving $50 today as I would be if I received $_______five
years from now.
11. The price of oil has fallen significantly in recent months. As a
result, gasoline prices are lower and people are using more 
petroleum. Over the long term, low petroleum prices will 
stimulate demand and significantly decrease the amount of petroleum 
available for future generations. Would you be in favor of 
increasing the price of petroleum, perhaps through a tax, so as to 
preserve supplies for future generations?
 yes •  no
12. A. Do you think that today's society should explicitly consider the
impacts, df its actions on future society when determining our 
present course of action?
’ :yes  no
B. If your answer to the last question was yes, why should we worry, 
about future generations? (Check all that apply.)
_____ It is our ethical and/or moral duty.
  It is our religious duty.
  It is our duty to our descendants
  Other 1 (specify)____________________________________
  Other 1 (specify)




c. If your answer eo question 12A was yes~ how should impacts on 
future generations be considered in our present decisions? 
Suppose for example~ ehae we are considering a course of action 
ehat will cause future society eo spend an extra $1 ~000 in 
today' s do1lars. How should this impac't be considered in our 
preser.'t decision? (Choose 'the ~ which applies.) 
I't should be considered ae 'the same magnitude as if this 
-- impac't was happening eo ourselves today. 
__ It should be considered at a magnitude which is smaller than 
the magnitude which would apply today but at the same 
magnitude as it this impact was happening to ourselves in the 
future. 
_ It should be considered at a magnitude which is smaller than 
the magnitude we would apply if this impact were to occur to 
ourselves in the future. 
__ It should be considered at a larger magnitude than if this 
impact was happening 'to ourselves 'today. 
13. Rank the six most important things to you in the following list. (1 
being highest, 6 being the lowest.) 
__ the availability of a clean environment for present society 
__ the availability of a clean environmen't for fu'ture generations 
__ peace for contemporary society 
__ peace for future soeiety 
__ education for contemporary society 
__ education for future society 
__ a high level of contemporary religious values 
__ a high level of religious values for future society 
__ contemporary goods and services 
__ goods and services for future society 
__ the welfare of future society 
__ the availability of goods and services for your grandchildren 
__ the welfare of your grandchildren 
__ the availability of goods and services for your children 
__ the welfare of your children 
the availability of goods and services for your di3tant 
-- descendants 
__ the welfare of your distant descendants 
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The following is a series of questions in which you are asked to 
choose between two alternatives. There are seven questions in ail.
14. Would you consider yourself to be better off under state A or state
B?
the chance of nuclear war is reduced 102.
3. you received a new car.
15. Would you be better off in state C or state D?
C. fewer natural resources are used today so that more
resources are preserved for future society.
D .___people become more religious.
16. Now consider your answers for the above two questions; would you be better off under:
E . your answer to question 14 (A or B).
F . your answer to question 15 (C or D).
17. Would you be better off in state G or H?
G. more goods and services were available for society's
consumption today.
H. more goods and services were available for future society.
18. Would you be better off in state 1 or state J?
I. more emphasis was placed on pollution control today.
J. the moral fiber of contemporary society was improved.
19. Now consider your answers to the last two questions, would you be 
better off under:
X. your answer to question 17 (G or H).
L. your answer to question 18 (I or J).
20. Finally consider your answers to question number 16 and question 
number 19. Would you be better off under:
M.__ your answer to question 16 (state A B C or D).
N.__ your answer to question 19 (G H I or J).
21. Rank in order the four most important things to you. That is, what 





22. Suppose that it was possible to purchase a $1 bond which pays $1 
per year forever, the first payment of which is distributed in 200 
years to the recipients or causes of your choice.
Would you be interested in purchasing any of these bonds? 
yes no




23. If your answer to question number 22 was yes, how many bonds would 
you purchase? (You may choose any dollar amount) 
dollars worth 
24. If your answer to question number 22 was yes, who or what would you 
want to receive the interest payments? (Specify) 
25. If your answer to question number 22 was no, that is you do not 
want to purchase any of the bonds, is it because 
_____you have no desire to transfer money to the future. 
money will not solve the future's problem. 
_____you do not believe that such a program could work. 
__ other( specify) _____________ _ 
26. If you checked the third box above (i.e., you do not think that the 
program could work) would you be likely to participate in the 
program if it was government guarenteed? 
_____yes __ no 
27. If you checked yes to the above question, how many bonds would you 
be willing to purchase? (You may choose any dollar amount.) 
·dollars worth 
28. If you checked yes to question 26, who or what would you want to 
receive the interest payments? (Specify) 
29. A. Suppose that instead of money payments, the interest was paid out 
(after 200 years) in the form of anything you choose, (i.e., 
clean air, education, hot dogs, religion, etc:.) would you be 




B. Would you prefer this type of payment mechanism over one that 
utilized money payments? 
_yes no 
If you would be willing to participate in a program which gave the 
future interest payments in the form of any good that you choose. 
iihat form, besides dollars, would you choose to utilize to make the 
int~rest payments? ' (Specify) 
If you would be willing to participate in a program which gave the 
future interest payments in the form of any good that you choose, 
how many bonds would you purchase? 
dollars worth 





32. ~o or what wouJ.d you want to receive the interest payments (in the 
form of your chosen good)? 
33. A. Are you 
very religious 
--religious 
-- slightly :religious 
--agnostic 
--atheist = other, (specify) -----
B. If you are religious, what religion are yo-.1? 
34. ~t statement best describes your feelings about the future: 
the end of the world is near, so we do not have to worry 
-- about t:aki.ng care of the ~orld for future generations. 
it: is our destiny to utilize the planet: as we need to; we 
-- should not: worry about the future as the future will take care 
of itself. 
it is our duty to take care of the earth for future 
-- generations. 





--- very conservative = other (specify) -------
36. What is the highest level of education that you have obtained? 
less than grade school 
-- g-cade school 
-- high school 
-- more than one year of college 
-- Bachelor's degree = advanced degree 
31. A. Did any of your childhood or :religious experiences give you a way 
to look at events occurring to future generations? 
__ yes no 
B. If yes, please explain (use back of sheet if necessary): 
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38. How would you describe the economic status of your upbringing? 
__ very poo<: 
poor 
-- lower middle income 
middle income 
-- upper middle inc=e 
--wealthy 
=very wealthy 
39. What do you consider your present economic statue to be! 
__ very poor 
poor 
-- lower middle income 
llliddle income 
- upper llliddle income 
--wealthy = very wealthy 
40. What do you expect your future economic status w111 be? 
__ very poor 
poor 
-- lower middle income 
middle income 
-- upper middle income 
--wealthy = very wealthy 
41. What was the highest education level obtained by one or more of 
your parents (guardians)? 
less than grade school 
-- grade school = high school • 
more than one year of college 
--Bachelor's degree = advanced degree 
42. How many children do you have? __ 
43. If you do not have children now do you plan to have children? 
___ yes no 
44. What is your age? __ years 
45. If you have any comments about this survey, please feel free to 
indicate them in the space below and on the back of the sheet if 
necessary. !hank you again for your help in this project. 
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Appendix II 
A General Equilibrium Model of Future Valuation 
In this appendix a theoretical, general equilibrium 
·model is developed. For this purpose assume the existence 
of a utility function in which the individual has a 
different discount rate for events over his/her lifetime and 
events after his/her lifetime. That is, assume: 
(1) U = U(Co,Po) + 
(1 + r) (1+6) 2 
where ct is consumption of a private good in period t, Pt 
consumption of a public good in period t, and r and s are 
discount rates. 
Note that the utility function has three time periods: 
0, 1, and 2. Periods zero and one represent time periods 
occurring dUring the individual's lifetime while period two 
occurs after the individual is dead. One can think of the 
three periods as being the present, the future, and the far 
future. Further note that no consumption of private goods 
occurs in period two. 
Assume. production functions for the private and public 
goods. OUtput in any time period is determined by a 
Cobb-Douglas production function given by: 




where Yt is output in period t, Lyt is land devoted to the 
production of output, ~ is capital, and A and B are 
technical parameters of. production. 
·Not all output must be consumed in any period and thus 
we can derive the savings function: 
(3) 
where st is savings in period t. The production function 
for the public good is given by: 
(4) 
where Lpt is land devoted to public good production and a is 
the technical parameter which tells how much of the public 
good can be produced with a given amount of land. 
There is, of course, only so much land available for 
the two uses. This relationship is given by: 
5) L = Lpt + Ly t 
where L is the fixed amount of land available. 
Land can be converted from one use to the other. That 
is, land currently used to produce output can be applied to 
the production of the public good and vice-versa. However, 
this process requires the application of capital. For these 
purposes assume: 
(6) 
where Kt is the total amount of capital available in any 
given period, Kyt is capital used to produce output, Kpt is 
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capital used to convert land into a suitable form to be used 
to produce the public good, and is capital used to 
produce land suitable for output production.
The conversion of land from one use takes place via the 
following equations:
(7) & pt = “ S*  ‘ SKDt' 51,1(5
(8) = ‘“ pt + SKDt
where Q and 6 are the technical parameters dictating the 
efficiency of land conversion.
From expressions (7) and (8) we can derive the 
following expressions:
(9) Lpt = Lpt_1 + S2K_pt - 6KDt, and
uo> = Lyt-i " fiKpt + 6KDf
In order to allow for investment in this model, savings 
must augment the amount of capital. This is accomplished 
via the following relationship.
< U )  S t   K t+1 K t
For simplicity no depreciation of capital is assumed in the 
model.
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To complete the model, assume the existence of two 
individuals, 1 and 2. Further assume that the utility 
function for the two individuals are identical and follow 
the general formulation of (1). A simple specific 
formulation of this relationship is given by:
1
(12) U1 = CqPo + 1 i ^
(1 + r )  (1+5) ‘
2 . „2„_ , 4  , *2(1 3 ) i r   CgPo + x +(l+r) (1+6)
where the superscripts denote individuals the formulations 
of (12) and (13) imply
(14) Ct = C* + c£, and
(15) St = s£ + sj
Lastly, we note that in this system wealth can be 
represented by the discounted value of private consumption. 
Therefore:
1 -1 1(16) W = C2 + ( 1+ Tt) ■‘■Cj.
With the basic form of the model complete, several 
avenues of simplification present themselves. To begin, 
equation (4) can be eliminated via substitution into 
equations (12) and (13). This yields
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(17) IT = CjTaL- +   1 andu (i+r) Tl+ep
22 2 Ct̂ P2(18) IT = C^aLpo + 1 gl +
(1+r) (1+8)2
Further elimination of equations can be obtained by 
combining the relationships expressed in equations (6),
(11), (2), (3), and (14). To accomplish this result, first 
substitute (6) into equation (11). This yields:
(19) St = ̂ t+l + ̂ t+l + ̂ t+l “ ^ t  " ^ t  ” ^ t  
Then substitution of (3) into (19) yields:
(20) Yt  Ct  + Kpt+1 + Kj,t+1   Kpt  X^ .
Finally, substitution for from equation (2) and from 
equation (14) yields: -"-ti,,
(21) ALB K  1_B  - C ^ - C ^ K  +  K +  K  - K  - K - K
Yt Yt * * Yt-1 Pt+1 Dt+1 Yt Pt Dt
Note that it is not necessary to include both equation 
(9) and equation (10) as the relationship expressed in (5) 
makes one of these expressions redundant. Therefore, let 
equation (10) be eliminated.
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Our problem, in a pareto optimal framework, has 
simplified to maximizing:
iC7ccL_, aL,(22) U1 = c;W:_ + 1 P1 + P2'o Po
(1+r) (1+6)2
subject to:
”2 2 C « J'pp
( 2 3 )  U  C c c l  +  1 +
° Po (1+r) (1+6)2
( 2 4 )  A L  B K  1 B  C 1 C 2 K  +  K  + K  KYt Yt t t Yt+1 Pt+1 Dt+1 Yt
 K   K  
Pt Dt
( 2 5 )  L   L p f c   L y t
( 2 6 )  L p t   L p t 1  +  Q K p t   6 3 ^ ,  and
( 2 7 )  W  C 1  +  ( 1+T C ) 1  C 1
Solving this system yields optimum values for the variables 
in terms of the paremeters and r and 6.
. . .
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